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Abstract
The first part of the thesis studies the voting behaviour of careerist experts in a secret
committee where voting profiles get ‘leaked’ to the public with a given probability. For
informative voting (where every expert votes according to his posterior probability) in
equilibrium, the committee must use the unanimity voting rule along with an interme-
diate probability of transparency. No committee that enforces informative voting can
maximise social welfare, that is, informative voting and welfare-maximisation are mu-
tually exclusive properties. Either full transparency or complete secrecy is required in
a committee under the unanimity voting rule to maximise welfare. For low priors, a
fully transparent majoritarian committee is better for the society than any unanimous
committee. In the second part of the thesis, the transmission of information is studied
where an informed media, whose interests are partially in conflict with a finite group of
rational voters, transmits news items in an attempt to manipulate democratic decisions.
In a common-interest two-alternative voting model where due to reputation concerns the
media can credibly commit to send any news reliably, we show that even if voters welcome
the news when it arrives, media’s presence can hurt their ex-ante welfare in both large
and small constituencies.
Acknowledgements
I would like to extend my special thanks to my principal supervisor Jaideep Roy for
his invaluable advice and guidance during every step of this thesis. I would also like to
thank my second supervisor Peter Postl for his constant encouragement and support. I
express my gratitude to Ralph Bailey, Sandro Brusco, Jayasri Dutta, Marcin Dziubin´ski,
Chirantan Ganguly, Parikshit Ghosh, Gilat Levy, Heracles Polemarchakis, Indrajit Ray
and Anil Somani for very helpful comments and suggestions during several stages of the
work. Parts of the thesis have been presented at the British Academy Workshop on
‘Communication in Teams’, 2010 at the University of Birmingham, the Indian Statistical
Institute Delhi and Kolkata Centres, the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and at
the XIth Meeting of the Social Choice and Welfare, New Delhi. I thank the participants
there for their remarks and questions.
i
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Related Literature 14
3 Professional Advice from Randomly Transparent Committees 41
3.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Evaluation of Talent, Informative Voting and Aggregate Welfare . . . . . 49
3.4 Quality of Advice from Expert Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Correlated Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.6 Summary and Possible Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.7 Chapter Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.7.1 Appendix 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.7.2 Appendix 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4 Media persuasion and voter welfare 78
4.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3 Single Decision Maker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
ii
4.3.1 Welfare Analysis with a Single Decision Maker . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 Information Transmission and Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4.1 Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.4.2 Voting versus Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.4.3 Media Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4.4 Reputation-building and endogenous viewership . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.5 Discussion of Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.6 Chapter Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.6.1 Notations and formal definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.6.2 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5 Conclusion 142
iii
List of Figures
3.1 Time line of a randomly transparent committee (for i = 1, 2, 3 and for a
given prior pi on the states in each dimension). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
iv
List of Tables
4.1 A summary of all results with Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Decision-making under imperfect information is a challenge that is faced in the context
of many economic activities. It is also natural that in a number of cases, there may be
asymmetric information among the parties involved in the process. It is plausible that
the participating agents may be driven by different (possibly conflicting) motivations. It
is in this context that the issue of transmission of information gains importance. Often,
the decision-maker who has to make a choice has inadequate knowledge of the costs and
benefits of the choice he is about to make. Therefore, he may find it advisable to consti-
tute a committee comprising of a single/multiple expert(s) who are supposed to provide
recommendations regarding the state of the world based on their specialized knowledge.
For example, a political leader may hire trained economists to advise him on the reper-
cussions of a policy that is being debated. Again, a commercial firm may also solicit
advice from a technical committee comprising of skilled experts when it is considering
making an investment for research and development in a specialized field.
This thesis develops models that seek to explain the nature of information transmis-
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sion when the senders of information are either solely motivated by career concerns, or
are ideologically driven in favour of a particular alternative. Either of these scenarios is
easily motivated. Reputational concerns are the driving force of the experts in a variety
of professions. Another issue which the thesis covers is the heterogeneity in the quality
of information of the experts who constitute the committee. This heterogeneity may be
explained by the facts that experts with better education or more reliable sources may
be in possession of more precise information that their less educated or relatively less
connected counterparts. The more precise the information of the expert is, the more
“talented” he will be deemed to be. In real life, it often becomes difficult to have precise
information regarding the talent levels of each of the experts who constitute a committee,
and they are treated as equals at the beginning. Due to this, each of their opinions is
given equal importance at the time of making the decision. The reputational objectives
of each of the committee members may be captured in their efforts to come across as a
highly talented expert, without explicitly caring for the particular alternative they rec-
ommend.
On the other hand, particularly in a political economy setting, the agents may be
preferentially motivated in favour of a particular policy. The thesis involves the scenario
where the decision makers have access to multiple sources of information, a constituent
element of which is the information received from the sender. This situation is motivated
by alluding to the fact that in the real world, there are multiple sources of information
available at the disposal of agents when they have to make a choice, and they typically
synthesise all the available information at the time of taking the final call. The rational
sender should in turn be aware of the multiplicity of these sources of information at the
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time of transmitting information. For example, if the Government Health department
has to decide to issue a public notice in favour of a particular vaccine, it also needs to
consider the information the potential patients are likely to receive from their private
medical practitioners. In the thesis, the instance of a media outlet transmitting infor-
mation through public news broadcasts is studied. The receivers of this information are
the voters, who themselves receive informative signals privately and cast their votes after
having aggregated all the available information.
In Chapter 3, information transmission from multiple senders to a single receiver is
studied, where multiple experts with career concerns provide recommendations to an eval-
uator. In Chapter 4 information transmission from a single sender to multiple receivers
is investigated, where a media outlet transmits news to multiple voters. Another point
of contrast is the following: in Chapter 3, the senders of information are the decision
makers (who are the committee members determining the decision of the committee).
However in Chapter 4, the opposite scenario is studied where the receivers of information
(the voters) determine the outcome.
In Chapter 3, three experts solely motivated by career concerns who possess expertise
in independent dimensions are considered. The sole objective of each expert is to convince
an evaluator (who may be interpreted to be the public) that their level of expertise is high.
The experts seek to achieve this objective through the process of voting for a particular
alternative. In this context, a setting where the experts vote in a secretive committee
is studied, wherein there is a possibility that their secret votes might get leaked to the
public. The focus is on informative voting, where every expert votes in accordance to his
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best judgement, and social welfare, which in turn is the ex-ante gain of the society from
a correct decision in every dimension. It is an established result that such informative
voting cannot be implemented in a fully transparent committee. In this work it is found
that it is not achievable in a fully secret committee either. It is shown in Chapter 3 that
informative voting is achieved only when the secret committee uses the unanimity voting
rule along with an intermediate probability of transparency, provided that the common
prior is not too informative. Non-conformism or anti-herding is interpreted to be the
inclination on the part of the expert to recommend the alternative which is considered to
be less likelier one according to conventional wisdom. This is motivated by the fact that
the experts know they will make a better impression in the public eye if they are able to
correctly predict the alternative thought to be less likely by the society. In a transparent
committee, the evaluator gets to see directly the alternative a particular expert has rec-
ommended while deciding on the expected level of expertise this expert possesses. The
recommendations of the other experts in the committee are immaterial in this decision.
The innate tendency to anti-herd is the only one at work in a fully transparent com-
mittee, and no other forces that may depend on what other experts have recommended
arise in this case. When the committee is fully secretive, then the evaluator only gets to
know the final decision of the committee and not the individual recommendations made
by the committee members. These have to be guessed by the evaluator. Hence at the
time of making a recommendation, a particular committee member has to consider the
actions of his colleagues, which will determine the decision of the committee and in turn
affect the impression the evaluator holds regarding the recommendation made by this
particular expert. Hence in the analysis of the behaviour of fully secretive committees,
the particular decision aggregation rule the committee operates under is significant, and
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the cases of unanimity and majority aggegation rules are separately analysed.
The unanimity rule is considered first, according to which the unconventional alter-
native (which is the less likelier alternative according to the social prior) will be declared
as the committee decision only if all the experts recommend it, and the conventional
alternative (which is the likelier alternative according to the social prior) will be the com-
mittee decision for all other cases. Here if a particular expert is pivotal, and recommends
in favour of the unconventional alternative, then the committee decision will be in favour
of the unconventional alternative. In this case the evaluator will infer perfectly what the
recommendation of the expert has been, even though the committee is secretive. This
follows from the particular aggregation rule (unanimity) the committee operates under.
However, if the expert recommends in favour of the conventional choice, then the com-
mittee decision will be in favour of the conventional choice, and in this case the evaluator
will not be sure what the expert had individually voted for. For instance, it could have
been possible that he had personally voted for the unconventional alternative, but any
or all of his colleagues had voted for the conventional choice that leads to the decision of
the committee to be in favour of the conventional choice. Alternatively, it could also be
that his colleague had voted for the unconventional choice, while he himself had voted
for the conventional choice that rationalizes the committee decision to be in favour of the
conventional choice. Hence, if the pivotal expert votes in favour of the unconventional
choice, he essentially makes his private recommendation fully known to the evaluator in
spite of the full secrecy of the committee. However, if he votes for the conventional choice
he is able to make his recommendation noisy in the eyes of the evaluator. Whether his
private recommendation should be made fully inferable or kept noisy is therefore an en-
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dogenous decision that has to be made by the expert operating in a fully secret committee
operating under the unanimity rule. The experts with mediocre talents are not confident
of their capabilities, and hence seek to vote in a way such that it becomes difficult for the
public to ascertain exactly what their private advices were. This objective is achieved
by recommending in favour of the conventional choice. Therefore under unanimity, the
mediocre expert is tempted to be a conformist and vote in favour of the conventional
choice in order to disguise his personal vote from the public. However, as explained be-
fore, there is an incentive for the careerist expert to be a non-conformist and vote for
the less likelier choice in a transparent committee. It is shown in Chapter 3 that there
exists optimal degrees of transparency which perfectly counter-balances the two forces of
excessive non-conformism or excessive conformism to induce a scenario where careerist
experts with all possible levels of talent vote according to their best judgments.
A fully secretive committee operating under the majority rule is considered next in
Chapter 3. Here unlike the case where the fully secretive committee works under the
unanimity rule, the pivotal voter can never make his personal recommendation perfectly
apparent to the evaluator. So unlike the unanimous committee case, there is no incentive
for the pivotal mediocre voter to vote for the conventional choice in order to keep his per-
sonal recommendation vague. However, due to the inherent rationale of non-conformism
in transparent committees explained earlier, the experts remain tempted to be overly
non-conformistic even in a secretive committee under majority rule. Under no degree of
transparency can they be made to vote according to their best judgments, for unlike the
unanimity case there is no opposing force to counter-balance their innate non-conformism.
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Welfare issues are addressed next, where the society gains when the aggregate com-
mittee decision is in accordance to the true state in a particular dimension, and loses
when the two do not match. From welfare maximization it follows that it may not be
optimal for the experts with mediocre talents to recommend in accordance to their best
judgments. This result depends crucially on the following: the talent levels of the experts
are heterogeneous, the weights assigned to the votes of all the experts are equal, and
every dimension is equally important in the welfare function. Suppose two of the experts
are highly talented while the level of talent of the third is mediocre. Suppose also that ac-
cording to their best judgment in their respective dimensions, the two smart experts feel
that the correct recommendation to be made should be in favour of the unconventional
state. However, suppose the private information received by the mediocre expert be such
that he feels that in his dimension of expertise, the correct recommendation to be made
should be in favour of the conventional state. But if the voting rule requires unanimity
for the action favouring the unconventional state to pass, it shall not be passed as the
committee decision. This hampers aggregate welfare, because even though the mediocre
expert has voted according to his best judgment, the quality of information at his disposal
is low owing to his mediocre talents. In this case to maximize ex-ante welfare, the weak
expert should exhibit an inclination towards non-conformism. Furthermore, it is also
shown that unlike the quest to make every expert vote according to his best judgment,
if we focus on ex-ante welfare maximization, then one requires either a fully transparent
or a fully secretive committee under the class of unanimity aggregation rule. This leads
to the following conclusion: Informative Voting (which means voting according to best
possible judgment) and Aggregate Welfare Maximisation through committee decisions
are mutually exclusive objectives if experts care about their individual reputations, know
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their own expertise and have private information in independent spheres of expertise. It
is also shown in the same chapter that when the society is sufficiently divided over the two
alternatives, a committee using the majority rule and operating with full transparency
corresponds to higher level of ex-ante welfare for the society than any unanimous com-
mittee.
In Chapter 4, the scenario when a perfectly informed but biased sender (the media)
transmits a public message to voters (who are partially informed themselves regarding
the state of the world) is looked into. The setting is motivated by the fact that media
outlets are often controlled by informed elites, whose preferences over alternatives are
not perfectly aligned with that of the general public. The public constitute the elec-
torate. This may lead to deliberate manipulation of social decisions by the biased media
by suitably controlling the content of public news they choose to transmit. If however
it is known that the media cares about his future reputation as a trustworthy source
of information, then it can credibly commit not to send any incorrect information, even
though it is possible for it to transmit vague information. If the media outlet is not
concerned with future reputation, then it can potentially send both vague as well as in-
correct information. In the model described in Chapter 4, the two following cases turn
out to be identical: voter behaviour after receiving news from a media outlet that does
not care about its future reputation, and voter behaviour when the media is absent. If
the media is reputation-driven, then its credibility enhances its ability to manipulate the
electorate. On the other hand, the power of a media outlet not driven by reputation to
transmit information to the electorate is less, but so also is its power to manipulate. It
then remains ambiguous what is better for the public: higher credibility (at a cost of
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higher ability to manipulate) or lower ability to manipulate (at a cost of low credibility).
Given this ambiguity, in Chapter 4 we ask what are the theoretical consequences of the
presence of reputational concerns in a media outlet on the welfare of the general mass.
In this context, a common interest voting game is studied, where each of the voters have
a common preference regarding the preferred alternative depending on the state of the
world. There exists a media outlet whose preferences are only partially aligned to that
of the voters, in the sense that for some states of the world the preferred alternative of
the media and the voters are the same, while for others they differ. The media suffers
prohibitive losses if it is found that it has delivered incorrect information by deviating
from the message strategy in equilibrium. Hence the information provided by the media
is “credible”.
Suppose the media chooses the message strategy that maximizes the ex-ante welfare
of the media. Firstly, the case when a single voter (or decision maker, DM in short) is
present is considered. It is shown in the model described in Chapter 4 that with a single
DM, the presence of the media can never affect the welfare of the voter adversely. The
intuition behind the result is the following: while deciding which alternative to vote form
the DM uses two sources of information: his private signal and the public news trans-
mitted by the media. Under certain scenarios, the informational content of the public
news provided by the media can overwhelm the private signal of the DM and make him
adopt a signal invariant action that makes him worse-off for some states of the world.
However, the reliability of the news also enables him to choose his desired alternative with
a higher probability for other states. Whether or not the DM finds the presence of the
reputation-driven media ex-ante desirable or not depends on weighing these losses and
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gains. It is found that the potential gains outweigh the potential losses. In other scenar-
ios, the provision of public news provided bolsters the action of the DM in the following
manner: for some states of the world, it induces the DM to vote according to his private
signal (which he would have done anyway even in the absence of the news), while for
other states the informational content of the news leads the DM to choose his most pre-
ferred alternative without fail. Hence the DM always welcomes the presence of the media.
The case when the electorate is comprised of multiple voters who share a common
preference over the available alternatives is considered next. However, each voter has
access to private information about the state of the world. In the event that the prior
of the voters is biased in favour of the alternative preferred by the media (this is termed
as “small conflict”), it is shown that regardless of the size of the constituency, media
presence can adversely affect the ex-ante probability of a correct decision and hence
voters’ welfare. Moreover, media presence will necessarily hurt voter welfare when the
constituency is large. This may hold true even for small constituencies as well depending
on parameter values. Considering the case where the prior of the voters is biased against
the alternative preferred by the media (this is termed as “large conflict”), it is shown
that for a sufficiently aware society, the presence of the media can both be beneficial
and harmful for welfare. However, for a society where the level of awareness is low, the
presence of the media is always welfare improving.
These results suggest that valuable news from a biased media is always welcome when
the social decision is taken by a single DM, while as democracy spreads and the number
of voters get large, a reliable source of news can in fact reduce ex-ante voter welfare.
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The basic intuition behind this result is the following: Consider the multiple voter case
where there is a small conflict between the voters and the media, and the precision of
private signals of the voters is sufficiently high. As explained for the single DM case, here
too the nature of new transmitted by the media is such that the voters follow a voting
strategy that is invariant to the private signals they receive. This in turn implies that
the probability with which the electorate arrives at the correct decision is independent
of the number of voters, since their individual signals are not assimilated in their voting
decisions, and information aggregation ceases. However, the voters invariably vote for
their preferred choice for some states of the world, but are certainly misled into voting for
their less preferred alternative for other states. On the other hand, had the media been
absent, the voters would have voted according to the private signals they received, and
hence the private signals would have been aggregated into the electoral decision. Hence
in the latter case the probability of the making the right decision for all states would have
been positively related to the number of voters. This is related to the Condorcet Jury
Theorem, according to which if each of the agents of equal competence who constitute
the electorate votes according to his private signal, then under majority, the probability
of making the correct decision under majority goes to one as the size of the electorate
goes to infinity. In the model described in Chapter 4, if the size of the electorate is
large enough, then the advantage of aggregating the informative signals in the voting
decision in the absence of the media is greater than the advantage gained from utilizing
the content of the additional source of information in the form of news transmitted by
the media (which in turn makes the private signals redundant). Hence the presence of the
media sharing credible information with the public regarding the state of the world may
reduce the ex-ante voter welfare compared to the case when no such credible information
12
is available to the media.
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Chapter 2
Related Literature
The basic question the thesis addresses pertains to information transmission. However,
the settings in which the issue of information transmission is investigated brings the
work to the purview of varied topics such as career concerns, cheap talk, transparency
and secrecy of committees, public information, and voting. The experts who constitute
the committee in the model described in Chapter 3 are solely driven by career concerns,
without being concerned explicitly about the quality of their recommendations. In this
context, papers which address career concerns of agents are discussed. The model in
Chapter 3 also deals with transparency and secrecy of committees. This is a heavily
debated topic, particularly in the wake of organisations such as the Wikileaks whose ba-
sic premise is that transparency in policy making ushers in a greater level of efficiency.
The literature that draws comparisons between secretive and transparent committees is
discussed. Furthermore, there is no explicit cost affixed to recommendations made by the
experts in the model described in Chapter 3, or to the news transmitted by the media
in the model studied in Chapter 4. Therefore, a connection may be drawn from these
models to costless signaling models in the form of “cheap talk”. In the model described
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in Chapter 4, the basic issue addressed is the effect of public information (in the form of
information transmitted by the media) on voter welfare. In the same model, the receivers
of information (the voters) themselves have informative signals regarding the state of
the world. Drawing from these connections, papers that address the issue of efficacy
of dissemination of public information, and those which describe information transmis-
sion where the receiver is imperfectly informed are discussed. In the model described in
Chapter 4, the media does not diverge from the message strategy owing to reputation
concerns. This may be motivated by considering verifiability in information transmission
(as assumed in games of persuasion). In both the models described in Chapters 3 and
4, there is a voting mechanism at work, and papers that involve strategic voting are also
briefly described.
We now look at some of the papers where agents are motivated by career concerns.
Early works in this area include that of Fama (1980), Holmstrom (1999) and Scharfstein
and Stein (1990). Fama (1980) looks at optimum compensation schemes for an employer
and finds that if perfect monitoring is possible, the optimal compensation method is a
periodic wage that pays on the basis of observed input. However, under regimes char-
acterized by imperfect monitoring of inputs, compensation packages may give rise to a
moral hazard problem where the employee provides inefficient amounts of input. Fama
(1980) had argued that such moral hazard problems can be overcome if the employees
have career concerns. Holmstrom (1999) investigates Fama’s claim and studies how a
person’s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to provide inputs
or make appropriate decisions. In the model, the person’s productive abilities are initially
unknown to every agent and are revealed over time through observations of performance.
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An incentive problem arises from the person’s motive to influence the learning process
(which in turn influences the wage received), by taking unobserved actions that affect
today’s performance. The paper shows that career motives can be beneficial as well as
detrimental, depending on the nature of alignment of interests between the principal and
the agent. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) also consider careerist agents by assuming that
there are two types of agents: “smart” agents receive informative signals about the value
of an investment, while “dumb” agents receive purely noisy signals. Initially, neither the
agents themselves nor the evaluator can identify the types, but the evaluator updates his
beliefs about the quality of the agent based on: whether the agent made a successful in-
vestment, and whether the agent’s behavior was similar to or different from other agents.
The career concerns of the agents are captured in their urge to be favourably evaluated.
The first component of the updating becomes less crucial if there exist systematically
unpredictable components of investment value, for it then becomes feasible that smart
managers could get unlucky and receive misleading signals, which in turn raises the sig-
nificance of the second component. Agents are more favorably evaluated if they follow
the decisions of others than if they behave in a contrarian fashion, which then gives rise to
strategic herding. Hence agents ignore their private information and imitate the actions
of others. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a) study careerist experts who privately receive a
signal that is comprised of an informed and an uninformed source. The quality of experts
may differ in the sense that it is more likely that the more talented experts will receive a
private signal from the informative source. The talent levels of the expert is not known
by any agent including the expert himself. The talent level of the expert is evaluated
on the basis of the advice given and the realized state of the world. When sequential
transmission of information with conditionally independent signals are considered, the
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paper shows that in the long run, learning is incomplete and herd behavior arises. In
equilibrium, there is only a finite number of experts who speak informatively. If every ex-
pert speaks communicates informatively forever, then the amount of information revealed
in each round necessarily converges to zero. Unlike Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a), the
paper by Visser and Swank (2007) assumes that talented experts receive the same signal,
and identify a “conformity effect” among experts who have career concerns, and at the
same time care for the quality of the decision they take. In this set-up, disagreement
signals lack of competence as competent members view the consequences of the project
in the same way. In this paper, similar to Scharfstein and Stein (1990), experts wish to
convince the evaluator that they have voted in the same way. Hence the “conformity
effect” may be identified in this context, wherein the reputational concern element in the
payoff function of the experts makes them want to speak with one voice. In order to
safeguard against the negative consequence of reputational concerns, it is warranted that
the person with the least careerist motive should be made decisive, which in turn may
be achieved by following the unanimity rule.
Strategic anti-herding or non-conformistic tendencies among careerist experts have
also been identified in the literature. In Zwiebel (1995), careerist experts are evaluated
on the basis of their relative performances. In the equilibrium, Zwiebel (1995) describes a
scenario where average quality experts choose to herd and adopt less risky action so that
they are evaluated against the standard benchmark, while high and low quality experts
choose riskier actions. The high quality experts are encouraged to take the risk since they
have access to better quality information, while the low quality expert is willing to make
the riskier choice in an attempt to mimic the high quality type. Effinger and Polborn
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(2001) analyze a model in which experts do not know their type, as in Scharfstein and
Stein (1990). They study two experts motivated by career concerns providing advice
sequentially, where the agent is most valuable if he is the only smart agent. This creates
an incentive for an expert to maintain a degree of exclusivity in his recommendation,
which prompts the second expert demonstrates anti-herding behaviour by proposing a
different action than his predecessor, which may be in contradiction to his information
set. In yet another paper demonstrating anti-herding behaviour among experts, Avery
and Chevelier (1999) develop a model of decision-making when two agents have to take a
binary decision sequentially. In their paper, the agents may either get informative signals
about the state of the world, or may be completely uninformed. The paper addresses the
case where the agents have different degrees of imperfect private information about their
abilities. There exists a semi-separating equilibrium where the second agent, if sufficiently
confident that her source if information is trustworthy, displays contrarion behaviour by
not following the first agent’s action and following her own signal, while the less certain
second agent follows his own signal with some probability that depends on the particular
signal received.
Levy (2004) was the first to show that reputational concerns alone are sufficient to
generate anti-herding behaviour even for a single expert. In her model, anti-herding was
interpreted to be the tendency of the agent to go against the conventional wisdom by
prescribing the alternative the society feels is the less likelier outcome (as is reflected in
the value of the social prior). Levy (2004) considers a decision maker who has a private
signal about the state of the world, and the accuracy of this signal reflects the talent
level of the decision-maker. There is a commonly known social prior, which determines
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which the likely state of the world is according to conventional wisdom. The decision-
maker takes an action based on the prior and her own private information. An evaluator
observes the state of the world, the prior, and the action taken by the decision maker
and evaluates the accuracy of the signal received by the decision -maker, which in turn
the decision-maker wants to maximize. It is found that in the unique equilibrium of the
model, the careerist decision maker excessively contradicts the prior, in the sense that
even when she believes that the prior is correct, she may recommend differently. The
logic is that if the decision maker’s action goes against the prior, it may be conveyed
that the precision of her private signal own information is accurate enough to match
the informative-ness of the prior. Hence going against public information may serve as
a signal about ability, which implies that the decision maker might have an excessive
incentive to use it. This makes the decision-make to distort her actions in this direc-
tion. Levy (2004) also considers the case where the decision-maker can choose to consult
an informatively informed adviser who provides public advice. In equilibrium, the most
able decision makers choose not to consult, since this choice itself signals that the level
of precision of her private signal is high. The paper also examines whether advisers to
the decision maker indeed report their information truthfully. If the adviser has career
concerns himself, he manipulates his decision to come across as a highly talented type.
Even if the adviser does not have any career concerns and is concerned only about the
outcome, he biases his recommendations in anticipation of the anti-herding behavior of
the decision maker. Thus, career concerns of either the adviser or the decision maker,
are sufficient to induce sub-optimality in recommendation of actions.
We therefore see that career concerns in the part of the agents either induce con-
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formism or anti-herding tendencies, which makes the agents not report truthfully. Otta-
viani and Sorensen (2006 b) analyze this specific question in a reputational cheap talk set-
ting and find that truthtelling is not implementable under very general conditions. They
characterise information transmission by privately informed careerist experts, whose eval-
uation is conducted based on the recommendations they make and the state of the world
that is realized expost. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006 b) describe an equilibrium where
the experts deviate from truth-telling (the nature and magnitude of deviation depend
on the information structure considered). This is valid even when experts have private
information about their own accuracy and care about their relative rather than absolute
reputation. To understand why complete honesty is not achievable in equilibrium, sup-
pose that the evaluator conjectures that the expert honestly recommends in accordance
with the signal received. The quality of the expert is dependent on the precision of the
private signal the expert receives regarding the state of the world. In a fully separating
equilibrium, particular recommendations made is an indicator about ability, which in
turn provides an incentive to the less able experts to mimic the recommendation of the
highly able experts in order to create a better reputation for themselves. This in turn
means that truth-telling cannot be sustained in equilibrium, where the expert’s incentive
to lie destroys any fully separating equilibrium where there is a perfect correspondence
between the expert’s signal and the recommendation made.
In the model described in Chapter 3, the issue of informative voting and welfare in
secretive committees where there is a probability of mass leakage is addressed. There
is a related body of literature that looks into the relative performance of fully secret or
fully transparent committees. In some of these papers, committee members are solely
20
motivated by their private preferences over the alternatives (Feddersen and Pesendor-
fer(1998), Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006), Persico (2004)). However, more closely
related are papers which focus directly on the comparison between secretive and transpar-
ent mechanisms wherein agents are motivated by career concerns. The papers according
to which in the presence of career-oriented agents, a secretive committee performs better
than a transparent committee are Gersbach and Hahn (2001), Stasavage (2007), Meade
and Stasavage (2008), Fingleton and Raith (2005).
Gersbach and Hahn (2001) analyze a two-period model in which all or some committee
members can be replaced after the first period. More specifically, they examine whether
it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of central bank members to be
published when the general public is unsure about the efficiency of the constituent mem-
bers, who in turn are aiming for re-election. In equilibrium, uninformed members mimic
the informed ones when the process is transparent by randomising between the choices of
the informed types. However, the uninformed types abstain when the process is secretive.
The paper therefore identifies an intertemporal trade-off between transparency (which al-
lows for better selection of committee members after the first period) and secrecy (which
allows for better decisions in the first period). However, the expected overall losses are
always larger in a transparent regime versus a secretive one. Gersbach and Hahn (2001)
therefore argues that secretive processes perform better since it reduces the incentive of
agents to distort their actions to signal their types. Stasavage (2007) investigates the idea
that public debate helps to reduce polarization and promote consensus when compared
to a private one, and finds the opposite to be true. In his model, the representatives have
both decision and reputation concerns, the latter being in the form of showing loyalty to
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the constituents. If the reputation concerns are sufficiently strong, then at the time of
public decision-making, the representatives face incentives to use their actions as a signal
of loyalty to their constituents, even at the cost of ignoring private information about the
true desirability of different policies. The constituents anticipate this sort of behaviour
and hence do not alter their prior policy beliefs following a debate. When representatives
instead make policy decisions in secrecy, they are more likely to allow private information
to influence their actions. Meade and Stasavage (2008) develop a theoretical model of se-
quential information transmission within the framework of a three-member committee in
which a known expert speaks first. All committee members are concerned both about the
decision as well as their public reputation. The paper assumes that committee members
are uncertain about the accuracy of their private signal. This setup is similar to Ottaviani
and Sorensen (2001), who show that when a committee member who is known to have
high expertise speaks first, subsequent careerist speakers may be induced to mimic the
behaviour of the known expert rather than to reveal their private information accurately.
This in turn is related to the contrarian behaviour displayed by agents as in Scharfstein
and Stein (1990). In their paper, Meade and Stasavage (2008) have extended the set-up in
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) to compare between transparent and secret deliberation.
They show that the likelihood of having an informative equilibrium in which members ac-
curately reveal private information is greater in the case of secret deliberation than public
deliberation. When information is transmitted secretively, incentives of individual mem-
bers are better aligned with those of the committee, since inferences about the quality of
individual members will in this case be based on the quality of the committee’s decision,
rather than on the accuracy of individual recommendations. Hence the experts have more
incentive to reveal their information in secretive committees. Fingleton and Raith (2005)
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studies strategic bargaining in which a seller and a buyer are each represented by an agent
with reputation concerns. The difference in the quality of agents stems from their ability
to obtain information about the other party’s reservation price; neither principal knows
the other’s reservation price or her agent’s type. The objective of each careerist agent
is to be perceived as a skilled bargainer by his respective principal. Under transparent
bargaining, the respective principals can observe the entire bargaining game as well as its
outcome, while under secret bargaining they observe only the outcome. It is shown that
agents unambiguously bargain more aggressively under transparent bargaining compared
to secretive bargaining, and hence a less efficient bargaining outcome is reached under
the former regime.
The papers discussed above therefore show that secrecy may bring about more effi-
cient decisions because it presents less motives the incentives for agents to manipulate
their actions in order to signal their types. Swank and Visser (2010) finds that imposition
of transparency does not increase accountability as the experts would typically arrange
pre-meetings and may reach informal understandings allowing them to come to the of-
ficial ‘transparent’ meeting with one voice. Seidmann (2010) considers the case where
the experts care for the decision as well as rewards received from outsiders to represent
their interests. He shows that a secret committee reaches better decisions, because if the
external rewards are high enough then the experts in a public committee tend to cast
their fully visible votes in accordance to the interests of the outsider, even though it may
not be informationally efficient.
In a different set-up, Gersbach and Hahn (2012) claim that a transparent committee
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performs better than a secretive committee by analyzing an inter-temporal model of com-
mittee decision-making where members differ in their levels of efficiency, which is their
private information. The experts endogenously choose to acquire costly information that
improves their chances of making a correct decision. The heterogeneity in the quality of
experts arises from the requisite effort they need to put in to obtain correct information.
In the second stage, the principal decides whether to retain the experts in the committee.
The careerist committee members want to maximize the probability of their retention
in the committee. This in turn induces them to acquire costly information and make
the right choice, for that increases the probability of their re-appointment. Under trans-
parency, the principal can evaluate the quality of a member by directly observing the
individual’s decisions, while under secrecy, he observes the collective decision alone. The
paper shows that under transparency the principal is always better off in the first period,
because it induces higher effort on behalf of committee members to acquire information
and thus improves decision-making.
Levy (2007a) shows that there are strong motives for manipulation of actions for both
the cases when the committee is fully transparent or fully secretive, and the intensity of
distortion are contingent on the voting rule of the committee. The paper considers the
voting behavior of career oriented experts (the paper considers a three expert set-up)
with privately known skill levels in independent dimensions. Each of the experts have an
informative signal about the true state in the dimension of his expertise, which eventually
gets revealed to the public who in turn act as the evaluators of the skill level of the ex-
perts. The experts do not have any preference over the decision, and are solely motivated
by career concerns so that their objective is to vote in such a way that portrays their
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perceived talent levels in the public eye to be as high as possible. In this scenario, Levy
(2007a) compares the tendencies of the experts to exhibit conformist or non-conformist
tendencies across different aggregation rules. The paper shows that conformist tendencies
rise as the aggregation rule warrants more evidence for the unconventional alternative to
be implemented. In a similar set-up but with two experts, Levy (2007b) shows that if
the voting rule is biased against the decision advocated by the prior, then a transparent
procedure corresponds to a higher level of welfare than a secretive one. If the voting rule
is biased in favor of the decision advocated by the prior, however, a transparent procedure
corresponds to a higher level of welfare when the prior is sufficiently weak, and a secretive
procedure dominates when the prior is sufficiently strong. This result is re-inforced for
a three-member committee in the model studied in Chapter 3, where it is additionally
found that for a sufficiently weak prior, a committee operating under the majoritarian
rule corresponds to a higher level of welfare than a committee which works under the
unanimity rule, the latter being subject to any degree of leakage.
In their seminal work, Crawford and Sobel (1982) analyse information transmission
between a perfectly informed but biased expert who sends a costless message to an un-
informed receiver. There has been a large body of work that explore information trans-
mission from a fully or partially informed agent to a partially informed or completely
uninformed agent in varied settings, where the fundamentals of the model follow the ba-
sic set-up in Crawford and Sobel (1982). The model in Chapter 3 differs from the basic
Crawford-Sobel framework in the sense that the senders of information are solely driven
by career incentives and do not have a preference for any particular outcome. The model
in Chapter 4 differs from the standard Crawford-Sobel framework in that there is partial
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alignment of interests between the sender and the receiver, in the sense that they match
completely for some states of the world, but are different for other states. Crawford and
Sobel (1982) show that in equilibrium, the information transmitted is partitional, and the
degree of precision of information conveyed is determined by the magnitude of conflict of
interest between the sender and the receiever. In their model, both state space and the
action space is continuous, and for every state there is conflict of interest between the
sender and the receiver. Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that the ex-ante payoff of the
sender and the receiver is always increasing in the level of precision of information (re-
flected in the number of partitions) in equilibrium. The basic model proposed in Crawford
and Sobel (1982) has been extended in several directions. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989),
Austen-Smith (1993), Krishna and Morgan (2001a), (2001b) consider multiple senders of
information, while Farrell and Gibbons (1989) consider multiple receivers. Chakraborty
and Harbaugh (2003), Levy and Razin (2007) consider multidimensional state spaces,
while Battaglini (2002) considers multiple senders combined with a multi-dimensional
state space. Aumann and Hart (2003), Krishna and Morgan (2004) consider multiple
rounds of cheap talk. Unlike the unilateral transmission of information from the sender
to the receiver as in Crawford and Sobel (1982), games where information is exchanged
through costless signals with multiple players each of whom have payoff relevant pri-
vate information is studied in Matthews and Postlewaite (1989), Austen-Smith (1990),
Banks and Calvert (1992), Baliga and Morris (2002), Baliga and Sjostrom (2004).1 Mor-
gan and Stocken (2003) consider the problem of communication when the bias of the
sender is private and unobservable. Depending on parameter values, they obtain either
1Farrell (1996), Farrell and Rabin (1996), Ganguly and Ray (2010) have conducted exhaustive liter-
ature surveys on cheap talk.
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non-responsive or semi-responsive equilibria. In either case, the divergence of interests
between the sender and the receiver makes communication noisy and reduces the amount
of information that can be communicated in equilibrium. In the semi-responsive equilib-
rium, unbiased senders can credibly communicate bad news, but cannot credibly convey
good news.
If a static cheap talk game is repeated, this may give rise to reputational concerns on
the part of the sender, imposing additional constraints on costless information transmis-
sion between the sender and the receiver. The following papers address this question: So-
bel (1985), Benabou and Laroque (1992), Morris (2001), Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a).
Analysing cheap talk in this repeated framework would require us to make assumptions
about the nature of these reputational concerns. Typically, reputational/career concerns
are motivated through two channels: the sender may care about appearing to be well
informed (as is considered in the model described in Chapter 3, or it may also be optimal
for the sender to have a bigger incentive to tailor the present information transmitted
such that a false perception regarding his reliability is created that affects his future cred-
ibility and hence future payoffs. In the second context, Sobel (1985) provides justification
why in a finite period setting it is profitable for a sender to build reputation by providing
information even though there is conflict of interest, where after each stage the receiver
assesses his credibility in order to judge how much to trust the information of the sender.
Sobel (1985) considers a binary variable, the value of which the sender knows and sends a
message to the receiver from a set of possible signals. Then the receiver takes an action,
payoffs are received, after which the receiver observes the actual value of the variable and
the game is repeated in the next period. The game in each period is of varied level of
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importance, which is exogenous and common knowledge. The receiver is uncertain about
the sender’s preferences, and believes with a given probability that the sender’s utility
function is such that the either the sender is a friend of the receiver, or an enemy. Once
a cheating is exposed, the receiver believes that the sender is an enemy and information
transmission for the future periods stop since the trust is broken. In this setting Sobel
(1985) constructs an equilibrium in which it is optimal for the “enemy” sender to report
truthfully with probability one in the rounds of relatively lower importance. Even though
the sender suffers relative losses in these rounds, he builds trust with the receiver for the
future (more important rounds). Morris (2001) considers a static cheap talk game where
an informed sender wishes to convey her valuable information to an uninformed receiver
who shares identical preferences, thereby having a current incentive to truthfully reveal
his information. But if the receiver thinks that the sender might be biased in favor of one
decision and the sender does not wish to be thought to be biased owing to future repu-
tation concerns, the sender has an incentive to lie. If the sender is sufficiently concerned
about his reputation, no information is conveyed in equilibrium. In Sobel (1985) it was
assumed that a sender who is a “friend” always tells the truth. Morris (2001) therefore
endogenizes the behavior of the “good” sender, and models the scenario where the “good”
sender may have an incentive to lie (despite a current incentive to tell the truth) in order
to enhance his reputation. Benabou and Laroque (1992) extend Sobel (1985) to study
a binary-state, binary-action repeated game where the sender does not know surely the
state of the world, but receives a noisy signal about it. In this context, there arises an
opportunity for the strategic class of senders to distort their announcements, since the
receivers cannot verify if the message was sent truthfully (owing to the fact that it is
common knowledge that the private information of the sender may be erroneous, and
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possible deviations may be ascribed to be an honest mistake). Benabou and Laroque
(1992) show that in the presence of reputation concerns, this tendency of the strategic
class of senders to deviate from truth-telling is lessened. The paper shows that in the
presence of the honest sender, the strategic sender may truthfully report the state of the
world for long periods of time in order to establish a reputation for honesty, which is
then subsequently used to manipulate the receiver. In a one-shot version of their game
however, unless the sender is honest with probability at least one half, there exists only
the babbling equilibrium in which no information is transmitted.
Information transmission in the case when the agents display bounded rationality has
also been studied in Crawford (2003) and Chen (2011). Crawford (2003) considers a class
of zero-sum two person perturbed Matching Pennies game played between a sender and a
receiver. Before actually playing the game, the sender sends a costless, non-binding and
noiseless message about his intended move to the receiver, after which the game is played.
If all players are rational, then the messages must be uninformative. However, Crawford
assumes both the sender and the receiver may either be naive or sophisticated. While
the sophisticated player is fully rational, the naive player optimizes his action based on
non-equilibrium beliefs which are independent of the strategies adopted by other players.
Crawford (2003) constructs an equilibrium where the sophisticated receiver can system-
atically fool a sophisticated receiver by declaring a particular move and playing the other,
provided the sophisticated receiver believes that the sender is naive with high probabil-
ity. Chen (2011) extends the Crawford and Sobel (1982) framework by considering a
sender who may potentially be honest or dishonest, and receivers who may be naive or
sophisticated. For a finite message space, an honest sender always abides by the message
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strategy, whereas a sophisticated sender may deviate from it if he finds it optimal to do
so. On the other hand, a naive receiver always trusts the message provided, whereas
a sophisticated receiver discounts the message appropriately considering the motivation
that might have prompted the sophisticated sender to send such a message. Chen (2011)
shows that equilibrium action of the sophisticated receiver is not necessarily increasing in
the messages he receives, even if the strategic sender follows an increasing strategy. This
happens if the receiver believes with high probability that the message is coming from a
dishonest sender who has pooled with an honest sender who has observed a high value
of the state, and as a result discounts the message heavily.
The set-up in Chapter 4 is in line with games of persuasion, which may typically
be described as sender-receiver games where costless messages may be sent, and where
the information transmitted can be proved (this is known as the verifiability of certifia-
bility criterion). In such games, one or more interested sender/senders try to influence
the receiver/receivers by strategically providing or concealing information relevant to the
decision. The analysis of persuasion games may be used to investigate welfare effects of
provision of information from an interested sender to a decision maker. The earlier works
in persuasion games were by Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981). Milgrom (1981)
considers a sender with private information who can convey information or withhold it
from a receiver in order to induce an action from the receiver, which in turn is taken
into account by the receiver to deduce the sender’s private information in equilibrium.
Grossman (1981) showed that the seller is not able to mislead the potential buyer about
the quality of his product, even in a monopolistic market in the absence of reputation
concerns, if the information transmitted is verifiable. The intuition of this result is that
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the buyer will believe that the seller will only report favorable information, since the
latter has the option to choose not to reveal any information. Since the models con-
sider rational receiver/receivers who base their inferences taking into account the seller’s
incentives to withhold unfavorable information, voluntary communication results in full
revelation of the preferences of the sender. This argument behind the fully revealing
equilibrium is known as the “unraveling argument”. The unraveling equilibrium, how-
ever relies on the principle that the receiver surely knows that the sender is fully informed.
Shin (1994) has shown that if the receiver is uncertain about the sender’s information
(second order uncertainty), then a perfectly revealing equilibrium does not exist and this
feature is also captured in Okuno-Fujiwara et al (1990). The reason for the failure of
the unraveling argument and the non-existence of a fully revealing equilibrium in this
setting is that the receiver is unable to distinguish between a sender who possesses in-
formation and remains silent and one who does not possess the information in the first
place. Koessler (2004) studies the sharing of knowledge by adding a preliminary stage of
non-cooperative communication to incomplete information games. Regarding the com-
munication, it is assumed that only truthful communication is allowed in the sense that
the sender cannot disclose any information that he does not possess. However, the play-
ers cannot commit to any information transmission mechanism prior to actually receiving
the information. By using knowledge consistency conditions in equilibrium, the paper
proposes sufficient conditions for the existence of perfectly revealing equilibria in some
classes of games. Glazer and Rubinstein (2004) study a model wherein a speaker wishes
to persuade a listener to accept a certain request. The alignment of the preference of
the listener with the request made depends on the values in two dimensions, which are
known to the speaker. The listener can check the value of a single dimension. The paper
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studies mechanisms that specify a set of messages that the speaker can send and a rule
that determines the listener’s response, where the mechanisms maximize the probability
that the listener accepts the request when it is justified and rejects the request when it is
unjustified, given that the speaker maximizes the probability that his request is accepted.
The issue of when it would be beneficial for the receiver to delegate the decision -
making authority to the informed sender has been investigated in a number of papers.
Dessein (2002) shows that when the receiver encounters a biased but better-informed
sender, unconstrained delegation of decision-making to the sender is better for the re-
ceiver than cheap talk communication whenever the conflict of interests are not too large.
Since the conflict of interest is common knowledge, after hearing from the sender the re-
ceiver tries to correct for the biased message when he chooses to decide the action himself
instead of resorting to delegation. The sophisticated sender, in turn, anticipates this
discounting and accordingly tailors his message, leading to loss of information. Hence in
certain cases, delegating the job to the sender is better for the receiver than trying to
glean information from the sender and acting by himself. The paper shows that in the
standard Crawford-Sobel framework, if the state space is uniformly distributed, then for
all levels of bias wherein informative communication is feasible, delegation is better for
the receiver than communication. The main intuition is the following: in the equilib-
rium in Crawford and Sobel (1982), lower levels of conflict correspond to finer partitions
in absolute terms. However, the partitions become coarser relative to the bias, that is,
information entails more noise relative to the bias. Hence, when highly informative com-
munication is possible, it is better for the receiver to delegate authority to the sender and
avoid communication. Ivanov (2010) extends the Crawford and Sobel (1982) framework
32
by introducing a preliminary stage where the receiver chooses the information structure
of the sender denoted by the conditional distribution of signal generation given the state
of the world. The information of the sender may be coarsened such that instead of know-
ing the state for sure, the sender will know if the state belongs to finite partitions. For
the uniform quadratic specification, the paper shows that if informative communication
is possible, then controlling the sender’s information at the pre-communication stage is
ex-ante better for the receiver than delegating to the sender. Regulation of information
is also better for the receiver than receiving information from a fully informed sender as
long as informative communication is sustainable. By suitably regulating the information
content of the sender, the receiver can limit the sender’s ability to distort information
that is provided to the receiver, and thereby be better-off when compared to direct del-
egation in the process. In a separate setting that involves a voting environment with
partially informed voters, the model described in Chapter 4 finds that it is never optimal
for the voters to abrogate their voting rights and delegate decision making authorities to
the media with whom their interests are only partially aligned.
In Chapter 4, the voters who act as receivers of costless signal from the media them-
selves have access to imperfect yet informative signals regarding the state of the world. In
the literature, strategic information transmission when the receiver is privately informed
is studied in Barreda (2010), Lai (2010), and Seidmann (1990). Barreda (2010) extends
the Crawford-Sobel framework by considering the case where the receiver has access to
imperfect yet informative private information apart from the message provided by the
biased yet informed sender. The paper shows that in this setting, information provided
will be partitioned in nature. When quadratic loss preferences are considered, it is shown
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that as the precision of the private information of the receiver rises, the sender may
provide more vague information. In a separate setting, the model described in Chapter
4 finds that as the precision of the private signal of the receiver/receivers increase, the
message transmitted by the sender will be more usable in the sense that the informa-
tion will help the receiver/receivers make better decisions for all states of the world. In
Barreda (2010), the receiver’s private information may not adequately compensate for
the loss in communication due to more vague information provided, thereby leading to a
decline in welfare for both the receiver and the sender. Two effects are identified which
arise as a result of the additional information which the receiver obtains. Firstly, the
“information effect” that empowers the receiver to make better decisions on average due
to his private information. This effect encourages the sender to transmit more vague
information, since he is assured that the receiver will not choose an action too far away
from the true state owing to his private information. Hence this effect discourages com-
munication. However, there is also a “risk effect”, since unlike the traditional Crawford
and Sobel (1982) framework, the sender is no longer sure exactly which action his mes-
sage is going to induce from the receiver, (which is also dependent on the latter’s private
information that is unknown to the sender). Since the sender is risk averse, he chooses
to send more precise information to reduce the variability of the expected induced action
of the receiver. Hence the risk effect encourages communication. It is shown that the
information effect dominates the risk effect reducing communication in equilibrium. Lai
(2010) studies strategic information transmission between perfectly informed sender and
partially informed receiver, where the information set of the receiver is bi-partitioned
such that he knows for sure which partition the state belongs to. The boundary of the
partition is private information, and it is common knowledge that this threshold value is
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uniformly distributed over the state space. In this scenario, if the sender provides some
information, it may either supercede, complement or falsify the private information of
the receiver. In the paper, it is shown that exaggerated information provided by the
sender will have a lower impact in inducing suitable action from the receiver, since the
latter has assistance from an additional source of information. As a result, the expert
exaggerates more and provides even less information compared to Crawford and Sobel
(1982), which results in extending the length of the partitions for the high states and
deletion of partitions for the low states. There exists a positive measure of information
structure for which it may be possible for the receiver to be strictly worse-off compared
to the case where he was uninformed. Hence this paper shows that for a single receiver,
given information from the sender, private information of the receiver may hurt the wel-
fare of the receiver. Seidmann (1990) considers a discrete state space with a privately
informed receiver, where the ideal action of the sender is independent of the state. Here
any message provided by the sender induces a distribution of the receiver’s actions across
its types (that depends on the private information of the receiver). This implies that
there may be more than one message that induces distributions over actions that are
not ordered by stochastic dominance. The different types of senders who agree in their
preference rankings of non-stochastic actions may disagree in their preferences over the
non-stochastic distributions, thereby making effective communication feasible.
There is also a literature which studies the impact of public information in binary ac-
tion co-ordination games where agents have both private and public signals about some
underlying state. This is linked to the model described in Chapter 4, as in that chapter
we investigate how the introduction of public news through the transmission of news by
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the media outlet affects voter welfare. Hirshleifer (1971) studies the scenario where indi-
viduals are unsure only about the size of their own commodity endowments and/or about
the profitability of their personal productive investments. It is shown that additional pri-
vate information of an individual leads to his gain at the expense of his colleagues. But
public information leads to re-directing productive decisions, and rational agents find it
optimal to combine in order to generate public information through formation of public
agencies such as the government. Angeletos and Pavan (2004) consider an environment
of macroeconomic complementarity and study how the precision of publicly provided and
privately collected information affect equilibrium allocations and social welfare. In their
model the individual’s return to investment is increasing in the aggregate level of invest-
ment and agents have different expectations about the underlying economic variables.
The paper shows that welfare unambiguously increases with an increase in precision of
public information, and policies that either disseminate more precise information about
economic fundamentals, or reduce the variability of interpretation of policies, necessarily
boost welfare. On the other hand, an increase in the precision of private information may
reduce welfare by increasing the heterogeneity of expectations and impeding market co-
ordination. This result is in contrast with Morris and Shin (2002), who show that public
information may hurt welfare and private information proves beneficial. In particular,
Morris and Shin (2002) consider a setup wherein the payoff of every agent is a weighted
sum of two parts: the first part is the distance of his chosen action and the true state of
the world; the second part depends on the average distance between the agent’s action
and the action profile of the entire population. Owing to this second term, there is an
incentive for the agents to coordinate their actions, due to this externality each agent tries
to second guess the decision of the other agents. With perfect information, each agent
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chooses his action to be equal to the true state of the world, and this maximizes social
welfare defined in turn as the normalized average of individual utilities. The nature of
public and private information is similar, both consisting of a signal that is composed of
the true state of the world to which a random error term is added. The variability of the
error term determines the precision of the information. In this set-up, if an agent observes
a public signal that is lower than his private signal, then his expectation of others’ expec-
tation of the true state is lower than his own expectation of the true state. If the incentive
to co-ordinate is sufficiently high, the action by every agent is closer to the public signal
than what is informationally efficient, leading to a loss in welfare. Thus, the attempt
the agents make to align their actions is socially wasteful. Hellwig (2005) studies the
welfare effects of disclosure of public information in a setting of monopolistic competition
among firms which vary in the levels of information at their disposal. This variation in
information content may lead to delays in price adjustments and increases the effects of
monetary shocks. If public information is provided, it leads to lower price dispersion and
unlike Morris and Shin (2002), always leads to welfare improvement. In a more general
setting, Angeletos and Pavan (2007) study the equilibrium and welfare properties for
games characterized by strategic complementarity or substitutability in the presence of
heterogeneous information. They show that complementarity increases the sensitivity of
equilibrium actions to public information, while substitutability increases the sensitivity
of equilibrium actions to private information, which increases cross-sectional dispersion.
Cao and Hirshleifer (2000) consider a model of informational herding by incorporating
word-of mouth learning, where agents are at liberty to observe not only past actions
undertaken by other agents but also the outcomes arising out of those actions. In this
context, they define an information regime to be fragile if at a particular time period, an
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induction of a public piece of information whose precision is not greater than that of the
private information possessed by the single agent himself changes the behaviour of the
next agent with positive probability. The paper shows that cascades may be formed that
aggregate information inefficiently and are fragile. Gersbach (2000) studies the commu-
nity members’ desire to have public information in a collective choice process governed
by a social choice function. The value of public information is the difference between
the expected utility, when agents know that everybody will become informed, and the
expected utility under ignorance. The paper considers heterogeneity among voters (in
terms of preferences over outcomes) and shows that under certain axiomatic assumptions
(non-decisiveness and Pareto) of the social choice function, there are payoff structures
for every social choice function whereby an arbitrary subset of agents is worse off from
public information. It follows therefore that the use of a social choice function for decid-
ing whether to gather information can lead to the adoption or rejection of information
gathering. In this context, Gersbach (1995) shows that if the aggregation rule is majority,
then the majority is better-off if public information is acquired in the set-up when no
distributional uncertainty exists and only two options are present.
With regards to committees, Condorcet (1785) argued that the majority of equally
competent individuals who vote according to their own signals in an election with binary
alternatives are more likely to make the optimal decision than a single individual. Also,
increasing the number of informed committee members raises the probability that a
correct decision is arrived at. Furthermore, the theorem states that the probability of
making the correct decision goes to one as the number of committee members tends to
infinity. In the theorem, Condorcet assumed that individuals always reveal their signal
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about the true state of the world. However, there are a number of papers which investigate
the aggregation of information in committees where this particular assumption of agents
voting non-strategically is dropped. It is shown that in case the agents are resorting to
strategic voting, it may be that voters may not always reveal their signal about the true
state of the world, and for these cases the Condorcet Jury Theorem may not hold. This
is because under strategic voting, each particular voter considers the private information
of the rest of the voters, and decides his own vote accordingly. In the process, it may be
that his personal information may not be able to influence his voting decision in a decisive
way. By incorporating strategic voting, a strand of literature (for example, Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1998)) has examined the validity of
the Condorcet Jury Theorem and made comparisons across different aggregation rules.
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) consider the following three voting strategies: “sincere”
voting, which takes place when each voter votes on the basis of the prior and the private
signal, “informative” voting, where the votes cast reflect the private signal of the voter,
and “rational” voting, where the voting profile constitutes a Nash-equilibrium of the
Bayesian game and represents strategic voting. They show that if the signal strengths
are homogenous, then if the prior and signal strength are such that sincere voting is
informative and rational, then it is possible if and only if aggregation rule is majoritarian,
which is also true in the model described in Chapter 4. However, in Chapter 4 it is found
that there may arise situations where the prior and signal strengths are such that sincere
voting is no longer informative and rational. For these cases sincere voting is rational
but no longer informative.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) provide an explanation for why voters abstain
strategically from voting even though it is costless to vote. The paper considers a two-
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alternative voting model with finite voters having heterogeneous preferences operating
under plurality rule. There are three types of voters: two types of partisans, who, re-
gardless of the state of the world, prefer either one of the alternatives, and independents,
who prefer to select the option that matches the true state of the world. Some voters re-
ceive a completely uninformative signal, while others receive a perfectly informative one.
The uninformed independent voters’ follow a mixed strategy of abstention and voting.
The reason to cast a vote is to compensate for the partisans, thereby maximizing the
possibility that the informed voters turn out to be pivotal in determining the outcome
of the election. In the context of jury trials, there is a conjecture that the unanimity
rule of conviction in trials would reduce the probability of convicting an innocent while
increasing the probability of acquitting a guilty defendant. Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998) investigate this claim in an environment of strategic voting by jurors. They study
a two alternative voting model where each voter is privately informed. Voters vary with
respect to their leniency, which is given by their threshold probability of the defendant’s
guilt above which they are prepared to vote in favour of sentencing by voting guilty. Each
juror behaves as if he is pivotal and therefore, under the unanimity rule, additional infor-
mation is revealed about the state of the world, which may overwhelm the private signal
of the voter and cause him to vote with the others. Thus the probability of convicting
an innocent defendant is bounded away from zero, and this holds even when the size of
the jury is high.
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Chapter 3
Professional Advice from Randomly
Transparent Committees
3.1 Motivation
“In the world of diplomacy, known for its ambiguity and opacity, the Wik-
iLeaks organization says its function is to “keep government open.” But with
the release of some 250,000 American diplomatic cables, the outcome may be
more ambiguous, closing doors to United States diplomats, turning candour
to reticence and leaving many people leery of baring their souls and secrets
to American officials.”
The New York Times News Service, Dec 5, 2010.
This chapter1 studies voting behaviour of careerist experts (who have expertise in three in-
dependent and equally important dimensions) in a secret committee where voting profiles
get ‘leaked’ to the public with an exogenously given probability. We focus on informative
1The contents of this chapter is joint work with Jaideep Roy.
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voting, where every expert votes in accordance to his privately formed posterior probabil-
ity and social welfare, which is the ex-ante gain of the society from a correct decision in
every dimension. We show that for informative voting to be obtained as an equilibrium
outcome, it is important that the committee uses the unanimity voting rule along with an
intermediate probability of transparency provided that the common prior is not too infor-
mative. We then show that no committee that enforces informative voting can maximise
social welfare (from the decision recommended by the committee), that is, informative
voting and welfare-maximisation are mutually exclusive properties. Moreover, within the
class of unanimous committees, randomness of transparency is never socially desirable
so that either a fully transparent or a fully secretive committee is required under the
unanimity voting rule in order to maximise welfare. We also show that with a low prior
(the case where expert committees are most valuable to the society), a committee using
the majority rule and operating with full transparency is better for the society than any
unanimous committee. Many important decisions are taken by professional experts who
care only about their reputation. They often operate in secret committees so that one
seldom gets to know the personal opinions of these experts who constitute the commit-
tee. A considerable amount of past research has focussed on how reputational concerns
affect incentives of experts to advise truthfully in different types of committees classified
by voting rules, and also on whether secrecy is desirable or should committee voting be
made fully transparent.2
2In contrast to the literature on professional experts, there is a large literature that investigates voting
in committees where agents have private preferences over the outcomes. One motivation comes through
the jury literature, particularly the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)
was the first to question the apparently innocuous assumption that voters vote ‘sincerely’, in a model
where agents have private preferences over the outcomes. The conflict between informativeness and
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We examine the issue of quality of professional advice obtained from a committee
with random transparency, an institutional environment where experts act in a suppos-
edly secretive committee but face an exogenous probability with which all their personal
opinions are collectively ‘leaked to the public (or an evaluator or a decision maker)’. Our
focus is on two aspects of such expert advice: informativeness of individual recommenda-
tions and aggregate welfare from the decisions reached by the committees they represent.
We analyse how these two properties are affected by the transparency probability and the
committee voting rule.3
We study a model where three professional experts in independent dimensions (and
possibly varying in their levels of expertise) constitute a committee that takes a binary
decision (between two alternatives, A and B) via plurality voting. All agents start with
a common prior biased towards choice B which is also shared by the public acting as
the evaluator of their talents. Experts receive signals whose information content reflects
their talents and talents are private information.
Once all experts in the committee have cast their votes, the committee decision is
made public. The public then observes the true state in each dimension and may also
observe the collective set of individual votes (if leaked). It then forms a belief about the
true talent of each expert. The experts are solely driven by careerist goals in the sense
that ceteris paribus, they strive to enhance their reputations in the eyes of the public
that act as the evaluator of their talent. We characterise such a committee by the voting
welfare was also raised in their work where it was noted that apart from considering the implementability
of informative voting strategies, the welfare considerations need to be taken into account as well. Gerling
et al. (2005) provides a survey on these and other related issues.
3We lend special attention to situations where the common prior is not too informative as it is only
then that the society would benefit most from recommendations of better informed committees.
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rule (unanimity and simple-majority)4 and the exogenous probability of transparency.
Welfare from an individual expert’s advice is then the gains made by the society when
the committee decision matches with the observed state in that expert’s dimension, or
in other words, the decision taken is correct in accordance with expert’s dimension of
expertise . Likewise, an individual advice is informative if the expert’s advice follows his
privately formed posterior.
We build on the the large body of previous work regarding the behaviour of profes-
sional advisers or decision makers driven by career concerns. The seminal work in this
area is by Holmstrom (1999), who finds that professional managers are averse to investing
in projects which are more likely to reveal whether they are talented or not, and prefer
to go with safer projects which hedge them more against investment failure. The concept
of herding has been explored in Scharfstein and Stein (1990), where the experts wish to
convince the evaluator that they voted in the same way.
The relationship between career concerns and herding have been addressed in a num-
ber of other works. In Zwiebel (1995), mediocre quality experts herd in order to set up
a robust benchmark for the evaluator to judge their talents. In Ottaviani and Sorensen
(2006a), the professional experts report sequentially and over time, the informative con-
tent of past reports overwhelm that of the current expert and he reports in accordance
with the reports of the previous rounds by ignoring his own information. In contrast,
there have also been papers where career concerns prompt the experts to ‘anti-herd’.
Effinger and Polborn (2001) identify the anti-herding effect where an expert is valuable
4In this binary set-up with B as the ‘status quo’ choice, the unanimity rule is biased towards B in
the sense that the committee decision is A if and only if all experts provide advice in favour of A, and
otherwise the status quo is upheld. Clearly, the simple majority rule does not suffer from such a bias.
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if he is the ‘only’ able expert, hence he is encouraged to act differently than the ones pre-
ceding him. In one of the first works in reputational cheap talk literature, Levy (2004)
showed that for a single expert (therefore in the absence of relative competition), abso-
lute career concerns were sufficient to generate anti-herding behaviour by the expert. She
interprets anti-herding to be the tendency of the expert to vote against the state which is
the likelier one according to the prior. The concept of herding is analogously defined. In
the model described in this chapter the concepts of herding and anti-herding are defined
in a similar way. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006 b) model the equilibrium behaviour of
professional experts when expert advice deviates from truth-telling in a typical sender-
receiver scenario but with the sender caring about his own reputation that is generated
from the advice he provides (rather than the usual conflict of preferences over outcomes
as in the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) and the vast literature around it).
In their model, the quality of the expert’s information is evaluated on the basis of the
advice given and the actual state of the world realized ex-post, a feature that is present
in our model as well. They show that their result on departure from truth-telling is valid
both for the cases where the experts are aware or unaware of their own talent levels.5
Like the model in this chapter, they also characterise the set of equilibria as a function
of the prior belief on the state.
The link between herding (or anti-herding) in the presence of career concerns and the
theory of committees was first studied in Levy (2007a). In particular, she compares a
fully transparent with a fully secretive committee to show that career minded experts,
5The literature on reputation remains divided on the assumption whether an expert knows his type
or not. Holmstrom(1999) and Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986) assume that agents do not know
their type, whereas Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) assume that agents do
know their type.
45
while voting strategically, exhibit conformist (herding) or non-conformist (anti-herding)
tendencies so that at the end their votes may not be informative or efficient. Her work
also highlights the importance of the voting rule used in such committees. We borrow
the basic model from Levy (2007a) to check if these biased tendencies are corrected with
random transparency.6 Levy (2007a) finds that if the common prior is sufficiently biased
towards the status quo alternative, a secretive committee with the unanimity rule induces
the highest level of welfare. We show that this is not a local result as it is robust to the
possibility that transparency can be random (and smooth). However, Levy (2007a) does
not report welfare results when the prior is not too biased. We show that for low values of
the prior, the opposite result holds where secrecy hurts welfare and it is optimal to have
perfectly transparent committees if one is confined to the unanimity rule.7 Interestingly,
we also find that in every such situation of low prior, the simple majority rule yields the
maximum level of aggregate welfare.
3.2 The Model
There are two possible actions A and B. Information about which should be the ‘correct
choice’ is available from three equally important and independent sources (or dimensions),
called 1, 2 and 3 (where each dimension can be thought of as an independent criterion to
6The model we study is a generalization of the model used in Levy (2007a) where only the two extreme
cases of fully transparent and fully secretive environments are studied.
7The model in this chapter also sheds light on Levy’s (2007b) welfare characterisation for the unani-
mous rule by considering a more general setting with random transparency. Moreover in Levy (2007b),
the analysis was confined to two member committees, as the goal of that paper was to characterise welfare
in terms of voting rule biases for or against the prior. Therefore in the paper the welfare implications
for the simple majority rule could not be looked into.
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judge the merits of each action).8 The true state in dimension i is denoted by wi ∈ W =
{a, b}, i = 1, 2, 3, with the following interpretation: B is the correct action according to
dimension i if and only if wi = b. Let W = {a, b}3 with w = (w1, w2, w3) ∈ W . Let
pii = Pr[wi = b] > 1/2 be the common prior for dimension i. For tractability, we assume
that pii = pi for each i = 1, 2, 3.
9
The choice of an action is determined by a committee composed of three experts called
i = 1, 2, 3. Expert i is a specialist exclusively in dimension i and receives a private signal
si ∈ S = {a, b} about the true state wi in his dimension of expertise. The informative
precision, denoted by ti, of the signal si is called expert i’s talent, with ti ∈ T = [1/2, 1],
i.e.,
Pr[si = a|wi = a] = Pr[si = b|wi = b] = ti.
Individual talents are private information and remain so throughout; however, it is com-
mon knowledge that they are uniformly and independently distributed over the support
T .10
Expert i gives an advice mi ∈ M = {a, b} simultaneously and independently along
8The degree of inter-dimensional dependence is unimportant if the committee is fully transparent. As
our focus is isolating the effect of career concerns in a secretive set up, we have maintained this flavour
of transparency by keeping the dimensions completely uncorrelated. In section 4 we informally address
the issue of correlated dimensions.
9Since pi > 1/2 one may think of B as the conventional choice or the choice the ‘society’ or the
‘decision maker’ would have taken in the absence of the committee, assuming, as we do implicitly, that
the public’s preferences over outcomes is anonymous.
10A model with the above characteristics can be extremely meaningful in medical practice, large body
public construction schemes, warfare, EU committees where each expert represents a single member-
state of the union or any other area where there are many equally and uncompromisingly important
dimensions of uncertainties for which one needs to respect the opinions of several specialized experts of
different talents.
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with the other experts and the advice (or simply vote) a (likewise b) is construed as the
statement that “a (likewise b) is the true state according to dimension i”. Denote by
M = {a, b}3 as the space of vote profiles with m = (m1,m2,m3) ∈ M. The decision
of the committee is denoted by dx and is defined by the voting rule x ∈ X = {2, 3} as
follows: dx : M → {A,B} aggregates dimension-dependent advices to recommend an
action such that dx = A if and only if |{i : mi = a}| ≥ x. If x = 2 we call this majority
while if x = 3 we call this A-unanimity (or, unanimity in short).
The true states wi, i = 1, 2, 3, become known to the public only after votes are cast
and the committee decision dx (that is always observed by the public) is reached. A
randomly transparent committee is then a pair C = (x, p) consisting of a secret committee
of three experts with voting rule x and the probability p ∈ P = [0, 1] with which the
voting profile m = (m1,m2,m3) ∈M is revealed to the public.
We shall use the term terminal node to denote the tuple (m,w). It is reached ‘only
if’ the public observes the voting profile and the states. Call I =M×W the set of all
terminal nodes. Let ζi be a conjecture held by the public about how expert i plays and
let τ (defined rigorously later) be the talent evaluation function, which is the Bayesian
posterior expectation held by the public about the talent ti of expert i at each terminal
node (m,w) ∈ I. The pay-off function of expert i is simply τ .11 The experts are risk
neutral and vote in order to maximise expected payoff, conditional on their talent and
their private signal. The above environment gives rise to a 3 - player strategic voting
game where the time line is as depicted in figure 1.
In the following section, we make precise the notions of strategies, evaluation functions,
11We drop the subscript i and so avoid writing τi as the τ function is simply a Bayesian update and
hence the experts’ identities in that function are irrelevant.
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Figure 3.1: Time line of a randomly transparent committee (for i = 1, 2, 3 and for a given
prior pi on the states in each dimension).
informative voting and aggregate welfare.
3.3 Evaluation of Talent, Informative Voting and Ag-
gregate Welfare
As in any standard model of strategic voting, experts provide advice as if they are pivotal.
Denote expert i’s voting strategy by σi, which is a function σi : T × S × P ×X →M . It
is a complete specification of how expert i would vote when she is of type ti ∈ T , receives
a private signal si ∈ S, faces transparency with probability p ∈ P and the committee
follows the voting rule x ∈ X. Let Σ be the space of all such voting strategies for expert
i.
The conjecture ζi held by the public about the experts’ voting strategy σi, is a function
ζ : T × S × P × X → M . The conjecture states explicitly, via the voting strategy σ,
the vote mi ∈ M that expert i would cast if her type is ti ∈ T, receives a private signal
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si ∈ S, faces transparency with probability p ∈ P and the committee follows the voting
rule x ∈ X. We let Z be the set of all such conjectures on expert i, ζi ∈ Z. This conjecture
leads to the beliefs we need to specify in order to define a Bayes Nash equilibrium via
the public’s expectations about ti.
The talent evaluation function is then τ : I × Z → [1/2, 1], i = 1, 2, 3, with
τ(mi, wi, ζi) = E(ti|(mi, wi), ζi) being the expectation held by the public about the true
value of expert i’s talent at node (m,w), given the conjecture ζi. The derived expressions
for τ are provided in the Appendix 2 in subsection 3.7.2.
The public learns the true state wi for each dimension i, updates beliefs on ti, in the
process generating a Bayesian probability belief αdx that mi = a.
12 It is important to
note that experts keep in mind αdx when advising. However, αdx depends, among other
things, on wi, i = 1, 2, 3 which expert i does not observe at the time he advises. As far
as wi is concerned, he forms beliefs about it’s true value using pi, si and ti, while for wj
and wk, he only uses pi. Consequently, an expert forms an expectation about αdx given
the fact that he votes as if he is pivotal. We denote this expectation by α.13 The formal
expressions for αdx and α will be derived and used directly in the proof of Proposition 1.
Given α and the transparency probability p, an expert forms an expectation about the
public evaluation about himself based upon his private signal si. In what follows, this
final expectation held by an expert shall be denoted by the operator Esi .
We are now ready to define a Nash equilibrium of the game.
12To be sure, it leads to degeneracy in the event m becomes publicly known. Also note that if mi and
wi are observed (for example, when leaked), then the evaluation of ti becomes independent of (mj ,mk)
and (wj , wk).
13Note that α is meaningful only if the voting profile m is not revealed as otherwise αdx becomes
degenerate.
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Definition 1. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1, σ
∗
2, σ
∗
3) constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the
above Bayesian game if, given ζ∗ = (ζ∗1 , ζ
∗
2 , ζ
∗
3 ), each expert i adopts a strategy which is
optimal for him, i.e. Esi [τ |σ∗] ≥ Esi [τ |(σi, σ∗−i)] for any σi 6= σ∗i .14
Let µwi = Pr[mi = a|wi, ti, ζ∗]. Given a randomly transparent committee C = (x, p),
we say that expert i’s voting is state-reflective if µa > µb.
The standard representation of voting strategies in this environment involves the
notion of a cut-off talent that identifies an expert who is indifferent between voting a and
b when she receives a signal si = a against the common prior.
Definition 2. A voting strategy σ is called a cut-off strategy if there exists a cut-off
talent t(x, p; pi) ∈ T such that σi prescribes the following:
mi =

b for all ti ∈ T if si = b, and for all ti ≤ t(x, p; pi) if si = a,
a otherwise.
The above strategy is state-reflective. We now define the notion of informative voting.
Let v(pi, ti|si) be the posterior probability-belief held by an expert with talent ti who
receives a private signal si that the true state of his criterion is wi = a.
Definition 3. We say that expert i’s voting strategy σi is informative if σi implies the
following: mi = b if and only if v(pi, ti|si) ≤ 12 , and mi = a otherwise. A randomly
transparent committee C = (x, p) shall then be called informative if there exists a Nash
equilibrium σ∗ of the 3-player strategic advice game induced by C = (x, p) such that σ∗i
is informative for all i = 1, 2, 3.
Informative voting implies the following: despite being driven by the reputation they
would earn, each expert would advise the action A if and only if her privately formed pos-
14As in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) and Levy (2007a), this is a weak equilibrium notion as no
restrictions are imposed on the public’s conjecture when observing behaviour off the equilibrium path.
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terior probability is such that she actually believes A to be the correct action with higher
probability than B according to her dimension of expertise. Note that this is a different
(and perhaps more useful) criterion to consider than the case where the message sent
by the expert is a direct revelation of the private signal he receives. This is because the
talent levels of the experts (known to the expert concerned) are heterogeneous and never
observed by the public. Therefore, informativeness implies the following: each expert
uses his private signal, talent level and the prior to calculate the posterior probability
and votes according to that.
While informativeness of committees is an important feature and well addressed in
the literature on related papers, in a model where experts can be ex-post heterogeneous
in their talents, there may arise a conflict between informative voting and committee
decisions that are desirable by the society, for example if a decision supported by highly
talented experts is stalled by a relatively unskilled vote against it. If the public is aware
that the committee decision will be implemented, they would at the end care about the
probability of the decision being correct. We ask whether this conflict between informative
voting and probability of correct committee decision can be mitigated via appropriate
choices of the voting rule x and transparency probability p, or is it always in the interest of
the public that some experts lie. To address this in the present framework, Levy (2007a)
uses an aggregate welfare function and below we propose a generalisation of that.
Let α, β ∈ R, with α > β. Suppose the society gains α utils whenever the decision
is correct in a particular dimension and β if it is wrong. The aggregate welfare under a
randomly transparent committee C = (x, p) at prior pi is given by
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W (x, p, pi) =
∑
w∈W
Pr(w)[(Pr(d = A|w, x, t(x, p; pi))×
∑
k∈i,j,h
Iak + (Pr(d = B|w, x, t(x, p; pi))
∑
k∈i,j,h
Ibk]
where, for z ∈ {a, b} in dimension k, k = 1, 2, 3, we have
Izk =

α if wk = z and
β otherwise.
Remark 1. If α = 1 and β = 0 (as used in Levy 2007a), then welfare becomes equivalent
to the aggregate probability that the committee’s decision dx is correct (ex-post) on
as many dimensions as possible (sometimes referred to as the information aggregation
criterion). As our results on welfare are ordinal, we shall show that truthful voting can
never lead to efficient information aggregation.
In the next section we address our two main concerns: whether there exists an infor-
mative committee and which committees maximise aggregate welfare.
3.4 Quality of Advice from Expert Committees
We begin by characterising randomly transparent committees which are informative. We
show that majoritarian committees are never so while unanimous ones are provided the
probability of leakage of individual votes takes an intermediate value and the prior is not
too biased towards alternative B. We make this precise in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider a randomly transparent committee C = (x, p) with voting rule
x ∈ {2, 3} and transparency probability p ∈ [0, 1] and let pi ∈ (1/2, 1) be an arbitrary
common prior. Then in equilibrium, the following is true:
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1. If x = 2 then for all p ∈ [0, 1] and for all pi ∈ (1/2, 1), C = (x, p) is not informative;
2. If x = 3, then there exists p˜i ∈ (1/2, 1) such that (a) for each pi < p˜i, there exists
p ∈ (0, 1) such that C(x, p) is informative and (b) for all pi ≥ p˜i and all p ∈ [0, 1],
C = (x, p) is not informative.
The proof of the above proposition is moved to Appendix 1. In order to uncover the
logic of the above result, we first note that only an expert i with a low talent will ever
be indifferent between mi = a and mi = b, while experts with high talents will likely be
inclined to follow their personal signals. Given this, we can identify the following forces
that affect the way the experts vote.
Non-conformism or anti-herding is promoted by virtue of an innate tendency to pro-
vide advice in favour of the unconventional choice (A, in our model), given the fact that
the experts know they will be hailed by the public as more talented if they can correctly
predict an outcome the public initially thinks to be less possible (since pi > 1/2). This
tendency gets stronger higher the value of the prior is and always works in favour of
recommending the state as a. This is the only force at work when the committee is fully
transparent (p = 1). Hence reducing the probability of transparency helps dampen this
tendency to anti-herd.
In the case when secrecy of committees is guaranteed (p = 0), we need to look
separately at the unanimous and the majority committees to analyse the different forces
at work. Consider first the unanimity rule (x = 3). Here if the expert is pivotal and
advises mi = a, thereby throwing his weight on the action A, the committee decision
will be A, and the public will clearly know that her personal message was indeed a.
Notice that in this case, the non-conformist force will be at play again as it then becomes
essentially a transparent committee with p = 1. However, if he recommends mi = b,
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then while the decision will be B, the public will not be sure what she individually voted
for. Hence, whether his private recommendation a ‘should be fully revealed’ or he would
recommend b making his recommendation noisy in the eyes of the public is a decision the
pivotal expert takes strategically. The experts with mediocre talents are not confident of
their capabilities, and hence seek to vote in a way such that it becomes difficult for the
public to ascertain exactly what their private advices were. This objective is achieved
by voting b. So under unanimity, the mediocre expert is tempted to be a conformist and
vote in favour of the choice B in order to disguise his personal vote from the public. With
these opposing forces at work, the rest of the proposition relies on purely quantitative
aspects and we show that there are degrees of transparency under which the two forces
will counter-balance each other and elicit informative voting from all types of experts.
Now consider x = 2 under full secrecy (p = 0). Note that unlike in the case with
x = 3, here, irrespective of whether the pivotal expert votes for a or b, he can never
make it perfectly clear to the public what he himself voted for. Given this, while a
‘wrong advice’ is not so harmful for the expert’s reputation, he is not rewarded enough
for a correct advice either. However, due to the inherent rationale of non-conformism
explained earlier, the experts remain tempted to be overly non-conformist, even in a
secretive (p = 0) majoritarian committee and hence informative votes cannot be elicited
from them.
Having understood if and when informative voting can be sustained, we move on to
welfare issues. The next result compares the welfare properties of committees working
under different aggregation rules and under different transparency probabilities.
We have the following proposition which holds independent of the welfare intensities
α and β and hence we prove a very general result on welfare.
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Proposition 2. Consider a randomly transparent committee C = (x, p) where the voting
rule is x and where p is the transparency probability. Then, for all α, β ∈ R, α > β, the
following is true in equilibrium:
1. C = (x, p) is informative if and only if it is not welfare maximising.
2. Suppose x = 3. Then there exist two threshold levels of the common prior, 1/2 <
pi∗ ≤ pi∗∗ < 1 such that (a) for all pi < pi∗, aggregate welfare is maximised if and
only if p = 1, and (b) for all pi > pi∗∗, aggregate welfare is maximised if and only if
p = 0.
3. There exists a threshold level of the common prior pˆi > 1/2 such that for all pi < pˆi, a
fully transparent (i.e. p = 1) majoritarian (i.e. x = 2) committee is socially better
than a unanimous (x = 3) committee with any transparency probability p ∈ [0, 1].
The proof of the above proposition is moved to Appendix 1 in subsection 3.7.1. The
results provided in Proposition 2 stem from the facts that the talent levels of the experts
are heterogeneous and the weights assigned to all the dimensions, as well as the votes
of all the experts are equal. Suppose two of the experts are highly talented while the
third is weak. Suppose also that according to their best knowledge (posteriors v(·)),
the two smart experts feel that A should be the correct choice (the probability of this
happening is inversely related to the prior pi), but according to the weak expert it is B.
In an informative voting equilibrium, each of them would vote according to their true
posteriors. But if the voting rule requires unanimity for decision A to pass, it shall not be
passed as the committee decision. This hampers aggregate welfare, because even though
the weak expert has voted informatively, the quality of information at his disposal is
low owing to his mediocre talents. Hence in order to maximise aggregate welfare under
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unanimous committees, informative voting is not the criterion to be considered and we
require, in this case, the weak expert to exhibit non-conformist tendencies (or anti-herd).
The fact that this is the case no matter what is the transparency probability p and the
prior pi even when ex-ante all experts are identically distributed on the talent interval
[1/2, 1] is on the other hand a striking conclusion.
When pi is low, the welfare maximising choice would be to have as much transparency
as possible to push for non-conformism, thereby minimising the inherent inefficiency
embedded in the unanimity rule just discussed. On the other hand, when pi is high, welfare
maximisation warrants minimising the chance of overturning the committee decision in
favour of the unconventional state, which under unanimity is maximised under full secrecy
(p = 0).
As mentioned before, expert advice becomes most important for the society when
the prior is hardly informative so that the public or the decision maker needs expert
recommendation to decide which action to take. Part (3) of Proposition 2 shows that
when the prior is low, a fully transparent committee using the simple majority rule is
better in terms of aggregate welfare than any unanimous committee. This is due to the
fact that the simple majority rule does not suffer from any bias in favour of either choices,
whereas the unanimity rule is inherently biased in favour of the conventional choice B.
This inherent aggregation bias reduces the level of welfare under unanimity for all sorts of
randomness of unanimous committees and can be beaten by an appropriate majoritarian
committee when the prior is sufficiently low. Hence even under full transparency (p = 1),
welfare achieved under unanimity is less than that that under majority. This result is in
line with what is shown in Fedderson and Pesendorfer (1998) in the context of strategic
juries.
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The following Corollary draws on the implications of Proposition 1 and Proposition
2.
Corollary 1. Informative Voting and Aggregate Welfare Maximisation through commit-
tee decisions are mutually exclusive objectives if experts care about their individual rep-
utations, know their own expertise and have private information in independent spheres
of expertise.
3.5 Correlated Signals
We now discuss briefly how the results are likely to change if the dimensions are informa-
tionally correlated. If this correlation is low enough (in the extreme case tending to zero),
then our results should hold. But suppose there is a high degree of correlation among
the dimensions. Take the example of x = 3. Then the pivotal expert receiving the signal
si = a and deciding to vote for B knows that the other two must have voted in favour of
outcome A. Due to the high degree of inter-dimensional correlation, he may take this as
evidence in favour of the true state in his dimension being a as well. Since the reputa-
tion gained by making the correct recommendation is higher, he is more inclined to vote
in favour of the unconventional choice A. This may be termed as the pivotality effect.
Moreover the fact that the reputation gained by correctly predicting the unconventional
choice is higher than that for the conventional choice B is still true. Thus, the intensity
of the bias in our model which prompts the mediocre experts to favour voting for the
conventional choice B when x = 3 gets weakened in this set-up due to the existence of the
additional pivotality effect. Hence if the dimensions are highly correlated, informative
voting will either not be achievable or the required range of priors to do so will shrink
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(for example, p˜i as in Proposition 1 falls). Note that the extra pivotality effect is absent
when x = 2. Hence when x = 2, the impossibility result that informative voting is not
implementable should hold even when the dimensions are correlated. Now we consider
aggregate welfare. Since a distorting pivotality effect exists only when x = 3, our result
that for sufficiently low values of the prior, x = 2 promotes higher welfare than x = 3
should hold in the case of correlated dimensions as well.
3.6 Summary and Possible Extensions
In the model described in Chapter 3, the objective was to examine the direction and
magnitude of influence that random transparency might have on the informativeness of
expert advice and welfare from expert committee decisions when the experts are moti-
vated by their private career concerns. We find that for informative voting to be obtained
as an equilibrium outcome, it is necessary and sufficient to have the following: a unan-
imous committee, probabilistic transparency (which is neither too high nor too low),
and a prior that is not too informative. It follows then that the simple majority rule
is never good for the objective of informative voting. However we then show that even
if there exist such unanimous committees with intermediate probabilities of transparen-
cies to achieve informative voting, they can never maximise aggregate welfare, that is,
informative voting and maximising aggregate welfare are mutually exclusive virtues for
professional committees. We next show that within the class of unanimous committees,
randomness of transparency is also never socially desirable. In particular there exists a
critical value of the common prior such that if the prior falls below that level, unanimous
committees serve the society best in this respect only under full transparency while for
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priors above that level, full secrecy is desired. Hence when committee decisions are taken
unanimously, the presence of whistle blowers and organisations like the Wikileaks which
introduces probabilistic transparency can be socially harmful. Finally we show that if
the common prior is small (the only case where informative voting is at all attainable),
the majority rule is most promising for welfare.
We have been unable to prove analytically some other conjectures that came out of
numerical simulations and we now report them briefly. First, we have observed that
in Proposition 2, pi∗ = pi∗∗. This means that for unanimous committees there exists
a unique threshold level of the prior pi∗ such that for all priors below (above) pi∗, full
transparency (secrecy) maximises aggregate welfare. Second, when the prior pi is high
enough, a fully secretive (p = 0) unanimous committee yields a higher welfare than
any majoritarian committee (which is an additional observation concerning Part (3) in
Proposition 2). Also, if we solely focus on the degree of non-informativeness (that is the
absolute difference of the cut-off posterior probability v(t∗(x, p;pi), pi|a) from 1
2
), one can
observe that under certain conditions, the majoritarian committee is less distortionary
than its unanimous counterpart. In particular, the following holds: there exist priors
pi′, pˆi with 0 < pi′ ≤ pˆi < p˜i < 1 such that (1) ∀pi > pˆi, the degree of non-informativeness
under unanimity is lesser than that under simple majority; moreover, a fully secretive
(p = 0) unanimous committee is the least non-informative one for all pi ≥ p˜i. (2) ∀pi < pi′,
there exists a unique transparency probability ppi with 0 < ppi < 1 such that (a) ∀p < ppi,
the degree of non-informativeness is lesser under a majoritarian committee, while (b)
∀p > ppi, it is lesser under a unanimous committees.
There are a number of extensions which may be looked into in this framework. For
example, it will be interesting to investigate how the results on informative voting and
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welfare will change if the number of experts is increased from three. Studying the 3-
expert case has allowed us to look at an unbiased aggregation rule (simple majority), and
a biased aggregation rule (A-unanimity). However, increasing the number of experts will
provide the opportunity to study the impact of super-majority rules as well. We have one
conjecture for a specific aggregation rule in this regard. As an illustration, let us consider
the number of experts to be a hundred. Suppose the A-unanimity aggregation rule is
considered such that the committee decision will be A only if all the hundred experts
vote a, and will be B otherwise. In this case, if the pivotal expert with mediocre talent
level votes b, the decision will be B, and it will be much more difficult for the public
to ascertain what he has personally voted for than in the three-expert case. Hence the
incentive for the mediocre expert to be a conformist and vote in favour of the conventional
choice in order to disguise his personal vote from the public gets stronger as the number
of committee members increases. Therefore, the degree of leakage optimally required
to elicit informative voting should increase. We may also consider a scenario where
the experts care explicitly for welfare and are not solely driven by career concerns. If
the aggregate welfare function explicitly enters the pay-off function of the expert, then
his incentive to vote for the conventional choice b will rise as the prior increases and vice
versa. Also, we may consider an endogenous model of leakage where individual committee
members may choose to reveal their personal recommendations to the public. It would
be interesting to know whether endogeneity of leakage can lead to leakage at all and if
so which types of experts would be more inclined to do so. Further, one may also model
exogenous leakage institutions in greater detail to understand the different objectives
which lead to varying degrees of transparency and whether the design of committees
itself can control this exogenous randomness. One may also ask if our results hold in
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a scenario wherein private information transmission is allowed among experts through
deliberation and how randomness affect the value of information flow across experts. We
reserve these extensions for future research.
3.7 Chapter Appendix
We divide the Appendix containing the proofs of the results described in this chapter
into two parts. The main proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 are in Appendix 1. Thes proofs
require us to prove some further sub-results which we move to Appendix 2 to maintain
a smoother presentation of the main proofs. The proofs described in Appendix 2 are
contained in Levy (2007a).
3.7.1 Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1 : We begin with the posterior beliefs of the experts. Using Bayes
rule, the posterior belief v(pi, ti) of expert i is given by
v(pi, ti|si) := Pr(wi = a|pi, si, ti) =

(1−pi)(1−ti)
piti+(1−pi)(1−ti) if si = b
(1−pi)ti
pi(1−ti)+(1−pi)ti if si = a.
Given the definition of informative voting, and the expression for the posterior v(pi, ti|a)
as given above, we begin with the following observation, the proof of which is straight-
forward.
Observation 1. When si = a, then v(pi, ti|a) ≤ 1/2 iff ti ≤ pi. Hence, if expert i is using
an informative voting strategy, then the following must be true: when si = a, we have
t(x, p;pi) = pi.
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Notice the fixed-point element (viz. for pi) in the requirement of informative voting.
The existence of this fixed point feature will be central in the remainder of the proof.
From Observation 1 we know that C = (x, p) is informative if and only if t∗(x, p;pi) = pi,
where ‘∗’ is used to indicate equilibrium. Also, as the proposed class of voting strategy is
state reflective, it follows that in equilibrium, mi = a only if si = a and ti > t
∗(x, p;pi).
Thus,
µa = Pr[si = a and ti > t
∗(x, p; pi)|wi = a, ti, ζ∗].
But
Pr[si = a and ti > t
∗(x, p; pi)|wi = a, ti, ζ∗] =

ti if ti > t
∗(x, p;pi)
0 otherwise
Hence
µa =
∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi)
tif(ti)dti = 1− t∗(x, p;pi)2,
where f(·) stands for the uniform prior over T . Since the equilibrium is informative, it
follows that µa = 1− pi2.
Similarly we have
µb = Pr[si = a and ti > t
∗(x, p; pi)|wi = b, ti, ζ∗].
But
Pr[si = a and ti > t
∗(x, p;pi)|wi = b, ti, ζ∗] =

1− ti if ti > t∗(x, p; pi)
0 otherwise.
Hence
µb =
∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi)
(1− ti)f(ti)dti. = (1− t∗(x, p; pi))2,
and so, since the equilibrium is informative, we have µb = (1− pi)2.
Let
piwi(x, t
∗(x, p;pi)) = Pr[dx = A|mi = wi, {wj}j 6=i, t∗(x, p;pi)],
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and recall that αdx(wi, {wj}j 6=i, x) is the public’s posterior belief that mi = a, given that
the public knows now the committee decision dx and has observed the states in each
dimension. Then,
αA(wi, {wj}j 6=i, x) = µwipia(x, t
∗(x, p;pi))
µwipia(x, t
∗(x, p;pi)) + (1− µwi)pib(x, t∗(x, p;pi))
,
αB(wi, {wj}j 6=i, x) = µwi(1− pia(x, t
∗(x, p;pi)))
µwi(1− pia(x, t∗(x, p; pi))) + (1− µwi)(1− pib(x, t∗(x, p;pi)))
.
Finally define α(dx, wi, x) to be the probability estimate held by expert i of the public’s
posterior belief that mi = a.
α(dx;wi, x) =
∑
(wj ,wk)∈{a,b}2
Pr[(wj, wk)|pivi, x, t∗(x, p;pi)]αdx(wi, {wj}j 6=i, x),
where pivi stands for the event that expert i is pivotal.
Let U(mi; p) be the expected payoff of expert i with talent ti and private signal si
from the vote mi. Using the shorthand v := v(pi, ti|si), we have
U(a; p) = p [vτ(a, a, ζ∗) + (1− v) τ(a, b, ζ∗)]
+ (1− p) [v (α(A, a, x)τ(a, a, ζ∗) + (1− α(A, a, x))τ(b, a, ζ∗))
+ (1− v) (α(A, b, x)τ(a, b, ζ∗) + (1− α(A, b, x))τ(b, b, ζ∗))],
and
U(b; p) = p[vτ(b, a, ζ∗) + (1− v)τ(b, b, ζ∗)]
+ (1− p)[v (α(B, a, x)τ(a, a, ζ∗) + (1− α(B, a, x))τ(b, a, ζ∗))
+ (1− v) (α(B, b, x)τ(a, b, ζ∗) + (1− α(B, b, x))τ(b, b, ζ∗))]
Case A: si = b. The following lemma shows that the cut-off strategy is consistent with
equilibrium behaviour in every subgame where player i receives the signal si = b for any
p ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, in each such subgame, voting is informative irrespective of the actual
realization of the random variable ti.
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Lemma 1. If si = b, then for any value of ti, any transparency probability p ∈ [0, 1] and
any voting rule x ∈ {2, 3}, we have (i) v < 1/2 and (ii) mi = b is expert i’s best response
for all talent levels. Hence voting is informative.
Proof. The following has already been shown in Levy (2004, 2007a): if si = b, then expert
i with any ti is strictly better off with mi = b in any committee C = (x, p) as long as
p ∈ {0, 1}.15 Since the expected payoff for an expert in the committee C = (x, p) for
any p ∈ (0, 1) is a convex combination of these payoffs, this proves part (ii). To prove
part (i) observe that v(pi, ti|b) < 1/2 if and only if 1 − ti < pi. But since ti ≥ 1/2 and
pi > 1/2, this condition must always hold. Parts (i) and (ii) together then imply that in
each subgame with si = b, voting is informative irrespective of the actual realization of
the random variable ti.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is the following: the reputation gained by making a
correct prediction is always greater than the reputation gained by making an incorrect
prediction. Since according to the informative prior the likelier correct state is b, if the
private informative signal received by the expert is also b, then she has no reason to go
against both these informative sources and send a message of mi = a.
Given Lemma 1, it is enough to consider the case when si = a. Hence, the rest of the
proof deals with that case.
Case B: si = a. Consider the indifference equation U(a; p) = U(b; p). We know from
Observation 1 that if an expert votes informatively, then upon receiving a private signal
si = a, she will be indifferent between mi = a and mi = b only when her talent ti = pi.
Let v∗ ≡ v(pi, pi|a) and τˆ(mi, wi; ζ) be the evaluation when t∗(x, p; pi) = pi. Note that
v(t∗(x, p;pi), pi|a) = 1/2.
15The outline of the proof is provided as Proof A in the Appendix 2.
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Let p(pi) solve the indifference equation U(a, p) = U(b, p) for the case when t∗(x, p; pi) =
pi. The strategy of the rest of the proof is as follows. We shall show that such a solution
never exists when x = 2 and exists under certain restrictions when x = 3. We proceed as
follows.
Suppose p(pi) exists. Then,
p(pi) :=
N
N −M ,
where
M := v∗(τˆ(b, a; ζ)− τˆ(a, a; ζ)) + (1− v∗)(τˆ(b, b; ζ)− τˆ(a, b; ζ)),
and
N :=v∗(α(A; a, x)− α(B; a, x))(τˆ(b, a; ζ)− τˆ(a, a; ζ))
+ (1− v∗)(α(A; b, x)− α(B; b, x))(τˆ(b, b; ζ)− τˆ(a, b; ζ)).
Note that the expressions for M and N depend only on the prior pi and their reduced
forms, both for x = 3 and x = 2, are given in Appendix 2 and are used in the rest of the
proof.
For existence of p(pi), it is necessary that p(pi) ≥ 0. For p(pi) ≥ 0, there are
two exclusive necessary and sufficient conditions: either (I) [N ≥ 0 and N > M ] or (II)
[N ≤ 0 and N < M ].
Suppose condition (I) holds. As it is also necessary that p(pi) ≤ 1, it then follows that
N ≤ N −M so that M ≤ 0. On the other hand if condition (II) holds, then by similar
arguments it must be that M ≥ 0.
Claim 1. For all committees C = (x, p) and for all prior pi ∈ (1/2, 1), we have M < 0.
Proof. Since v∗ = 1/2, it follows that M < 0 if and only if
τˆ(b, a; ζ) + τˆ(b, b; ζ) < τˆ(a, b; ζ) + τˆ(a, a; ζ),
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a condition that always holds given the inequalities (iii) and (iv) in Proof A in Appendix
2.
Claim 1 rules out condition (II) and for the rest of the proof we shall only consider
condition (I).
We now give a direct proof of Part (i) of the proposition. So let x = 2. It is routine
to verify that if pi ∈ {1/2, 1}, then N < 0. Next, setting N = 0 and solving for pi yields a
unique real root pi ≈ −0.2208 /∈ [1/2, 1]. Since N is continuous in pi, we conclude that for
all pi ∈ [1/2, 1] it must be that N < 0. Thus we have shown that with x = 2, condition
(I) can never be satisfied. This proves part (i).
We now prove part (ii) of the proposition. Suppose x = 3. It is again routine to check
the following: at pi = 1/2 we have N > 0; at pi = 1 we have N < 0; and N = 0 if and
only if pi = p˜i(≈ 0.54197). Given these, the rest of the proof follows by invoking the fact
that N is continuous in pi. This completes the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2 : The following lemma will be useful in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 2. Suppose t∗(x, p;pi) ∈ [1/2, 1] solves the indifference equation U(a; p) = U(b; p).
Then t∗(x, p;pi) > t∗(x, p′; pi) if and only if p < p′.
Proof. By suitable manipulation, the indifference equation U(a, p) = U(b, p) can be ex-
pressed as pL = (1− p)R, where L = U(a; 1)− U(b; 1) and R = U(b, 0)− U(a, 0). Levy
(2004 and 2007a) shows that for x = {2, 3}, the following hold:16 dL
dt
> 0 and dR
dt
< 0.
Now consider the cut-off talent level t∗(x, p;pi) that solves the indifference equation
U(a; p) = U(b; p). Fix the value of t∗(x, p;pi) thus obtained and suppose p rises to p′
so that now p′L > (1 − p′)R. Let t∗(x, p′; pi) be the new cut-off talent that solves the
16The outline of the proofs of these two inequalities are given in Proof B in Appendix 2.
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indifference equation p′L = (1 − p′)R. The equality p′L = (1 − p′)R can be attained in
one of the following three ways: either (i) L decreases and R increases, or (ii) both L
and R fall but the fall in L is larger than that in R, or (iii) both L and R rise but the
rise in L is smaller than that in R. But since dL
dt
> 0 and dR
dt
< 0, cases (ii) and (iii)
cannot be true as in each of these two cases the required directions of t∗(·) are opposite
to each other. Hence it must be that case (i) holds. But for that case it must be that
t∗(·) falls. To complete the proof, we address the special situation where the equation
U(a, p) = U(b, p) is solved at t∗(x, p;pi) = 1/2. For that case we can mimic the above
proof by considering p′′ < p for which p′′L < (1 − p′′)R and then similarly show that
t∗(x, p′′; pi) > t∗(x, p;pi).
Lemma 2 shows that as the probability of the committee being transparent rises, the
cut-off talent t∗ falls. Given that all experts with talents above t∗ vote mi = a, the lemma
suggests that as the committee gets ‘more’ transparent, non-conformist tendencies (that
is voting against the direction of the common prior) rise.17 It is also important to note
that although the proof of the lemma uses a ‘convexification’ argument on two extreme
committees, namely, C(x, 0) with weight 1 − p and C(x, 1) with weight p, the cut-off
talent t∗(x, p; pi) is not in general equal to pt∗(x, 1; pi) + (1− p)t∗(x, 0; pi).
Keeping this in mind, we now return to the proof of Proposition 2.
Let x = 3. Fix p and pi and use the shorthand t := t∗(3, p;pi) for the cut-off talent in
17In Levy’s (2007a) special cases of p ∈ {0, 1} it was shown that t∗(3, 1;pi) < t∗(3, 0;pi) and for high
enough values of pi, we have t∗(2, 1;pi) < t∗(2, 0;pi).
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equilibrium. Then,
W (3, p, pi) =pi3(((1− t)2)3(3β) + (1− ((1− t)2)3)(3α)) + (1− pi)3((1− t2)3(3α)+
(1− (1− t2)3)(3β)) + 3(1− pi)2pi(((1− t2)2(1− t)2)(2α + β)+
(1− (1− t2)2(1− t)2)(2β + α)) + 3pi2(1− pi)((((1− t)2)2(1− t2))(2β + α)+
(1− ((1− t)2)2(1− t2))(2α + β))
Maximise W (x, p, pi) with respect to t. Let tf be the free solution from the first order
condition of unconstrained optimisation of W (C(x, p), pi), given by dW
dt
= 0 Then, tf is
given by the following three solutions: tf1 =
1
2pi−1 , t
f
2 =
A+10pi2−7pi+3
6(2pi−1) , and t
f
3 =
A−10pi2+7pi−3
6(1−2pi) ,
where A = (100pi2 − 36pi + 9)1/2|pi − 1|. Let t∗ be the constrained solution so that
t∗ ∈ [1/2, 1] by definition.
To prove Part (1) we proceed as follows. Observe that since 0 < t < 1, it suffices
to check if there exists pi such that t∗ = pi from any of the above solutions. Inserting
tfk = pi, k = 1, 2, 3, it is routine to check that for the first two solutions, viz. t
f
1 and t
f
2 ,
this implies pi = 1. For the remaining solution tf3 , we have pi = 1 or pi = 0. But since
pi ∈ (1/2, 1), this proves that informative voting cannot be a solution to the aggregate
welfare maximisation problem.
To prove Part (2.a) we proceed as follows. Define the function S(t) = 4t3−9t2 +6t−1.
Note that dW
dt
|pi=1/2 = −3(α−β)S(t). We first show that S(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [1/2, 1]. For
that, by invoking the fact that S(t) is a continuous function, it is sufficient to observe that
S ′(t) = 0 has exactly two solutions, t = 1/2 and t = 1, S(1) = 0 and S(1/2) = 0.25 > 0.
Since α > β, it then follows that dW
dt
|pi=1/2 < 0 for all values of t. By continuity of W (·)
in pi, it follows that there exists 1/2 < pi∗ < 1 such that for each pi ≤ pi∗, we have dW
dt
< 0
for all values of t. Thus for such values of pi, it must be that t∗∗ = 1/2. Now recall the
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definition of t∗(3, p;pi) that solves the indifference equation U(a; p) = U(b; p). By Lemma
2, it follows that for each pi ≤ pi∗, p = 1 uniquely maximises W (x, p, pi).
We prove Part (2.b) in a similar fashion. Define the function H(t) = t5− 5t4 + 10t3−
10t2 + 5t − 1. Note that dW
dt
|pi=1 = −18(α − β)H(t). We first show that H(t) < 0 for
all t ∈ [1/2, 1). This is established by the following facts that can be easily checked:
H ′(t) = 0 has a unique real root t = 1, H ′(1/2) = 5/16 > 0, H(1/2) = −1/32 < 0 and
H(1) = 0. Hence by continuity of H(·) and the fact that α > β, it follows that H(t) < 0
for all t ∈ [1/2, 1). By continuity of W (·) in pi, it follows that there exists pi∗∗ < 1 such
that for each pi ≥ pi∗∗, we have dW
dt
> 0 for all values of t ∈ [1/2, 1). We now use the
following fact that follows from Levy (2004).18
Fact 1. For every pi, there exists 1/2 ≤ t¯(pi) < 1 such that t∗(x, p; pi) ≤ t¯(pi) for all p.
Given Fact 1, for each pi ≥ pi∗∗, it must be that t∗∗ = t¯(pi). By Lemma 2 it follows
that for each pi ≥ pi∗∗, the value of p which maximises W (C(x, p);pi) is p = 0.
We now prove part (3). Given what we have proved thus far, it would suffice to show
that there exists a threshold value pˆi of the prior with 1/2 < pˆi < 1 such that for all pi < pˆi
and for all α, β ∈ R, α > β, we have W (C(2, 1), pi) > W (C(3, 1), pi). We first prove the
following claim.
Claim 2. t∗(x, p;pi) = 1/2 when p = 1 and pi = 1/2.
Proof. Recall the indifference equation pL = (1 − p)R used in the proof of Lemma 2.
At p = 1 this indifference equation is solved if and only if L = 0, where L = U(a; 1) −
U(b; 1). From the expressions of τ(mi, wi; ζ) it follows that at t
∗(x, p;pi) = 1/2, we
have τ(a, a; ζ) = τ(b, b; ζ) and τ(b, a; ζ) = τ(a, b; ζ). Using these, one can obtain L =
18The outline of the proof is given as Proof C in Appendix 2.
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(1 − 2v) (τ(a, a; ζ)− τ(b, a; ζ)). From inequalities (i)-(iv) in Proof A in Appendix 2 it
follows that τ(a, a; ζ) > τ(b, a; ζ). Hence L = 0 if and only if that v = 1/2 which is
possible at pi = 1/2 if and only if t∗(x, 1; 1/2) = 1/2.
Let x = 2. The full expression for W (2, p, pi) is provided in Appendix 2. That
expression, using the shorthand t := t(x, p;pi), simplifies to
W (2, p, pi) =3(β(8pi3t2(2t3 − 5t2 + 4t− 1)−
4pi2t2(2t4 − 5t2 + 2t+ 1) + pi(8t6 − 4t5 − 10t4 + 4t3 + 1)−
t4(2t2 − 3))− α(8pi3t2(2t3 − 5t2 + 4t− 1)−
4pi2t2(2t4 − 5t2 + 2t+ 1) + pi(8t6 − 4t5 − 10t4 + 4t3 + 1)
− (t2 − 1)2(2t2 + 1)))
It follows that at p = 1 and pi = 1/2, we have W (2, 1, 1/2) = 6
16
(5α + 3β). From
part (2) we know that when pi < pi∗ (where pi∗ is as defined there), aggregate welfare
under x = 3 is maximised if and only if p = 1. So consider pi = 1/2, p = 1 and
x = 3. Then, W (3, 1, 1/2) = 3
16
(9α + 7β). Note that since α > β it follows that
W (2, 1, 1/2) > W (3, 1, 1/2). By continuity of W (·) in pi, there exists pˆi > 1/2 such that
fixing t = 1/2, we have W (2, 1, pi) > W (3, 1, pi) for all pi < pˆi. Using the expressions for
aggregate welfare above, it is routine to show that
dW (x, p, pi)
dt
|x=3,pi=t=1/2 = 3
4
(β − α) < 0,
and
dW (x, p, pi)
dt
|x=2,pi=t=1/2 = 0,
and
d2W (x, p, pi)
dt2
|x=2,pi=t=1/2 = 6(β − α) < 0.
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Proposition 1 in Levy (2004) shows that dt
∗(·)
dpi
> 0 for all x ∈ {2, 3} when p = 1.19 Hence,
as pi rises from pi = 1/2, the cut-off talent t∗ rises for both x = 2 and x = 3, and so in
equilibrium, the desired inequality W (2, 1, pi) > W (3, 1, pi) is sustained for all pi < pˆi.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
3.7.2 Appendix 2
Expressions for τ(mi, wi; ζ) : Using the class of strategies defined earlier, we first need to
work out the specific forms of the evaluation functions as follows:
τ(a, a; ζ∗) = E(ti|mi = a, wi = a, ζ∗) =
∫ 1
1
2
tif(ti|mi = a, wi = a, ζ∗i )dti,
where,
f(ti|mi = a, wi = a, ζ∗) = Pr[(mi = a|wi = a, ζ
∗)|ti].Pr(ti)∫ 1
1
2
Pr[(mi = a|wi = a, ζ∗)|ti] · Pr(ti)dti
.
Now,
Pr[(mi = a|wi = a, ζ∗)|ti].Pr(ti) = Pr[si = a and ti > t∗(x, p; pi)|wi = a, ti].Pr(ti)
=

0 if ti ≤ t∗(x, p;pi)
tif(ti) otherwise.
So
f(ti|mi = a, wi = a, ζ∗) =

tif(ti)∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi) tif(ti)dti
if ti > t
∗(x, p; pi)
0 otherwise.
Hence,
τ(a, a; ζ∗) =
∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi)
ti
tif(ti)∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi) tif(ti)dti
dti.
Similarly one obtains
τ(a, b; ζ∗) =
∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi)
ti
(1− ti)f(ti)∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi)(1− ti)f(ti)dti
dti,
19The outline of the proof is given in Proof D in Appendix 2.
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τ(b, b; ζ∗) =
∫ t∗(x,p;pi)
1
2
ti
f(ti)∫ t∗(x,p;pi)
1
2
f(ti)dti +
∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi) tif(ti)dti
dti+
∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi)
ti
tif(ti)∫ t∗(x,p;pi)
1
2
f(ti)dti +
∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi) tif(ti)dti
dti,
and
τ(b, a; ζ∗) =
∫ t∗(x,p;pi)
1
2
ti
f(ti)∫ t∗(x,p;pi)
1
2
f(ti)dti +
∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi)(1− ti)f(ti)dti
dti+
∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi)
ti
(1− ti)f(ti)∫ t(x,p;pi)
1
2
f(ti)dti +
∫ 1
t∗(x,p;pi)(1− ti)f(ti)dti
dti.
Expressions for M ,N used in the proof of Proposition 1
Suppose voting is informative, that is t(x, p;pi) = pi. Then the term M is the same
for both x = 3 and x = 2 and is given by
M =
10pi2 − 3pi − 1
12pi2(pi + 1)(pi − 2) .
For x = 3, the term N is given by N = K
Q
, where
K =8pi24 − 89pi23 + 394pi22 − 757pi21 − 78pi20+
3239pi19 − 5391pi18 − 557pi17 + 12635pi16 − 13656pi15−
5570pi14 + 23501pi13 − 14031pi12 − 11173pi11 + 18614pi10−
3994pi9 − 7283pi8 + 3435pi7 + 2361pi6 − 374pi5−
2556pi4 + 798pi3 + 974pi2 − 348pi − 48,
and
Q =12pi2(pi + 1)(2− pi)(pi3 − 2pi2 + 2)(pi4 − 3pi2 + 3)×
(pi4 − 4pi3 + 7pi2 − 6pi + 3)(pi5 − 2pi4 − pi3 + 4pi2 − pi − 2)×
(pi5 − 4pi4 + 5pi3 − 5pi + 4)(4pi2 + 4pi + 1).
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For x = 2, the term N is given by F
Z
, where
F =2048pi21 − 19712pi20 + 73472pi19 − 115264pi18−
11456pi17 + 311616pi16 − 402624pi15 + 11216pi14+
448432pi13 − 419904pi12 + 35584pi11 + 172004pi10 − 81524pi9+
1108pi8 − 40588pi7 + 38987pi6 + 8909pi5 − 11209pi4−
185pi3 − 1614pi2 + 80pi + 120.
and
Z =12pi2(pi + 1)(pi − 2)(2pi2 + 1)(2pi2 − 3)(2pi2 − 4pi − 1)×
(2pi2 − 4pi + 3)(4pi2 − 4pi − 3)(2pi3 − 2pi2 − pi − 1)×
(2pi3 − 2pi2 − 3pi − 1)(2pi3 − 4pi2 + pi + 2)(2pi3 − 4pi2 − pi + 4).
Full expression for Aggregate Welfare for x = 2: Using the shorthand t := t(x, p;pi), we
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have
W (C(2, p), pi) =(1− pi)3(((1− t2)3 + 3(1− t2)2(1− (1− t2)))(3α)+
(1− ((1− t2)3 + 3(1− t2)2(1− (1− t2))))(3β))+
(3pi(1− pi)2)(((1− t2)2(1− t)2 + (1− t2)2(1− (1− t)2)+
2(1− t2)(1− t)2(1− (1− t2)))(2α + β) + (1− ((1− t2)2(1− t)2+
(1− t2)2(1− (1− t)2) + 2(1− t2)(1− t)2(1− (1− t2))))(2β + α))+
(3(1− pi)pi2)(((1− t2)((1− t)2)2 + (1− (1− t2))((1− t)2)2+
2(1− (1− t)2)(1− t2)(1− t)2)(α + 2β) + (1− ((1− t2)((1− t)2)2+
(1− (1− t2))((1− t)2)2 + 2(1− (1− t)2)(1− t2)(1− t)2))(2α + β))+
pi3((((1− t)2)3 + 3((1− t)2)2(1− (1− t)2))(3β) + (1− (((1− t)2)3+
3((1− t)2)2(1− (1− t)2)))(3α)).
Proof A: Part a:(provided as Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 in Levy 2004): Consider p = 1. In
this case the indifference equation U(a; 1) = U(b; 1) may be written as:
τ(a, a, ζ∗i )− τ(b, a, ζ∗i )
τ(b, b, ζ∗i )− τ(a, b, ζ∗i )
=
1− v
v
(3.1)
where v is as defined in the text.
Using the Maximum Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) it is shown that if the indif-
ference equation is solved for si = a, then the following inequalities hold: (i)τ(a, a, ζ
∗
i ) >
τ(a, b, ζ∗i ), (ii) τ(b, b, ζ
∗
i ) > τ(b, a, ζ
∗
i ), (iii) τ(a, a, ζ
∗
i ) > τ(b, b, ζ
∗
i ) (iv) τ(a, b, ζ
∗
i ) > τ(b, a, ζ
∗
i ).
If the indifference equation is solved for si = b, then the following inequalities hold:
(v)τ(a, a, ζ∗i ) > τ(a, b, ζ
∗
i ), (vi) τ(b, b, ζ
∗
i ) > τ(b, a, ζ
∗
i ), (vii) τ(b, b, ζ
∗
i ) > τ(a, a, ζ
∗
i ) (viii)
τ(b, a, ζ∗i ) > τ(a, b, ζ
∗
i ). Now consider the case of si = b. Using inequalities (v)-(viii), it
follows that the LHS of equation (3.1) is less than 1, while the RHS of equation (3.1) is
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greater than 1. Hence the LHS < RHS, which may be rewritten as vτ(a, a, ζ∗i ) + (1 −
v)τ(a, b, ζ∗i ) < (1− v)τ(b, b, ζ∗i ) + vτ(b, a, ζ∗i ). Note that the LHS is actually the expected
gain from mi = a while the RHS is the expected gain from mi = b. Hence the expert
can never be indifferent between mi = a and mi = b when si = b, and the indifference
equation can only be satisfied when si = a. Note further that the RHS of equation (3.1)
is an increasing (decreasing) function of t when a private signal of b(a) is received by the
expert, while the LHS is a constant. This along with the fact that the RHS is equal for
t = 1
2
for the si = a and si = b cases imply that when si = b, then U(a; 1) < U(b; 1).
Proof A: Part b:(provided in Proposition 2 in Levy 2007a): Now consider p = 0. Note
that due to state reflective voting, the following inequalities hold for any x = {2, 3}, which
are : (ix) α(A; a, x) ≥ α(B; a, x), (x) α(A; b, x) ≥ α(B; b, x), (xi) α(A; a, x) ≥ α(A; b, x),
(xii) α(B; a, x) ≥ α(B; b, x). Using inequalities (v)-(xii), by suitable manipulation it is
shown that U(a; 0) < U(b; 0) for all talent levels when si = b, and hence the expert can
never be indifferent between mi = a and mi = b when si = b. Now consider the case when
the indifference equation is solved by si = a. By suitable manipulation of the indifference
equation, and the fact that the expression (1−v)/v is an increasing (decreasing) function
of t when s = b(a), and is equal when t = 1
2
, it follows that in this case, U(a; 0) < U(b; 0).
Proof B: Part a: (provided in Proposition 1 of Levy 2004): Consider p = 1. Note that
in the case of si = a, given inequalities (i)-(iv), we have
dU(a;p=1)
dt
> 0 and dU(b;p=1)
dt
< 0.
Hence dL
dt
> 0.
Proof B: Part b: (provided in Proposition 2 in Levy 2007a): When p = 0, the indifference
equation can be re-arranged to be written as
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v[α(A; a, x)− α(B; a, x)][τ(a, a, ζ∗i )− τ(b, a, ζ∗i )] =
(1− v)[α(A; b, x)− α(B; b, x)][τ(b, b, ζ∗i )− τ(a, b, ζ∗i )]
By inequalities (ix) to (xii), one obtains [α(A; a, x)−α(B; a, x)] > 0 and [α(A; b, x)−
α(B; b, x)] > 0. By differentiating with respect to the cut-off talent level, it is shown that
dU(a;p=0)
dt
> 0 and dU(b;p=0)
dt
< 0. Hence dR
dt
< 0.
Proof C (provided in Proposition 1 in Levy 2004): The main argument is as follows:
If the upper bound of the cut-off indifferent talent level is violated, the ranking of the
talent evaluation functions become τ(a, a, ζ∗i ) > τ(a, b, ζ
∗
i ) > τ(b, b, ζ
∗
i ) > τ(b, a, ζ
∗
i ). This
implies that experts of all talent levels receiving any private signal vote mi = a, since this
becomes the dominant strategy of all experts and we have a perfectly pooling equilibrium
such that the indifference equation never holds and therefore the conjecture ζ∗i will not
be consistent with the actual strategy followed by the expert i. Hence for the equilibrium
to be sustained, there must exist an upper bound of t¯(pi) which is easily calculated by
equating τ(b, b, ζ∗i ) = τ(a, b, ζ
∗
i ).
Proof D (provided in Proposition 1 in Levy 2004):
By total differentiation of the indifference equation when p = 1, one has
dt∗(.)
dpi
=
d 1−v
v
dpi
dkθ
dt∗ −
d 1−v
v
dt∗
where kθ =
τ(a,a,ζ∗i )−τ(b,a,ζ∗i )
τ(b,b,ζ∗i )−τ(a,b,ζ∗i ) .
Since we have
d 1−v
v
dpi
> 0, dkθ
dt∗ > 0, and
d 1−v
v
dt∗ < 0, therefore
dt∗(.)
dpi
> 0.
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Chapter 4
Media persuasion and voter welfare
4.1 Motivation
Voting is a popular institutional apparatus to aggregate information and take better
social decisions.1 By making privately informed voters cast independent votes, society
can increase the probability of electing policy alternatives that are welfare enhancing for
the voters, particularly when voters have common preferences. In such circumstances,
the role of an informed media or expert forecaster can be decisive. Behind the cry for the
right to information and freedom of press lies an argument that media keeps voters well
aware of key social and economic variables so that their personal judgments are more
informed.2
It is often the case that the media has its own biases that reflect preferences of a
minority of the population. A survey by Lichter et al. (1986) suggests that in the decade
from 1975 to 1985, conservative ideologies outnumbered liberals among the American
1The contents of this chapter is joint work with Peter Postl and Jaideep Roy.
2Of course, media has other roles in public life that are also useful, such as keeping a check on
corruption and crime. The model presented in this chapter abstracts away from these issues.
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public while during that period close to three quarters of journalists held strong liberal
views. With the power to communicate publicly, one would expect an informed (but
biased) media to indulge in deliberate manipulation of social decisions through instru-
ments such as keeping the news vague or revealing the truth only if certain circumstantial
evidence is available. This can make media advice partly unreliable. To this end, Watts
et al. (1999) provides evidence about voter perception of biased media news during the
1988, 1992 and 1996 presidential elections in the US. The study reveals that there was a
rise in public perception that the media was liberally biased and a leading cause of this
was an increased participation of liberal elites in news items. Yet, the most influential
media sources in democratic societies are professional organizations or individuals who
care about their reputation as a reliable platform for public debates and news in the
future. Hence even known biases of the media cannot eliminate entirely the credibility of
the news when it is transmitted.
While public knowledge about the media’s reputation concerns makes the media better
placed to credibly transmit any information in spite of its biases, this power of credibility
in turn enhances its ability to manipulate voting outcomes. On the other hand if it
is known that the media does not care about its reputation, it may not enjoy the same
public trust as its reputation caring counterpart would. While the ability of media without
reputational concerns to inform is then less, so also is its power to manipulate. It then
remains ambiguous what is better for the voters: higher credibility (at a cost of higher
ability to manipulate) or lower ability to manipulate (at a cost of lower credibility). Given
this ambiguity, in the model studied in this chapter we ask what are the theoretical
consequences of the presence of reputational concerns of the media on the welfare of the
voters. In particular, we ask if the presence of reputation driven media transmitting
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credible news unambiguously improves ex-ante voter welfare. We show that the answer
depends upon various aspects of the environment including size of the constituency, degree
of conflict between the voters and the media and other informational parameters like
priors and signal strengths of voters’ private information. In general, media presence
tends to hurt when the constituency is large and voters receive strong private signals.
We study a society represented by an odd number of voters. The voters face uncer-
tainty over the true state of the world and must choose collectively (via the majoritarian
voting rule) between two alternatives, X and Y . They have common preferences over
states and alternatives and hold a common prior over the states. In addition, each voter
receives private information about the state. The quality of this information is common
and reflects the general degree of individual awareness in the society.3
The media due to reputation concerns can commit to credibly transmit information
by declaring an interval partition of the state space such that the true state is always
contained in the interval declared by the media. However, the media has preferences that
are not perfectly aligned with those of the voters. In particular, the media prefers X in
all states.4 After the interval containing the true state is declared to the voters, voting
takes place.
The benchmark model is normalized in a manner where without reputation, the me-
dia cannot credibly commit that the true state will always be contained in the interval it
declares. In this scenario no information can be transmitted by the media (and all results
we report below where the media is absent can also be interpreted as outcomes with a
3Individual awareness is typically reflected in the general level of education or other factors which
influence the ability of a voter to analyze privately obtained information.
4Our results remain qualitatively intact in a more general environment where in some states the media
can prefer Y .
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media that does not care about future reputation). The resulting voting subgame resem-
bles a common interest jury environment. Under the simple-majoritarian rule, there is
a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (in weakly undominated strategies) where each voter votes on
the basis of his private signal. It is well known that if the precision of signals is smaller
than some cut-off value, pooling appears unambiguously in equilibrium where all voters
commonly vote for one of the alternatives with probability 1 as their judgments are over-
whelmed by their (common) priors. Hence, the ex-ante voter welfare remains invariant
with the size of the constituency. When the signal strength is higher than this cut-off,
the equilibrium becomes fully separating where an individual vote perfectly reveals the
voter’s private signal. In that case, as the size of the constituency increases, standard
Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT henceforth) arguments come into play. Consequently, the
voters’ ex-ante welfare increases monotonically with the size of the constituency.
When reputed media (henceforth, media) is present, we look at equilibria that max-
imize the media’s ex-ante payoff. These equilibria are typically informative and can be
thought of as ones where the media has the highest ideological influence over the social
decision. Here, by revealing information carefully, the media can manipulate voting be-
havior to its own benefit. As in some states the two sides hold conflicting preferences,
this may hurt the voters. Yet, at the time voters receive a piece of news, they find the
news useful as privately they still remain only partially informed of the true state and
know that the informative content of the news transmitted by the media can be relied
upon.
In our analysis, we first consider the benchmark model with a single voter (or decision
maker, DM in short) and then proceed to the multi voter case. If the media chooses
to transmit informative news, then both in the case of a single DM or in the multi-
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voter case, it will typically send slanted news that either endorses its preferred policy
X or recommends against it. We show that with a single DM, the presence of the
media can never affect welfare adversely. This result is however altered when multiple
voters are considered. We show that regardless of the size of the constituency, media
presence can adversely affect the ex-ante probability of a correct decision and hence
voters’ welfare. If the prior bias of the voters is towards what the media wants (suggesting
smaller conflict between the two sides), news will not be informative if voters private
signals carry little information (i.e. an unaware society). As the voters individually get
more aware of the uncertainties, informative news will be transmitted. Moreover, media
presence will necessarily hurt voter welfare when the constituency is large. This perverse
effect of informative news can appear in small constituencies as well and we provide some
characterizations in this respect.
The outcomes change significantly when the prior bias of the voters is against what
the media wants (suggesting larger conflict between the two sides). In this case for a
sufficiently aware society, under certain scenarios the media transmits information such
that any news slanted towards media’s bias will be fully revealing, while news with a
slant against media’s own preference will be inconclusive. Interestingly, for these cases,
the voters will follow the media slant only when the media endorses what it wants but
vote according to their private signals when the news is slanted against the media’s bias.
We show that for a sufficiently aware society, the presence of the media can both be
beneficial and harmful for welfare in these cases. However, for a society where the level
of awareness is low, we show that the presence of the media is always welfare improving.
These results suggest that valuable news from a biased media is always welcome when
the social decision is taken by a single DM in the sense that it can never reduce the
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ex-ante welfare of the DM. However, as democracy spreads and the number of voters get
large, a reliable source of news can transmit immiserizing information in the sense that
it can reduce ex-ante voter welfare. It is important to note that while the possibility of
immiserizing information in our model is driven by the presence of strategic incentives
of the media, similar public information can appear from non-strategic actors as well or
even from sources whose intention is to send as much information as possible under the
belief that more information cannot hurt the voter. This is specially true in the case of
court trials where the judiciary tries to ensure that the trial is as informative as possible.
Yet, since not all trials can reveal the truth with certainty, one may ask if and when
any additional (but partial) public information adversely affects the probability of wrong
judgments. Our results then indicate that when the trial is known to provide partially
informative slants with evidential input, the probability that a jury takes the correct
decision can go down, though such trials are always welcome if the jury is replaced by
a dictatorial judge (single DM in our case). Moreover, when the jury is a priori biased
towards one outcome (say acquittal) and the jury members receive strong private signals,
using a jury may be better than a dictatorial judge. While a full analysis of these issues
is beyond the scope of the model in this chapter, this is an important avenue for future
research.
The social value of public information has been a well addressed subject since the
work of Hirshleifer (1971). In a model with complementarities, Morris and Shin (2002)
shows that public information can hurt social welfare while in the investment game of
Angeletos and Pavan (2004) and in a monetary policy game of Hellwig (2005), public
information necessarily improves welfare. Also, Angeletos and Pavan (2007) show how
welfare properties of public information depends not only on the form of strategic inter-
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action but also on other external effects that determine the gap between equilibrium and
efficient use of public information.5 However, in all these works, transmission of public
information is non-strategic.
Our work is also related to two other strands of literature, namely, cheap talk and vot-
ing, and to an emerging area of research that links the two. The seminal work by Crawford
and Sobel (1982) describes a framework of communication between an informed sender
and an uninformed receiver (or decision maker) where messages are costless and do not
directly affect the utility of the sender. However, we consider a particular setting where
the reputation-driven sender (the media) can potentially transmit vague information but
cannot lie. This is similar to the ‘verifiable disclosure’ approach to communication, initi-
ated by Grossman (1981) where the sender cannot lie but can withhold information. Our
approach to modeling a reputation-driven sender has resemblance to Chen (2011), who
considers a finite message space and defines an ‘honest’ sender to be one who by nature
always reports the message that is closest to her observation.
Our model fundamentally differs from the above body of work in two aspects: First,
we model a binary decision problem where the action space of the voters is finite and not
continuous (as in the standard Crawford-Sobel framework). Second, we consider a single
sender and multiple receivers with partially aligned interests, in the sense that there is
a range of states of the world where the preferred choice of the receivers (voters) as well
as the sender (media) is identical, whereas for some states they vary. In contrast in the
above papers, there is conflict of interest in each state of the world.
Next, consider our results concerning certain scenarios where the information provided
5See also Bikchandani et al. (1992), Cao and Hirshleifer (2000) and Gersbach (2000) among others
for related works on impact of public information on social welfare.
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by the sender is such that the voters vote according to their private signals. In these
instances the welfare analysis of the voters is related to the probability of correct decisions
in the CJT literature. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) study the innocuousness of the
assumption made in the statement of CJT that the voters vote ‘sincerely’ (that is, even
when they are in a group they vote as if alone) and introduces strategic voting. They show
that ‘sincere’ voting, which implies voting in accordance to private signals is equivalent
to strategic voting if the aggregation rule is simple majoritarian. For relatively high
levels of precision of private signals received by the voters, this result is obtained in the
communication game we study as well.6
Our work is also very closely related to a relatively scant but growing literature on how
social elites (media, popular political and apolitical figures) can influence mass opinions
through public information (for some review articles on this, see Mutz et al. (1996),
Kinder (1998) and Druckman and Lupia (2000)). Iyenger and Kinder (1987) and Lupia
and McCubbins (1998) study the role of media in persuading politically aware citizens
to elect parties in democratic societies. Zaller (1992) suggests related theories of how
political awareness and greater cognitive engagement of citizens with public sources of
political news can affect political opinions and support. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005)
address the idea that the media may represent biased elitist opinions regarding political
choice and that voters ‘like’ the influence cast by such political endorsements of the media.
That political commentators can be reputation driven (because of career concerns) has
been noted in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) though they derive biased media coverage
without ideological considerations. Other works on political economy and the role of
the public endorsements (see for example Grossman and Helpman (1999) and Stromberg
6See also Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1998) for more on this issue.
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(2004)) study how direct or indirect mass communication with the voters can influence
electoral outcomes.
Besley and Prat (2006) and Anderson and McLaren (2010) study how biased media
can communicate with voters using ex-post verifiable messages about quality of competing
parties. In particular, Besley and Prat (2005) study a scenario where there are multiple
media outlets, where each media outlet has two possible sources of making profit: the
first component consists of commercial profits, while the second corresponds to profits
garnered from collusion with the government. The first component is audience-driven,
which increases if the media outlet reports interesting information. The paper shows that
when the media outlets are homogeneous, the number of independent media outlets and
the probability that the government controls news provision in equilibrium are inversely
related. The intuition behind the result is that every time the government pays an outlet
to suppress its information, the commercial revenue of the other outlets goes up since the
degree of competition they face commercially goes down. If the government intends to
buy out all the media organisations, it has to pay each of them as if it were a monopoly
provider of unbiased information. Anderson and Mclaren (2010) consider the case when
the consumers of news media do not know how much information is possessed by the
media. Hence if there is a lack of news, citizens do not know whether that is due to
lack of information or because information is being strategically withheld. Uncertainty
about how much information the sender has prevents complete inference regarding the
sender’s information, with the result that who owns the news organization (differentiated
by preference heterogeneity) can make a difference to what the public learns in equilib-
rium. In contrast Chakraborty and Ghosh (2012) studies a cheap talk model where elite
and partisan media can advertise about the quality of two competing candidates in an
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otherwise Hotelling-Downs framework (with sincere voting). In their paper, the ideologi-
cal positions of different media outlets make candidates strategically position themselves
on the ideology line in order to gain media attention. Voters are sophisticated enough to
discount both the media endorsements and the pandering of parties towards the media
outlets. Among other characterizations of resulting electoral equilibria they demonstrate
the possibility of situations where the voters are better off when there are no media outlets
present even though their existence generate useful information transmission. The idea
there is that while media reveal information about quality of competing parties, their
existence in turn affects equilibrium policies in a way that ultimately can hurt social
welfare. Our welfare analysis shows that this phenomenon of immiserizing information
can be obtained through a different channel involving reputation of the sender who sends
public messages through news transmissions even when policies are exogenously given.
Also, Chakraborty et al. (2012) report another instance of immiserizing public informa-
tion where media can affect equilibrium policies in a Hotelling-Downs model with two
politicians and an unknown location of the median voter. They show that the media can
first affect policy making and then affect electoral outcomes, thereby leading to policy
convergence, though the Median Voter Theorem may not hold universally.
4.2 The Model
An odd number of voters with common preferences have to vote over two alternatives.
The timing of the game we study is as follows: there is a media, which announces that
news will be transmitted in accordance to a signalling technology (made up of partitions
of the state space). Then the state is realised and a partition which is in accordance to
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the signalling technology announced earlier by the media is declared to the voters. Due to
reputation concerns, it is common knowledge that the declared partition will necessarily
contain the true state, and the media cannot declare an interval that does not contain the
true state. After the partition is declared, each of the voters receive informative signals
regarding the state, and then voting takes place. Once all votes cast by the voters are
aggregated into a social decision, the media and the voters obtain their pay-offs depend-
ing on the social decision and the true state.
We model this environment in the following way.
I = {1, · · · , n} is the set of voters (n ≥ 1 and odd), A = {X, Y } is the set of
alternatives and Ω = [0, 1] is the set of states.
Priors : The state ω ∈ Ω is a random variable and agents have a common prior given
by density f(ω) where f is non-atomic, and the distribution function is given by F (ω).
Voters do not observe the true state ω.
Voters’ preference: Voters have a common preference over A represented by the state-
dependent strict preference relation  such that for some 0 < ωv < 1, we have X 
Y if ω ≤ ωv and Y  X if ω > ωv. These preferences of the voters are represented by
the utility function u : A× Ω→ R such that for ζ, τ ∈ R, ζ < τ we have:
u(X,ω) =

τ if ω ≤ ωv
ζ otherwise
and
u(Y, ω) =

τ if ω > ωv
ζ otherwise
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Voters’ private signals : Each voter i ∈ I receives a private signal si ∈ {X, Y } ≡ S whose
precision is p ∈ (1/2, 1), that is, P[si = X|ω ≤ ωv] = P[si = Y |ω > ωv] = p.
Media’s preference: The media strictly prefers X over Y in all states. This preference
of the media is represented by the utility function um : A × Ω → R such that for ζm,
τm ∈ R with ζm < τm we have um(X,ω) = τm and um(Y, ω) = ζm for all ω ∈ Ω.
Size of ex-ante conflict : The case F (ωv) > 1/2 will be referred to as a case of small conflict
between the voters and the media while large conflict will correspond to F (ωv) < 1/2.
Messages : The media sends a public message (that is observed by all voters). We model
messages as follows: For k ≥ 1, let Ωk = {Ω1, · · · ,Ωk} be a k-element partition of Ω.
Let the message set be Mk = {m1, · · · ,mk}. A message strategy of arity k is a function
mk : Ω → Mk that maps each ω 7→ mk(ω) ∈ Mk with the following literal meaning:
mk(ω) = mj means ω ∈ Ωj for all j = 1, · · · , k. Generic messages will be denoted as
m′,m′′ ∈ Mk. Let M be the space of message strategies of all arities k ≥ 1 . The
signalling technology that the media announces is characterised by the message strategy.
Voting and social decisions : A voting strategy for voter i ∈ I is a function vi : Mk×S → A
that maps the received message m′ ∈ Mk and the private signal si to generate a vote
vi ∈ A. We denote by v = (v1, · · · , vn) ∈ An a vote profile and use the shorthand v(m′, s)
to denote (v1(m
′, s1), ..., vn(m′, sn)).
The social decision function δ : An → A is majoritarian and maps a vote profile
v ∈ An to an outcome δ(v) ∈ A such that δ(v) = X if and only if #{i ∈ I|vi = X} ≥ n+12 .
Lies and punishments : Once all the above decisions are taken, the voters observe the
true state ω. At this stage, the voters pass a judgment about the ‘trustworthiness’ of the
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media. Fix any pair (Ωk,Mk). Suppose the media uses some arbitrary message strategy
mk : Ω → Mk. We call a message mj ∈ Mk, j = 1, · · · , k a lie if ω /∈ Ωj. In other
words, a message that violates (ex-post) the ‘literal meaning’ clause defined above is a
lie. The voters dislike lies and punish the media. Let c be the associated cost borne by
the respective media in the event it is punished for lying. We shall assume c > τm.
7
Equilibrium: We focus on symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies where
voters use weakly undominated strategies.8 As well established in the existing literature
on strategic voting, a voting equilibrium thus generated is called ‘informative’, and we
focus on this equilibrium in what follows. Under this class of equilibria, there is a dis-
tinction that is useful for our purposes: one where each vote reveals fully the voter’s
private signal (separating equilibrium) and the other where votes reveal no such infor-
mation (pooling equilibrium). Also, we look at message strategies in equilibria which
maximize the media’s ex-ante payoffs, which we call the most influential and report the
coarsest9 among them. By the term equilibrium, in the rest of the analysis we shall mean
a coarse, influential and informative equilibrium where voters vote informatively and the
media is as influential as permitted by equilibrium conditions. For a formal definition of
equilibrium, see Appendix 4.6.1.
7This is similar to Chen (2011). Also see Mertens and Zamir (1985) on conceptualizing mis-
information.
8In our model this means that each voter follows a voting strategy in which he votes in favor of the
alternative that is better for him after having made full use of his available information (which consists
of the public message, the private signal received and if possible inference about the signals of the other
voters from the pivotal vote profile).
9This means that among the set of all ‘most-influential news coverage’, the media uses that which
requires minimal partitioning of the state space.
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4.3 Single Decision Maker
We first study the model in a standard sender-receiver setting where there is a single
receiver. Moreover, as we shall see in Section 4.4, much of the analysis we do now will
be used directly when we study voting. So, suppose in the model described above, there
is a single receiver or decision maker (DM), that is n = 1 (we denote this single ‘voter’
by i and use the notation ‘∅’ to denote the absence of the media and hence an empty
message). We begin with the benchmark case where the media is absent.
Lemma 3 (Without Media). Suppose there is a single decision maker, that is n = 1.
His optimal decision vi has the following features:
(a) Suppose F (wv) > 1/2. Then,
(i) vi(∅, si) = si if p > F (ωv) and
(ii) vi(∅, si) = X for each si ∈ S if p < F (ωv);
(b) Suppose F (wv) < 1/2. Then,
(i) vi(∅, si) = si if p > 1− F (ωv) and
(ii) vi(∅, si) = Y for each si ∈ S if p < 1− F (ωv).
If the strength of the private signal is sufficiently weak, then the degree of inference
that can be drawn from it is low. In this case when the prior distribution is biased in
favor of the alternative X (that is, F (ωv) > 1/2), the DM chooses X irrespective of his
private signal. However, if the strength of his private signal is high, then the reliability of
the signal prompts the DM to choose according to his private signal. When F (ωv) < 1/2,
the probability of states where he prefers Y is higher than the states where he prefers X.
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By analogous reasoning, he therefore chooses Y irrespective of his private signal in case
his signal strength is sufficiently low, and chooses according to his signal otherwise.
We next move to the case when the media is present. As it is common knowledge that
the media associates a high cost with the subsequent penalization owing to delivery of
incorrect information, it can credibly pass any information and this enhances its ability
to influence social decisions. The following two lemmas deal with the equilibrium actions
in this case. In this framework, news is an interval of the state space. We call a news
item conclusive in favour of a particular alternative if and only if in each feasible state
included in the news item, the optimal social decision of the voters is in favour of that
particular alternative. Any news that violates this property will be called inconclusive.
Also, a news item is called X-endorsing (Y -endorsing) if the resulting probability mass
over the declared interval (before private signals are incorporated) is higher for X (Y )
than for Y (X).
Two classes of message strategies are considered both for the single DM or multiple
voters cases: Under Class 1 message strategies, the state space is partitioned into two
intervals, such that the left interval Ω1 is inconclusive, while the right interval Ω2 provides
conclusive evidence towards Y . If the state belongs to Ω1, then upon receiving the
resultant message the endorsement of the news in favour of X is strong enough to ensure
that the voter chooses X irrespective of his private signal. However, the alternative Y
is always chosen if the state belongs to Ω2, which is the less preferred alternative of the
media. Under Class 2 message strategies, a potentially tri-partitional message strategy
is considered such that: if the state is declared to belong to the left partition Ω1, the
voter follows a pooling strategy of voting X irrespective of the private signal received. If
the state is declared to belong to the middle partition Ω2, the voter follows a separating
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strategy of voting according to the private signal received. If the state is declared to
belong to the right partition Ω3, the voter follows a pooling strategy of voting Y . The
optimal message strategies under Class 1 and Class 2 are characterised, and then the two
are compared to find the better message strategy that maximises the ex-ante welfare of
the media. From the optimisation problem it follows that the optimum message strategy
under Class 2 always reduces to a two-partitioned message strategy both for the single
voter or multiple voters cases. The optimum Class 2 message strategy is such that the
voters follow a separating voting strategy when one interval is declared, and follow a
pooling strategy when the other interval is declared. A further comment may be made
in this connection. Consider the following class of message strategies, say Class 3, which
is described as follows: the state space is partitioned into two intervals, such that the
left interval Ω1 provides conclusive evidence towards X, while the right interval Ω2 is
inconclusive . If the state belongs to Ω1, then upon receiving the resultant message the
voter chooses X irrespective of his private signal. However, the alternative Y is always
chosen if the state belongs to Ω2, which is the less preferred alternative of the media. It
is easy to check that Class 3 message strategies will always correspond to a lower level
of ex-ante pay-off for the media than any Class 1 message strategy, and hence confining
our attention to Class 1 and Class 2 message strategies is without loss of generality.
Lemma 4 (Small Conflict: F (ωv) > 1/2). Suppose there is a single decision maker with
small conflict with the media. Then, there exists a unique ω∗ > ωv such that the media
announces whether or not ω ≤ ω∗, that is, Ω1 = [0, ω∗] and Ω2 = (ω∗, 1]. Moreover,
(a) if p < F (ωv), then ω
∗ = 1 and vi(Ω1, si) = X for each si ∈ S, i.e., news contains no
information, and
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(b) if p > F (ωv), then F (ω
∗) = F (ωv)/p (that is, ω∗ > ωv), vi(Ω1, si) = X for each
si ∈ S and vi(Ω2, si) = Y for each si ∈ S, i.e., X-endorsing news is inconclusive
while Y -endorsing news is fully revealing, and the decision maker always chooses in
accordance with the media endorsements.
With small conflict, the prior distribution is biased in favor of the (media’s favorite)
alternative X. From Lemma 3, it follows that when no information is provided, the DM
choosesX irrespective of his private signal if the strength of his private signal is sufficiently
low. Since the media prefers the alternative X for all states of the world, this is the ideal
scenario for it and therefore it chooses not to transmit any information in equilibrium.
However, if the signal strength of the DM is high, under no additional information, he
chooses according to his private signal, which prompts the media to intervene in this
scenario. In this case, the media optimally chooses to follow Class 1 message strategy,
such that in the most influential equilibrium, the length of the X-endorsing interval is
maximized. To see this, observe that in order to make the DM adopt a pooling strategy
of voting X, the message should provide credible information that is sufficiently strong
in favor of X (which means the mass of states greater than ωv that may have generated
the same message needs to be sufficiently small) so that the DM chooses X even when he
receives a private signal of Y . To achieve this end, a single message should be delivered for
all states in [0, ωv] (which ensures maximal evidence in favor of states for which the voter
favors X) along with other states in (ωv, 1] . After having included the entire support
[0, ωv], the maximum point ω
∗ up to which the news can be thought to be generated from
a left interval sustaining a resultant pooling strategy of voting X satisfies the condition
F (ω∗) = F (ωv)/p which implies that ω∗ > ωv.
Remark 2. Note that ω∗ is a decreasing function of p. This implies that the degree of
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inconclusiveness of news endorsing X goes down as the signal strength rises, that is, a
more informed DM receives more information.
We next move to the case where the conflict between the media and the DM is large.
Lemma 5 (Large Conflict: F (ωv) < 1/2). Suppose there is a single decision maker with
large conflict with the media. Then there exists a unique ω∗ ∈ (0, 1) where the media
announces whether or not ω ≤ ω∗, that is, Ω1 = [0, ω∗] and Ω2 = (ω∗, 1]. Moreover,
(a) If p > 1− F (ωv), then
(i) if F (ωv) < 1−1/
√
2, then ω∗ satisfies F (ω∗) = (F (ωv)/p)−((1−p)/p), i.e. ω∗ <
ωv, with vi(Ω1, si) = X for each si ∈ S and vi(Ω2, si) = si, i.e., X-endorsement
is fully revealing, Y -endorsement is inconclusive, the DM follows only an X-
endorsement but votes according to private signal with a Y -endorsement;
(ii) if F (ωv) > 1−1/
√
2, then if p < 1/(2(1−F (ωv))), we have F (ω∗) = F (ωv)/p i.e.
ω∗ > ωv, with vi(Ω1, si) = X for each si ∈ S and vi(Ω2, si) = Y for each si ∈ S,
i.e., X-endorsements are inconclusive while Y -endorsements are fully revealing
and the DM follows media endorsements; However if p > 1/(2(1−F (ωv))), then
the message strategy and voting behavior is similar to part (a.i).
(b) If p < 1− F (ωv), then
(i) when p < 1/
√
2 we have F (ω∗) = F (ωv)/p, i.e. ω∗ > ωv, with vi(Ω1, si) = X
for each si ∈ S and vi(Ω2, si) = Y for each si ∈ S, i.e., X-endorsements are
inconclusive while Y -endorsements are fully revealing and the DM follows media
endorsements, and
(ii) when p > 1/
√
2 we have F (ω∗) = F (ωv)/(1− p), i.e. ω∗ > ωv, with vi(Ω1, si) =
si and vi(Ω2, si) = Y for each si ∈ S, i.e., X-endorsements are inconclusive
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while Y -endorsements are fully revealing; however, the DM follows only the
Y -endorsements, but votes according to private signal with an X-endorsement.
When F (ωv) < 1/2, the prior distribution is biased in favor of the alternative Y that
the media wants to defeat. Consider a highly aware society. If the degree of conflict is
very large, the media chooses to follow a bi-partitioned message strategy which induces
the DM to follow the media slant if the news is in favor of X, while he votes according
to his private signal if the news is in favor of Y . The media finds this voting behavior
ex-ante profitable, for it is assured of its most favored alternative X when ω ∈ [0, ω∗),
while there still is a positive probability that X will be voted for when ω ∈ [ω∗, 1]. The
same message strategy and induced voting behavior is maintained when the degree of
conflict is lessened, along with the characteristic that the level of awareness exceeds a
threshold value. However, if the awareness level is lower than the threshold limit, the
media in a most influential equilibrium follows a two-interval message strategy such that
the DM follows a pooling strategy of choosing X when the state belongs to the left
interval endorsing X, and Y when it belongs to the right interval endorsing Y .
Now consider a sufficiently unaware society where in the media’s absence the DM
chooses alternative Y in each state irrespective of his private signal, which is the worst
possible outcome for the media. Note that in this case even when the entire length of
[0, ωv] is included in a single message, the DM cannot be induced to vote for X for the
entire region (ωv, 1] when he receives a private signal of X, because he does not have
enough faith in the precision of his signal. In this case, under the most influential equi-
librium the media follows a message strategy that satisfies the following characteristics:
if the signal strength is greater than a cut-off value, the bi-partitioned message space is
such that when the state belongs to the X-endorsing interval, the DM chooses according
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to his private signal. If the state belongs to the Y -endorsing interval, the DM chooses
alternative Y irrespective of the private signal received. Here the length of the left in-
terval is maximized by including the entire zone of [0, ωv] and stretching the support of
the interval to the maximal point such that the DM votes according to his private signal
for all states in this interval. If the signal strength is less than the cut-off value, then
the most influential equilibrium entails a bi-partitioned message space such that the DM
chooses X irrespective of his private signal when the state belongs to the X-endorsing
interval, and Y when it belongs to the Y -endorsing interval.
4.3.1 Welfare Analysis with a Single Decision Maker
While we have shown that the media can and will influence the decision, it turns out that
a single DM weakly benefits from media presence. In this regard, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 (Media is weakly welfare-improving). In a scenario with a single decision
maker, the presence of a media can only enhance ex-ante welfare. In particular,
(a) Suppose F (ωv) > 1/2. Then,
(i) When p < F (ωv), the decision maker’s welfare is invariant to the presence of
the media.
(ii) When p > F (ωv), the decision maker’s welfare is higher under the presence of
a media;
(b) Suppose F (ωv) < 1/2. Then,
(i) When p > 1−F (ωv), the decision maker’s welfare is higher under the presence
of a media;
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(ii) When p < 1− F (ωv), then
• If p < 1/√2, the presence of a media is always better for ex-ante voter
welfare, whereas
• If p > 1/√2, the ex-ante voter welfare is invariant to the presence or ab-
sence of the media.
Consider the case of low conflict where solely based on the prior distribution, the
inclination of the DM is towards alternative X which the media prefers (that is, when
F (ωv) > 1/2). In this case if the inclination based on prior information exceeds the
strength of the private signal of the DM, then no additional information appears in equi-
librium as the media’s best alternative always wins with probability 1. Hence in this case
the ex-ante welfare of the DM remains same both in the presence or absence of the me-
dia. Moreover, in the case where the media finds it optimal to transmit some information
through its news, the DM is never worse-off with the news. For example, consider (a.ii)
of the proposition. Here by Lemma (4) part (b) it follows that in equilibrium the media
makes the DM choose X irrespective of his signal for all states [0, ω∗], where ωv < ω∗.
This implies that information provided by the media may over-ride the informative pri-
vate signal of the DM when ω ∈ (ωv, ω∗], prompting him to choose the less desirable
alternative for these states. On the other hand, with the media the DM is assured that
he will choose his most favored alternative when ω ∈ [0, ωv]. The net effect is that the
ex-ante welfare of the DM is higher with news coverage and hence the presence of a media
augments his welfare.
Now consider the case of large conflict, represented by F (ωv) < 1/2. In this case the
power of the media to manipulate the DM is limited due to large conflict of preferences,
and hence the information provided by the media can never hurt the ex-ante welfare of
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the DM.
In other words, we can think of the result in the following manner. There are two
sources of information for the single DM: his private signal and the endorsing news pro-
vided by the media. Under certain scenarios, news provided can over-ride the private
signal of the DM and make him worse-off for some states of the world. However, reli-
able news also enables him to choose his desired alternative with a higher probability
for other states. Since for a single DM, only one informative signal is used to generate
final decisions, it can never be that the welfare of the DM is reduced by introducing an
additional source of information available from the media, since the potential gains for
some states outweigh the potential losses for other states owing to the introduction of
this additional information source. In other scenarios, the news provided complements
the action of the DM in the following manner: for some states of the world, it induces
the DM to vote according to his private signal (which he would would have done any-
way even in the absence of the news), while for other states the informational content of
the news leads the DM to choose his most preferred alternative without fail. Hence the
DM always welcomes the presence of the media. Seidmann (1990) considers information
transmission in a single receiver setting with no costly talk where the type of the receiver
is private information. In this case, any message provided by the sender induces a dis-
tribution of the receiver’s actions across its types, and there may be two messages that
induce distributions over actions that are not ordered by stochastic dominance. Different
types of senders who agree in their preference rankings of non-stochastic actions may
differ in their preference rankings of these non-ordered distributions, thereby making ef-
fective communication possible. However, in our model we focus on costly talk where the
preference ranking of every possible type of sender over the distribution of the receiver’s
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action is identical.
4.4 Information Transmission and Voting
We have seen that media presence is always welfare improving with a single DM. With
multiple decision makers who take decisions via voting, news otherwise useful can coor-
dinate beliefs of voters in such a way that aggregate decisions are less efficient. When
the media sends public messages and voters vote strategically, we ask what sort of infor-
mation is credibly transmitted and when can the media manipulate social decisions in its
favor. The results we obtain without a media or a media with small conflict are similar
to Lemmas 3 and 4 though the proofs are more involved and provided in the Appendix.
We begin with the following lemma for the game without media.
Lemma 6 (Voting without Media). Suppose there are n ≥ 3 independent voters but there
is no media presence. The equilibrium voting strategy for each voter i = 1, ..., n is the
same as those of a single decision maker described in Lemma 3.
Lemma 6 is readily understood from the observation that under the simple majori-
tarian rule, in a separating voting equilibrium where each vote reveals the voter’s private
signal, the pivotal vote profile provides perfectly balanced evidence in favor of either al-
ternatives, and hence the decisive piece of private evidence to be considered by the voter
is just his own signal as is the case with a single DM. This then leads to the result that
the equilibrium behavior of each voter in a multiple voter case (under our equilibrium
criterion of informative voting) is the same as the scenario where a single decision maker
is present.
Given Lemma 6, we now allow media presence. We first deal with the case when the
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conflict of preference between the voters and the media is small.
Lemma 7 (Voting with Small Conflict: F (ωv) > 1/2). Suppose in the presence of an
informed media there are n ≥ 3 voters and suppose the conflict between the voters and
the media is small. Then the equilibrium actions of the media and the voters are same as
those with a single decision maker in the presence of the media as described in Lemma 4.
If the inclination of the voter based solely on the prior distribution to vote for X
exceeds the strength of his private signal, then no additional information is made available
to him even when a media is present, and each voter votes X irrespective of their private
signals. In this case the unanimous decision is X for all states of the world which the
media prefers. This rationalizes her choice of not transmitting any information to the
voters. When the signal strength is high, the intuition behind the particular message
strategy followed by the media is identical to the logic provided in explaining Lemma 4.
Apart from news that reveals no information in any state (which appears when the
voters’ posteriors sans media news always tilt towards what the media wants), the media’s
problem (both in the single DM or multiple voter case) reduces to a choice between two
types of informative news coverage: (i) only the X-endorsing news is inconclusive and (ii)
potentially tri-partitional message strategy where it is possible to have coverage where
slants in favor of both X and Y -endorsing news is conclusive. When F (ωv) > 1/2, we
prove that type (i) dominates unambiguously both in the single DM or multiple voter
case. However, when F (ωv) < 1/2, the problem gets more nuanced as already reflected
in Lemma 5 even with a single DM.
In general, the choice between these two types of news depends crucially on what we
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call Condition (∗). Let
J(n, p) =
n∑
j=n+1
2
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j.
Condition (∗):
J(n, p) ≥ p(2− F (ωv))− 1
(2p− 1)(1− F (ωv))
Note that the expression J(n, p) is the probability that a constituency of size n and
awareness p makes a correct social decision when voters vote in accordance with their
private signals. Then, (∗) provides a lower bound on this probability. This lower bound
increases in p and decreases in ωv.
While (∗) holds unambiguously when F (ωv) > 1/2, it is neither universal nor empty
when F (ωv) < 1/2. The following lemma specifies equilibrium actions under F (ωv) < 1/2
by using (∗) directly. It shows that only when p is large, condition (∗) matters; when
it holds, type (i) messaging dominates while when it is violated type (ii) messaging
dominates. We then discuss and provide examples concerning the condition. The lemma
uses a particular value of p which we call p′ where
p′ =
(27− 3√78) 13
6
+
(3
√
78 + 27)
1
3
6
≈ .76.
Lemma 8 (Voting with Large Conflict: F (ωv) < 1/2). Suppose in the presence of an
informed media there are n ≥ 3 voters and suppose the conflict between the voters and
the media is large. Then, there exists a unique ω∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that the media announces
whether or not ω ≤ ω∗, that is, Ω1 = [0, ω∗] and Ω2 = (ω∗, 1]. Moreover,
(a) If p > 1− F (ωv), then
(i) If (∗) holds then ω∗ satisfies F (ω∗) = F (ωv)/p, i.e. ω∗ > ωv, with vi(Ω1, si) = X
for each si ∈ S and vi(Ω2, si) = Y for each si ∈ S, i.e., X-endorsement is incon-
clusive, Y -endorsement is fully revealing and voters follow media endorsements;
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(ii) If (∗) does not hold then ω∗ satisfies F (ω∗) = (F (ωv)/p) − ((1 − p)/p), i.e.
ω∗ < ωv, with vi(Ω1, si) = X for each si ∈ S and vi(Ω2, si) = si, i.e., X-
endorsement is fully revealing, Y -endorsement is inconclusive, voters follow
only an X-endorsement but vote according to their private signals with a Y -
endorsement;
(b) If p < 1− F (ωv), then
(i) for n ≥ 5, the message strategy and voting behavior is same as in (a.i).
(ii) for n = 3, for all p < p′, the message strategy and voting behavior is same as
(a.i). When p > p′, then F (ω∗) = F (ωv)/(1−p), i.e. ω∗ > ωv, with vi(Ω1, si) =
si and vi(Ω2, si) = Y for each si ∈ S, i.e., X-endorsements are inconclusive
while Y -endorsements are fully revealing; however, voters follow only the Y -
endorsements but vote according to private signals with an X-endorsement.
From the lemma it follows that the media always transmits news that is slanted either
in favor of X or Y . We first discuss the case when the society is sufficiently aware and
each voter votes according to his private signal in the absence of the media. Here, if the
media is present the kind of news it will choose to transmit depends on whether (∗) holds
or not.
We now provide some sufficiency conditions for (∗) to hold. Let
Q(n, p;ωv) = J(n, p)(F (ωv)− 1)(2p− 1) + p(2− F (ωv)),
and note that (∗) holds if and only if Q(n, p;ωv)− 1 ≤ 0.
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Highly aware society: If p = 1, then J(n, p) = 1. Hence in this case, Q(n, 1;ωv)−1 = 0.
Also note that ∂(Q(n,1;ωv)−1)
∂p
|p=1 = F (ωv) > 0. This shows that when p → 1, the expres-
sion (Q(n, 1;ωv) − 1) < 0. Hence (∗) is always satisfied for all n if the precision of the
signal received individually by the voters is high enough.
Large constituency: Also consider the case when the size of the electorate is very large.
Note that J(n, p)→ 1 as n→∞, and hence corresponding to this case Q(n, p;ωv)− 1 =
p(F (ωv)− 1) < 0 for all p ∈ (1/2, 1). This shows that condition (∗) is always satisfied if
the number of voters is sufficiently large.
Intermediate awareness, not-too-large conflict, small constituency: Moreover,
note that Q(n, 1;ωv)− 1 ≤ 0 if J(n, p) ≥ (p(2−F (ωv))− 1)/((2p− 1)(1−F (ωv))), which
is always satisfied if the RHS of the inequality is less than or equal to 1/2. This yields
p ≤ 1+F (ωv)
2
. Since (∗) is valid for the case p > 1 − F (ωv), we must therefore ensure
1 − F (ωv) < 1+F (ωv)2 , which yields 13 < F (ωv). Hence we know that if 13 < F (ωv) < 12
and 1 − F (ωv) < p ≤ (1 + F (ωv))/2, condition (∗) always holds. As a specific example,
consider F (ωv) = .35. In this case 1 − F (ωv) = .65, and (1+F (ωv))2 = .675. Consider
p = .66, n = 3. In this case Q(n, p;ωv)− 1 ≈ −.063 < 0, and hence (∗) is satisfied.
When (∗) does not hold: The complement of (∗) is non-empty as well. We construct
an example. Let n = 3 and F (ωv) = .18. In this case for intermediate values of the
precision of the private signal (that is when 0.63 < p < 0.9), (∗) is violated while for the
cases 1/2 < p < 0.63 or 0.9 < p < 1, (∗) is satisfied. As a specific example, consider
n = 3 and p = .7. For these values, Q(n, p;ωv)− 1 ≈ .017 > 0, and hence (∗) is violated
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in this case.
Given the above discussion, suppose (∗) is satisfied. Lemma 8 shows that in this case
the media transmits news that is slanted either in favor of X (in which case the content
of the news is inconclusive) or Y (here the content of the news is fully revealing). In
both cases the voters vote in favor of the alternative towards which the news provided
is slanted. If, however (∗) is violated, the media transmits news that is either slanted
conclusively in favor of its own preferred alternative X or inconclusively in favor of its
less preferred alternative Y . Upon receiving news that is decisively slanted towards
X, the voters always vote X. However, if they receive news from the media that is
inconclusively slanted towards Y , they vote in accordance to their private signals. This
may appear counter intuitive since here the voters support what the media likes when
it asks them to do so, but they are careful and use their private information when the
media endorses what it does not like. However, it is worth noting that the voters would
have voted according to their private signals had the media been absent. Hence, when
the media is present, it regulates the information content of the news to make the voters
choose for sure the preferred alternative of the media (X) for as many states as possible,
while for others they are left to behave as they would have in the media’s absence. This
leaves the media with a positive probability of having the social decision to be X when
ω ∈ [ω∗, 1].
Now consider a society with low awareness levels wherein in the media’s absence the
voters would have been influenced by the prior and unequivocally voted for Y irrespective
of their private signal received. Note that in this case it is impossible for the media to
make the voters vote X for all ω ∈ (ωv, 1] when their private signals is X even when the
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entire stretch [0, ωv] is included in a single message. Hence the voting behavior of part
(a.ii) is impossible to replicate here. In this scenario, the media optimally chooses between
message strategy in part (a.i) of the lemma versus providing news of the following kind:
either the news has an inconclusive slant towards X that induces the voters to follow
their signals, or the voters are induced to vote in favour of the slant towards X. It is
shown that for a sufficiently large electorate (greater than or equal to five), the latter
type dominates the former. This is because under the latter, the media is surely able to
implement X when ω ∈ (ωv, ω∗], whereas under the former type of message strategy Y
will be chosen for these states under a large electorate, since each voter votes according
to his private signal.
4.4.1 Welfare
We now compare ex-ante voter welfare across absence and presence of media. When the
prior distribution is biased in favor of X (that is, for the case of small conflict), we have
the following result. With low signal precision, the ex-ante welfare of the voter under
both cases is the same. Otherwise, the ex-ante welfare of the voter is different for the two
cases. Here we may differentiate among the following scenarios: for a sufficiently large
size of the electorate (greater than or equal to seven), the ex-ante welfare of the voter is
always higher in the absence of the media. We however show that this is not a general
feature of the model. If the number of voters is low (either three or five), then for an
intermediate range of signal precision, ex-ante welfare of the voter is higher when the
media is present, while for extreme values (either high or low) of signal precision ex-ante
voter welfare is higher in the absence of the media. These observations are made precise
in Proposition 4.
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Proposition 4 (Welfare under Small Conflict: F (ωv) > 1/2). In a scenario with n ≥ 3
voters, the presence of a media with small conflict may or may not enhance ex-ante
welfare. In particular,
(a) When p < F (ωv), the ex-ante voter welfare is invariant to the presence of the media.
(b) When F (ωv) < p,
(i) If n ≥ 7, the ex-ante voter welfare is higher in the absence of the media;
(ii) If n < 7, there exists 1/2 < k∗(n) < p such that (1) when k∗(n) < F (ωv) <
p, the ex-ante voter welfare is higher in the absence of the media; (2) when
1/2 < F (ωv) < k
∗(n), there exists F (ωv) < pˆ(n, F (ωv)) < p˜(n, F (ωv)) < 1 such
that for p ∈ (F (ωv), pˆ(n, F (ωv))) ∪ (p˜(n, F (ωv)), 1), the ex-ante voter welfare is
higher in the absence of the media. However, when p ∈ (pˆ(n, F (ωv)), p˜(n, F (ωv))),
the ex-ante voter welfare is higher when the media is present.
Consider the case when the prior distribution is biased in favor of the alternative X.
In this case if the signal strength of the voters is sufficiently low, then the media chooses
not to transmit any information and the resultant equilibrium (both in the presence and
absence of the media) is such that each voter votes X irrespective of his private signal.
It therefore follows that the social decision is unanimously chosen to be X and this is
invariant to the number of voters. Hence the ex-ante voter welfare is the same whether
or not a media is present.
If the signal strength is sufficiently high, then the proposition states that ex-ante voter
welfare is higher in the absence of a media for a sufficiently large size of the electorate. The
reason is as follows: In the presence of a media, the nature of information provided is such
that the voters invariably vote for their less preferred alternative (X) when ω ∈ (ωv, ω∗].
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However, they surely vote for their preferred alternative (X) when ω ∈ [0, ωv]. Now,
consider the scenario where the media is absent, in which case each voter votes according
to his own signal. The probability J(n, p) of a correct decision rises as the number of
voters increase, since the incidences of informative signals that contribute to the social
decision rises. Hence the relative advantage the presence of a media has on voter welfare
when ω ∈ [0, ωv] diminishes as the size of the electorate rises, due to the fact that owing
to the large volume of informative private signals aggregated it becomes highly likely that
the preferred alternative (X) in this range would be the social decision anyway. When
ω ∈ (ωv, ω∗], (which is the zone of incorrect decision-making under the media), by the
same logic it follows that the preferred alternative (Y ) in this range would be the social
decision in the no media case as the size of the constituency rises. Hence the ex-ante
voter welfare under no media exceeds that under a media.
Now consider the case when the size of the electorate is sufficiently small. In this case
the probability of a correct decision (without media when voters vote according to their
private signals) is low, due to the low number of informative signals that are aggregated
to form the social decision. We explain the welfare comparison in this case by a numerical
example.
Example 1. Suppose F (ωv) is a uniform distribution with support [0, 1]. Let the number
of voters be n = 3. It follows that in this case, if k∗(3) ≈ .527 < ωv < p, then the ex-
ante voter welfare is always higher under no media. Since the prior distribution is such
that for the majority of the states the preferred alternative of the media and the voters
coincide, the media uses this to manipulate the voters such that the voters are better-off
on their own without the media. The reasoning is completed by highlighting the fact
that in this case p > ωv, which means we are commenting on the scenario where the
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strength of the private signals of the voters is high. Let 1/2 < ωv = .51 < .527. When
p ∈ (.51, pˆ(3) ≈ .52197) or p ∈ (p˜(3) ≈ .68804, 1], the ex-ante voter welfare is higher in
the absence of the media, while for p ∈ (.52197, .68804) the ex-ante voter welfare is higher
under a media.
Note from Lemma 7 that when the voters have a high level of awareness, ω∗ is a
decreasing function of p. This implies the region over which the media is able to manipu-
late the voters into voting for their less preferred choice decreases as the strength of their
private signal rises. This means when p is low the zone of manipulation (ωv, ω
∗] under
the media is large, so that the voter welfare is higher in the absence of the media. On
the other hand, if p is very high, the probability that the voters will collectively choose
the preferred alternative without a media is high for all states, and hence higher voter
welfare again warrants non-interference from the media. However, for an intermediate
range of p, the presence of a media (yielding an advantage in the form of a guarantee
that the social decision will be the most preferred one for the voters when ω ∈ [0, ωv])
dominates, such that the ex-ante voter welfare is higher under a media relative to the
case when the media is absent.
The intermediate range of signal precision for which the presence of the media is
desirable for voter welfare shrinks as the size of the electorate rises from three to five.
The logic behind the result is the following: the ex-ante voter welfare without the media
increases as the size of the electorate goes up, while the ex-ante voter welfare under media
presence is invariant to the number of voters. Hence the zone where the absence of media
is relatively more advantageous for voter welfare goes up as the size of the electorate rises,
which alternatively implies that the zone where the presence of the media is preferable
for achieving higher voter welfare shrinks.
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The following proposition deals with the last case to be considered where the prior dis-
tribution is biased in favor of Y . There may still arise cases when additional information
available from the media may hurt voter welfare, while in others additional information
augments voter welfare.
Proposition 5 (Welfare under Large Conflict: F (ωv) < 1/2). In a scenario with n ≥ 3
voters, the presence of a media with large conflict may or may not enhance ex-ante welfare.
In particular,
(a) Let 1 − p < F (ωv). If (∗) is satisfied, then ex-ante voter welfare is higher in the
presence of the media iff F (ωv) <
p
1−p(1−J(n, p)). If (∗) is violated, then the ex-ante
voter welfare is always higher in the presence of the media.
(b) Let F (ωv) < 1 − p. In this case the presence of the media always corresponds to
higher ex-ante welfare for the voter.
Consider the case of a sufficiently aware society where each voter votes according to
his private signal in the absence of the media. As discussed before, (∗) is always satisfied
for all p ∈ (1
2
, 1) when n → ∞, in which case we have J(n, p) = 1. Since F (ωv) > 0,
it follows that F (ωv) >
p
1−p(1 − J(n, p)) and thus if the size of the electorate is very
large, ex-ante voter welfare is higher in the absence of the media. This is because of the
following: in the media’s presence the probability of a correct decision is invariant to the
number of voters since each of them follows a signal invariant (or pooling) voting strategy
where the decision is always unanimous. In its absence the voters vote according to their
private signals which implies that the large number of private signals aggregated to form
the social decision guarantees that the correct social decision will be arrived at with a
very high probability. Thus for a very large electorate, the presence of a manipulative
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media hurts welfare.
If however, the size of the electorate is low, then whether the presence of the media
leads to higher ex-ante welfare or not depends on the ‘relative size’ of the set of states for
which decision-making is improved owing to the information provided by the media vis a
vis the set of states over which the voters are manipulated to vote for their less favored
alternative. This in turn is compared to the scenario where the media is absent. Both
the cases where media presence or absence is desirable for higher ex-ante voter welfare
is feasible, which we demonstrate by citing two examples where the number of voters is
low and (∗) holds.
Example 2 (Condition (∗) holds, media presence improves welfare). For the first exam-
ple, let F (ωv) = .35, p = .66 and n = 3. It is already shown after Lemma 8 that (∗) is
satisfied for these values of the parameters. For these values, p
1−p(1 − J(n, p)) ≈ .521 >
.35 = F (ωv), and hence in this case the presence of the media leads to higher ex-ante
voter welfare.
Example 3 (Condition (∗) holds, media presence hurts welfare). Let F (ωv) = .48, p =
.74 and n = 3. In this case the conditions 1
3
< F (ωv) <
1
2
and 1 − F (ωv) < p ≤ 1+F (ωv)2
holds, and hence (∗) is valid which is checked by noting that corresponding to these
values, (Q(n, 1;ωv) − 1) ≈ −.083 < 0. However, in this case p1−p(1 − J(n, p)) ≈ .477 <
.48 = F (ωv), and hence in this case the absence of the media leads to higher ex-ante
voter welfare.
Now consider the case where (∗) is violated, an example of which has been provided
after Lemma 8. In this case, due to transmission of news by the media, the voters follow
a signal invariant strategy of voting X for a certain range of states contained entirely
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in [0, ωv], which is their preferred alternative for these states of the world. For the rest
of the states the voters vote according to their private signals, which they would have
done anyway even in the absence of the media. Hence ex-ante voter welfare is higher
in the presence of the media when (∗) is violated. Now consider the case where the
precision of signals of the voters is sufficiently low such that in the media’s absence the
voters vote for Y irrespective of their signal received. Since the states where the preferred
alternative of the media and the voters are different are more likely to occur given the
prior distribution, the power of the media to manipulate the voters is limited, and given
this the voter welfare is higher if information from the media is received.
A summary of all results of this section can be found in Table 1.
We now discuss some other aspects and implications of this model.
4.4.2 Voting versus Delegation
In a cheap talk setting with a single receiver, Dessein (2002) shows that full delegation of
decision making rights to the informed sender is better than cheap talk communication
if the degree of conflict is not large. In a similar setting Ivanov (2010) studies the case
where it is now possible to limit the degree of precision of the expert’s information, but
not the content. The paper studies the welfare effects of information transmission versus
directly delegating the expert to take the decision to show that it may not be in the best
interest of the principal to delegate authority to the most informed subordinate.
In relation to these two works, an important feature of our multiple-receiver model
is that under no circumstances can it be better for the voters to give up their rights to
vote and delegate decision making authorities to the media or the informed elite. To
see this first note that if the media becomes the DM, then the social decision is X and
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the expected payoff of each voter is simply F (ωv)τ + (1 − F (ωv))ζ. Suppose first that
F (ωv) > 1/2. If p < F (ωv) then we have shown that the outcome from voting is X
independent of whether there is a reputation driven media or not. Hence, in this case
delegation to the media cannot help the voters. If p > F (ωv), then the payoff of the
voter in the absence of a media is simply J(n, p)τ + (1 − J(n, p))ζ which is higher than
F (ωv)τ + (1−F (ωv))ζ, the voter’s payoff from delegation, if and only if J(n, p) > F (ωv).
But for any n > 1 and any p > 1/2 we have J(n, p) > p, and since p > F (ωv) it follows
that for any n ≥ 3 and any p > 1/2 we have J(n, p) > F (ωv). Hence delegation cannot
be first best. Now suppose F (ωv) < 1/2. In this case when p > 1 − F (wv), then in the
absence of a media the voting equilibrium is separating. In this case, democracy beats
delegation if J(n, p) > F (wv), which always holds since J(n, p) > 1/2 > F (wv). When
p < 1 − F (wv), then in the absence of a media the the voting equilibrium is pooling
(on alternative Y ) so that voter’s payoff is given by F (wv)ζ + (1 − F (wv)τ while under
delegation it is given by F (wv)τ + (1 − F (wv))ζ. Since F (wv) < 1/2, the welfare with
no media beats welfare under delegation. Hence, in no circumstance can the society be
better off by delegating decision making authorities to the media.
4.4.3 Media Regulation
We have established that media presence can hurt. This result suggests interesting pol-
icy implications. To address this, it is more convenient to re-interpret the model slightly.
Suppose for the moment that the voters can neither avoid the media nor directly punish
it for transmitting misleading news. However, there is a regulatory authority that poten-
tially can penalize the media. If it decides to impose a fine (like cancellation of telecast
rights) for misleading news, and if this is common knowledge, then the model studied
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above can be readily used to ask what the authority should do.
Observe that if the media is not regulated in this sense, it resembles the case when no
information can be transmitted credibly (that is, absence of a reputed media). Our results
suggest in certain circumstances (characterized by p, F and n), the optimal policy is then
either to ban the media outright (so that it cannot transmit any news) or deregulate it
completely (so that it cannot credibly transmit any information even if it tried). Since
banning the media is most of the time politically infeasible, deregulation is the only
option. By deregulating, the authority takes away credibility of the media and our results
show this can be beneficial.
Of course, our results also suggest that under certain other circumstances when media
presence helps the voters, the authorities should strengthen regulatory punishments.
4.4.4 Reputation-building and endogenous viewership
Fix viewership first to n. If the media is aware that by gaining in reputation it can
improve its own payoffs, it is fair to say that some sort of truthful reporting should
appear in a repeated setting. By subsequently reporting truthful news, the media builds
the credibility of future news. Interestingly, under certain values of p and F the ex-ante
welfare of the voters in each period is lower in this scenario, when compared to the case
where the media was not engaged in an effort to build a reputation through truthful
reporting.
Further, if media’s presence can hurt the voters, can the voter choose to stay away
from media news? Durante and Knight (2012) examines whether and how viewers in
Italy respond to changes in partisan bias in media news. They find robust evidence that
viewers responded to these changes by modifying their choice of favorite news programs.
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So consider the scenario where the viewership of news is decentralized in the sense that
each of the voters endogenously choose whether to access the news transmitted by the
media. In our setup, full participation in the acquisition of news is the unique Nash
equilibrium, which then becomes equivalent to the model we study. This is because
ceteris paribus, as our analysis of a single DM reveals, more information always increases
that voter’s expected payoff. This coupled with the fact that in a multi-player scenario
each voter votes as-if-pivotal would mean that each voter will always be willing to improve
his information prior to voting.
4.5 Discussion of Assumptions
Our model may also be re-investigated in a more general setting by considering the
following: firstly, we have considered a scenario where each of the voters get a binary
signal that depend on the range in which the true state belongs. An alternative set-up
where the voters receive informative signals regarding the underlying state of the world
may be studied. This would alter the results quantitatively. However, given the nature
of strict preferences over the alternatives the voters share for every state of the world,
the fundamental manner in which the behaviour of the voters has been modelled (which
is that the voter aggregates all information to ascertain which alternative will yield him
the higher expected pay-off) remains the same. The second possible modification is the
following: in our model, we look into the scenario where there is a discrete switch in
the preferences of the voters (in the sense that when the state is lower than or equal to
wv, the voters prefer alternative X, while for all states above wv they prefer Y ). This
assumption maintains the characteristic of standard jury models that the voters have
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strict preference over the alternatives for every state of the world. We may alternatively
consider the following case: suppose the pay-off of the voters from the alternative X is
decreasing as the state increases, while the pay-off of the voter from the alternative Y is
increasing as the state increases. When the state is lower than wv, the voters prefer X,
for all states higher than wv, the voters prefer Y , while they are indifferent between X
and Y when the state is wv. This modification again will quantitatively alter the results,
but the basic process in which the behaviour of the voters and the media works in our
model will be the same. In our model, we have assumed that the media can pre-commit
to the signalling technology before observing the state. We may consider the scenario
where the media announces the signalling technology after observing the state. In this
case the most influential message strategy will be changed according to the observed
state by the media. For a media which is not driven by reputation, it cannot credibly
commit to announce any signalling technology with the guarantee that the true state will
necessarily be contained in the interval that is declared to the voters. In this scenario,
no information can be transmitted.
Lastly, one may also investigate how the results are altered if we consider a multiple
alternatives voting model and/or apply other aggregation rules such as the system of
approval voting or cumulative voting. It is also quite natural to introduce multiple media
outlets with either like or conflicting biases (in a set-up similar to Krishna and Morgan
(2001), Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989)) who may either sequentially or simultaneously
deliver messages to the voters, and examine their implication on public welfare. We
reserve this for future research.
Summarising, we may say the following: in the model described in Chapter 4, we
study the effect of information transmission by a perfectly informed and partially biased
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media to less informed voters. We show that the presence of media never hurts welfare if
there is a single decision maker or when multiple voters are present with low awareness
levels. If the voters are sufficiently aware, then media presence hurts welfare for large
electorates. The strategically chosen content of the informative news transmitted by
the media overpowers the private information of the voters and invariably makes them
vote for a particular alternative. In contrast, without the media the voters would have
voted according to their private signals so that the probability of the correct decision
increases with the size of the constituency. Hence media absence can improve welfare
in large constituencies. This perverse effect of media presence can also appear in small
constituencies, though not universally. Needless to mention, our work is not to suggest
that media is not useful. As our results show, in many instances they are.
4.6 Chapter Appendix
4.6.1 Notations and formal definitions
Fix the arity of the message strategy to k. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is a
strategy profile (mk, v) such that:
(i) for each si ∈ {X, Y }, and i ∈ I we have
∑
s−i∈{X,Y }n−1
(∫
ω∈Ωk
P[s−i|mk(ω), si]u(δ(v(mk(ω), (si, s−i))), ω)f(ω|s)dω
)
≥
∑
s−i∈{X,Y }n−1
(∫
ω∈Ωk
P[s−i|mk(ω), si]u(δ(v′i(mk(ω), (si, s−i))), v−i, ω)f(ω|s)dω
)
,
and
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(ii) for each realized state ω ∈ Ω and each ω′ /∈ Ω(mk(ω)), we have
∑
s∈{X,Y }n
P[s|ω]um(δ(v(mk(ω), s)), ω) ≥
∑
s∈{X,Y }n
P[s|w]um(δ(v((mk(ω′)), s)), ω)− c.
Given two equilibria (mk, v) and (mk′ , v
′), we say that they are decision-equivalent if
for every ω ∈ Ω, v(mk, s) = v′(mk′ , s). We say (mk, v) is decision-equivalent coarsening
(DEC) of (mk′ , v
′) if they are decision equivalent and k < k
′
. We shall always work with
maximal DECs, that is, given the set of all decision equivalent equilibria, we shall only
consider those which are the coarsest in this set.
In the voting sub-game an equilibrium is pooling when vi(mk(ω), si) = vj(mk(ω), sj)
for any i, j ∈ I for any si, sj ∈ {X, Y }. Similarly an equilibrium is separating when
vi(mk(ω), X) 6= vi(mk(ω), Y ) for any i ∈ I.
Let Ξ be the set of all possible informative equilibria. An informative equilibrium
(m∗k, v
∗) ∈ Ξ is called most influential if for all equilibria (mk, v) ∈ Ξ, we have
∫
ω∈Ω
 ∑
s∈{X,Y }n
P[s|ω]um(δ(v∗(m∗k(ω), s)), ω)
 f(ω)dω
≥
∫
ω∈Ω
 ∑
s∈{X,Y }n
P[s|ω]um(δ(v(mk(ω), s)), ω)
 f(ω)dω.
We identify social welfare in terms of the ex-ante welfare of the voters prior to any
non-prior information received. Note that this is fully explained by any individual voter’s
preferences since all voters are ex-ante identical and each represents the preferences of
the public. Let U(mk, v) be the ex-ante welfare of a single voter under a strategy profile
(mk, v). Then
U(mk, v) =
∫
ω∈Ω
 ∑
s∈{X,Y }n
P[s|ω]u(δ(v(mk(ω), s)), ω)
 f(ω)dω.
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4.6.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3 :
Let γsi = P[ω ≤ ωv|si]. In the absence of the media, let the expected utility of the voter i
from voting vi when he receives a private signal of si be denoted by Uvi(∅, si). The voter
i votes for X if and only if UX(∅, si) > UY (∅, si), from which it follows that (2γsi − 1)τ >
(2γsi − 1)ζ. Since τ > ζ, the above inequality holds if and only if (2γsi − 1) > 0, which
implies γsi > 1/2. Hence it follows that vi(∅, X) = X if γX > 1/2 and vi(∅, X) = Y if
γX < 1/2. Similarly, vi(∅, Y ) = X if γY > 1/2 and vi(∅, Y ) = Y if γY < 1/2.
Consider F (ωv) > 1/2. In this case the condition γX > 1/2 implies p > 1 − F (ωv),
which always holds since p > 1/2. The condition γY < 1/2 implies p > F (ωv). The
binding condition for vi(∅, si) = X for each si ∈ S is therefore p > F (ωv). This proves
part (a.i) of the lemma. Note that when p < F (ωv), then γX > 1/2 and γY > 1/2. This
proves part (a.ii) of the lemma.
Now consider 0 < F (ωv) < 1/2. In this case the condition γY < 1/2 implies p > F (ωv),
which always holds since F (ωv) < 1/2 < p. The condition γX > 1/2 implies p > 1−F (ωv),
which is therefore the binding condition for vi(∅, si) = si for each si ∈ S. This proves
part (b.i) of the lemma. Note that when p < 1 − F (ωv), then γY < 1/2 and γX < 1/2
holds. This proves part (b.ii) of the lemma and concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4 :
When 1/2 < p < F (ωv), from Lemma 3 part (a.ii) it follows that in the voting subgame
of the informative equilibrium the voting strategy vi is such that the preferred alternative
of the media is implemented for all states ω ∈ [0, 1], and hence there does not exist any
profitable deviation for the media from ω∗ = 1. This proves part (a) of the lemma.
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Let 1/2 < F (ωv) < p. Consider the equilibria under following class of message strategy
with arity k = 2, which we classify as Class 1, under which Ω1 = [0, ωˆ), Ω2 = [ωˆ, 1], where
ωv < ωˆ such that vi(m1, si) = X and vi(m2, si) = Y for each si ∈ S.
Suppose the message provided is m1. In this case voter i considers the following posterior
probability given by
γ
′
si
= P[ω < ωv|si,m1] = G
H
,
where
G = P[si,m1|ω < ωv, ]P[ω < ωv]
and
H = P[si,m1|ω < ωv]P[ω < ωv] + P[si,m1|ωv < ω < ωˆ]P[ωv < ω < ωˆ]
Voter i votes vi(m1, si) = X iff γ
′
si
> 1/2, and vi(m1, si) = Y otherwise. We have,
γ
′
X =
pF (ωv)
pF (ωv) + (1− p)(F (ωˆ)− F (ωv))
and
γ
′
Y =
(1− p)F (ωv)
(1− p)F (ωv) + p(F (ωˆ)− F (ωv)) .
Note that γ
′
Y = 1/2 when F (ωˆ) =
F (ωv)
p
. Since
∂γ
′
Y
∂F (ωˆ)
< 0, it follows that when F (ωˆ)
is greater (lesser) than F (ωv)
p
, then γ
′
Y is lesser (greater) than 1/2. Since p > 1/2, we
have γ
′
si=X
> γ
′
si=Y
. Therefore when Ω1 = [0, ωˆ] where F (ωˆ) =
F (ωv)
p
is satisfied, the
voter votes vi = X for each si ∈ S in a symmetric informative equilibrium. For the case
when m2 = (ωˆ, 1], it follows that P[ω ≤ ωv|m2, si] = 0 for each si ∈ S, and hence in an
informative equilibrium the voter i votes vi = Y for each si ∈ S. This proves that (mk, v)
is an equilibrium.
Note that in this case the ex-ante payoff of the media under Class 1 message strategy
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is given by
E[um]1 =
∫ wˆ
0
τmf(ω)dω +
∫ 1
wˆ
ζmf(ω)dω
which simplifies as
E[um]1 = F (wˆ)(τm − ζm) + ζm
Since τm > ζm, it follows that
∂E[um]1
∂wˆ
> 0, which implies that by choosing wˆ that satisfies
the condition F (wˆ) = F (ωv)
p
, the ex-ante payoff of the media is maximized under Class 1
message strategies. Hence the optimum value of ex-ante payoff of the media under Class
1 message strategies is given by
E[um]
∗
1 =
F (ωv)
p
(τm − ζm) + ζm (4.1)
Consider the equilibria in the following class of message strategies, defined as Class
2.
Class 2 : Suppose there exists α ∈ [0, ωv), β ∈ (ωv, 1] such that the message strategy
function mk followed by the reputation driven media is such that Ω1 = [0, α), Ω2 = [α, β),
Ω3 = [β, 1], where the voting strategy followed is:
vi =

X if Ω1 = [0, α)
si if Ω2 = [α, β]
Y otherwise
Note that when m2 = (α, β] is received, then in an informative and symmetric equi-
librium for vi = si for each si ∈ S to hold, the conditions
γˆX = P[ω ≤ ωv|si = X,m2 = (α, β]] > 1/2
and
γˆY = P[ω ≤ ωv|si = Y,m2 = (α, β]] < 1
2
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need to be satisfied simultaneously. The first inequality reduces to
p
1− p(F (ωv)− F (α)) + F (ωv) > F (β)
while the second becomes
1− p
p
(F (ωv)− F (α)) + F (ωv) < F (β).
Under this class the ex-ante payoff of the media is denoted by E[um]2 where
E[um]2 =
∫ α
0
τmf(ω)dω +
∫ ωv
α
(pτm + (1− p)ζm)f(ω)dω+∫ β
ωv
((1− p)τm + pζm)f(ω)dω +
∫ 1
β
ζmf(ω)dω
which is simplified as
E[um]2 = (F (α) + F (β))(1− p)(τm − ζm) + F (ωv)(τm − ζm)(2p− 1) + ζm (4.2)
Since τm > ζm and 1/2 < p < 1, from (4.2) it follows that in order to maximize the ex-
ante payoff of the media, the following maximization problem needs to be solved, which
we denote as (∗).
Maximize (F (α)+F (β)) subject to: (i) p
1−p(F (ωv)−F (α))+F (ωv) > F (β), (ii)1−pp (F (ωv)−
F (α)) + F (ωv) < F (β), (iii) 0 ≤ F (α) < F (ωv), and (iv) F (ωv) < F (β) ≤ 1.
Setting F (α) = 0 and considering equality in constraint (i), we have F (β) = F (ωv)
1−p .
Note that since p > 1/2 and F (ωv) > 1/2, therefore the condition 1 ≥ F (ωv)1−p can never
hold. Now consider 1 < F (ωv)
1−p . In this case from the optimization problem (∗) it follows
that the optimum value is given by the relation F (β∗) = 1, which implies β∗ = 1. Putting
the optimum value of F (β∗) in constraint (i), we have F (α∗) = F (ωv)
p
− 1−p
p
. Replacing
the optimum values of F (α∗) and F (β∗) in (4.2), we have the maximum ex-ante payoff
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of the media under equilibria belonging to Class 2 to be
E[um]
∗
2 =
(
F (ωv)
p
− 1− p
p
+ 1
)
(1− p)(τm − ζm) + F (ωv)(τm − ζm)(2p− 1) + ζm (4.3)
After having described the equilibria which corresponds to the highest ex-ante payoff of
the media in Class 1 and Class 2 for the single receiver case, we compare the ex-ante
payoff of the media between these two equilibria. From (4.1) and (4.3) it follows that
E[um]
∗
2 − E[um]∗1 =
E
p
(4.4)
where E = (τm − ζm)(2p2(F (ωv)− 1) + p(3− 2F (ωv))− 1)
Since τm > ζm, we have E[um]
∗
2 − E[um]∗1 < 0 if
2p2(F (ωv)− 1) + p(3− 2F (ωv))− 1 < 0 (4.5)
LetD(p, F (ωv)) = 2p
2(F (ωv)−1)+p(3−2F (ωv))−1. Note that ∂D(p,F (ωv))∂F (ωv) = 2p(p−1) < 0.
Therefore the maximum value of D(p, F (ωv)) is attained at D(p, 1/2) = −(p − 1)2 < 0.
Hence D(p, F (ωv)) < 0 for all p ∈ (1/2, 1), F (ωv) ∈ (1/2, 1). This proves that for the
single voter case, the optimal equilibrium obtained under Class 1 corresponds to a higher
level of ex-ante payoff for the media than the optimal equilibrium obtained under Class
2.
We now argue that the optimum equilibrium obtained under Class 1 corresponds to
the maximum ex-ante payoff of the media among all possible equilibria. Note that under
Class 1 equilibria, E[um]1 is increasing in wˆ, and the maximum value of wˆ under Class 1
is when the condition F (wˆ) = F (ωv)
p
is satisfied. When F (wˆ) > F (ωv)
p
then γ
′
Y < 1/2 and
we revert to equilibria under Class 2 with α = 0, β = wˆ which has been proved to have a
lower expected payoff for the media than the optimum Class 1 equilibrium. This proves
part (b) and concludes the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 5 :
Now consider the case when a media is present when F (ωv) < 1/2.
Analogous to the proof of Lemma 4, it follows that the most influential equilibria under
Class 1 type of message strategies is achieved by choosing ωˆ such that the condition
F (ωˆ) = F (ωv)
p
is satisfied. Under this class the expected utility of the media is given by
(4.1).
Now we consider Class 2 type of message strategies which gives rise to optimization prob-
lem (∗) as defined in the proof of Lemma 4 part (b). Let p > 1 − F (ωv), which implies
F (ωv) > 1 − p. In this case, analogous to the proof of Lemma 4, it follows that β∗
and α∗ are such that F (β∗) = 1 and F (α∗) = F (ωv)
p
− 1−p
p
. Hence the expression for
E[um]
∗
2 − E[um]∗1 for this case is given by (4.4). Consider the expression D(p, F (ωv)) as
defined in the proof of Lemma 4. From (4.4) it follows that E[um]
∗
2 is greater (lesser)
than E[um]
∗
1 if D(p, F (ωv)) is positive (negative). Note that D(1, F (ωv)) = 0 and
∂D(p,F (ωv))
∂p
|p=1 = 2F (ωv) − 1 < 0, since F (ωv) < 1/2. Also note that D(1/2, F (ωv)) =
−F (ωv)
2
< 0 and ∂D(p,F (ωv))
∂p
|p=1/2 = 1 > 0. The expression D(p, F (ωv)) = 0 has a unique
solution in p ∈ (1/2, 1) that is given by p¯ = 1
2(1−F (ωv)) . This proves that for all p lesser
(greater) than p¯, the expression D(p, F (ωv)) is negative (positive). Now, if the condition
1 − F (ωv) < p < p¯ = 12(1−F (ωv)) has to hold, we must have 1 − F (ωv) < 12(1−F (ωv)) which
holds iff F (ωv) >
(
1− 1√
2
)
≈ .29. Hence if F (ωv) ≤ .29, then 12(1−F (ωv)) ≤ 1−F (ωv) < p
and D(p, F (ωv)) > 0 always holds. This proves part (a.i). However, if F (ωv) > .29,
then if 1 − F (ωv) < p < p¯, we have D(p, F (ωv)) < 0 but if 1 − F (ωv) < p¯ < p, then
D(p, F (ωv)) > 0. This proves part (a.ii) of the lemma.
Now consider p < 1− F (ωv). In this case the solution of optimization problem (∗) is
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given by α∗ and β∗ such that F (α∗) = 0 and F (β∗) = F (ωv)
1−p . Putting α
∗ and β∗ in (4.2)
we have the ex-ante payoff of the media corresponding to the most influential message
strategy under Class2 to be
E[um]
∗
2 =
(
F (ωv)
1− p
)
(1− p)(τm − ζm) + F (ωv)(τm − ζm)(2p− 1) + ζm (4.6)
From (4.1) and (4.6) we have
E[um]
∗
2 − E[um]∗1 =
F (ωv)(τm − ζm)(2p2 − 1)
p
Since F (ωv) > 0, τm > ζm, it follows that E[um]
∗
2 is lesser (greater) than E[um]
∗
1 if p
is lesser (greater) than 1√
2
. This proves parts (b.i) and (b.ii) of the lemma and concludes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3 :
When 1/2 < p < F (ωv), from Lemma 3 case (a.ii) and Lemma 4 case (a) it follows that
under no media or with media the ex-ante welfare of the DM is
U(∅, v) = F (ωv)τ + (1− F (ωv))ζ
This proves part (a.i) of the proposition.
When 1/2 < F (ωv) < p, then from Lemma 3 part (a.i) it follows that
U(∅, v) = pτ + (1− p)ζ (4.7)
In the presence of the media it follows from Lemma 4 part (b) that in the most influential
informative equilibrium, the ex-ante welfare of the DM is
U(mk, v) = τ + F (ωv)(τ − ζ)
(
p− 1
p
)
(4.8)
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From (4.7) and (4.8) it follows that U(mk, v)− U(∅, v) > 0 iff
(p− 1)(F (ωv)− p) > 0 (4.9)
which always holds since F (ωv) < p < 1. This proves part (a.ii) of the proposition.
Now consider F (ωv) < 1/2.
When p > 1− F (ωv), then from Lemma 3 part (b.i) it follows that in the absence of the
media, the ex-ante voter welfare is given by (4.7). Now consider presence of the media.
In the instances when the optimal Class 1 message is delivered, the ex-ante welfare of
the voter is given by (4.8). Since F (ωv) < 1/2 < p < 1, therefore (4.9) always holds,
and hence U(mk, v) − U(∅, v) > 0 in this case. In the instances when optimal Class 2
message is provided by the media, it is easy to check that U(mk, v)− U(∅, v) > 0, since
in the absence of the media the DM always votes according to his private signal, while in
its presence he votes according to his signal for ω ∈ [ω∗, 1], while being guaranteed of his
most preferred alternative X when ω ∈ [0, ω∗). This proves part (b.i) of the proposition.
Suppose p < 1−F (ωv), then from Lemma 3 part (b.i) it follows that the ex-ante welfare
of the DM is given by
U(∅, v) = F (ωv)ζ + (1− F (ωv))τ (4.10)
In the presence of a media it follows from Lemma 5 part (b.i) that if p < 1√
2
, then in
the most influential informative equilibrium, the ex-ante welfare of the DM is given by
equation (4.8). From (4.8) and (4.10) we have U(mk, v) > U(∅, v) iff F (ωv)(τ − ζ)(2p−
1) > 0, which always holds since F (ωv) > 0, τ > ζ and p > 1/2. This proves the first
case of part (b.ii) the proposition.
Suppose p < 1−F (ωv), and p > 1√2 , then from Lemma 5 part (b.ii) it follows that under
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media the welfare of the DM is
U(mk, v) =
(
F (ωv)
1− p
)
(pτ + (1− p)ζ) +
(
1− F (ωv)
1− p
)
τ
= F (ωv)ζ + (1− F (ωv))τ
By comparing above expression with (4.10) we find that U(∅, v) = U(mk, v), and hence
this proves the second case of part (b.ii) of the proposition, thereby completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6 :
Consider the case where a separating voting strategy is followed by all j ∈ I, j 6= i.
Let E(n − 1, k) be the event that out of n − 1 private signals, exactly k equal X, k =
0, · · · , n − 1. Voter i is pivotal if and only if k = n−1
2
. We shall use the shorthand
Pivi = E
(
n− 1, n−1
2
)
. Let
γ˜si = P[ω ≤ ωv|Pivi, si] =
A
B
where
A = P[Pivi, si|ω ≤ ωv]P[ω ≤ ωv]
= P[Pivi|ω ≤ ωv]P[si|ω ≤ ωv]P[ω ≤ ωv]
and
B = P[Pivi, si|ω ≤ ωv]P[ω ≤ ωv] + P[Pivi, si|ωv < ω]P[ωv < ω]
= P[Pivi|ω ≤ ωv]P[si|ω ≤ ωv]P[ω ≤ ωv] + P[Pivi|ωv < ω]P[si|ωv < ω]P[ωv < ω]
Note that
P[Pivi|ω ≤ ωv] = P[Pivi|ω > ωv] =
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2 (1− p)n−12
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Given the prior density f(ω) with the associated distribution F (ω),
γ˜X =
pF (ωv)
pF (ωv) + (1− p)(1− F (ωv))
and
γ˜Y =
(1− p)F (ωv)
(1− p)F (ωv) + p(1− F (ωv)) .
Note that under the simple majoritarian aggregation rule, γ˜si = γsi , where γsi = P[ω ≤
ωv|si] is defined in the proof of Lemma 3. Fix any symmetric voting strategy profile v−i.
Define
UX(∅, v−i, si) =
n−1∑
k=0
[
P[E(n− 1, k)|si]
(∫
ω∈Ω
u(δ(v−i, vi = X), w)f(ω|s)dω
)]
,
and
UY (∅, v−i, si) =
n−1∑
k=0
[
P[E(n− 1, k)|si]
(∫
ω∈Ω
u(δ(v−i, vi = Y ), w)f(ω|s)dω
)]
.
At this voting strategy profile v−i, voter i votes for X if and only if UX(∅, v−i, si) >
UY (∅, v−i, si). This reduces to
(2γ˜si − 1)τ > (2γ˜si − 1)ζ.
Since τ > ζ, the above inequality holds if and only if (2γ˜si − 1) > 0, which implies
γ˜si > 1/2.
Hence for a separating strategy profile v where vi(∅, X) = X and vi(∅, Y ) = Y for
any i ∈ I to hold in equilibrium, both the conditions γ˜X > 1/2 and γ˜Y < 1/2 need to be
satisfied.
Now consider the scenario where either of the condition γ˜X > 1/2 and γ˜Y < 1/2 is vi-
olated, in which case it follows that a separating voting strategy cannot be sustained
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in a symmetric equilibrium. In this case we consider other possible symmetric equi-
libria which are (i) vi = X for each si ∈ S for all i ∈ I or (ii) vi = Y for each
si ∈ S for all i ∈ I. Note that if for all j ∈ I, j 6= i, the voting strategy vj = X
for each sj ∈ S is followed, then voter i is never pivotal. Furthermore, for this case
Pr(w < wv|v−i, si) = Pr(w < wv|si). In an informative equilibrium, since the preference
of the voter is X  Y if ω ≤ ωv and Y  X if ω > ωv, upon receiving a private signal
si = X the voter i votes vi = X if γX > 1/2 and vi = Y if γX < 1/2. Similarly, upon
receiving a private signal si = Y the voter i votes vi = X if γY > 1/2 and vi = Y if
γY < 1/2. These two observations along with the fact that γ˜si = γsi completes the proof.
We now state and prove the following Claim:
Claim 3. Let J(n, p) =
∑n
j=n+1
2
(
n
j
)
(p)j(1− p)n−j. Then J(n, p) is increasing in n.
Proof of Claim 3 :
Following Proposition 1 in Karotkin and Paroush (2003), we may express
J(n+ 2, p)− J(n, p) =
(
n
n−1
2
)
p
n−1
2 (1− p)n−n−12 p2
(
p
1− p
)(
1− p
p
−
(
1− p
p
)2)
=
(
n
n−1
2
)
p
n+5
2 (1− p)n−12
(
1− p
p
−
(
1− p
p
)2)
Hence the sufficient condition for J(n + 2, p) − J(n, p) > 0 is 1−p
p
− (1−p
p
)2 > 0, which
holds in our model since p ∈ (1/2, 1). This proves the claim.
Proof of Lemma 7 :
Consider 1/2 < p < F (ωv). The result follows directly from Lemma 3 case (a.ii) and
Lemma 6.
Let 1/2 < F (ωv) < p. Note that P[ω < ωv|si,mk, P ivi] = P[ω < ωv|si,mk] for all k.
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Consider the Class 1 and Class 2 message strategies defined in the proof of Lemma 4. It
follows from the proof of Lemma 4 that the optimum value of ex-ante payoff of the media
under Class 1 message strategies is given by (4.1). The ex-ante payoff of the media under
equilibria in Class 2 is given by
E[um]2 =
∫ α
0
τmf(ω)dω +
∫ ωv
α
(J(n, p)τm + (1− J(n, p))ζm)f(ω)dω+∫ β
ωv
((1− J(n, p))τm + J(n, p)ζm)f(ω)dω +
∫ 1
β
ζmf(ω)dω
where J(n, p) =
∑n
j=n+1
2
(
n
j
)
(p)j(1− p)n−j, which is simplified as
E[um]2 = (F (α)+F (β))(1−J(n, p))(τm−ζm)+F (ωv)(1−2J(n, p))(ζm−τm)+ζm (4.11)
Since τm > ζm and 0 < J(n, p) < 1, this implies that in order to maximize the ex-ante
payoff of the media (F (α) + F (β)) needs to be maximized subject to: (i) p
1−p(F (ωv) −
F (α)) + F (ωv) > F (β), (ii)
1−p
p
(F (ωv)− F (α)) + F (ωv) < F (β), (iii) 0 ≤ F (α) < F (ωv),
and (iv) F (ωv) < F (β) ≤ 1. We denote this optimization problem as (∗∗). Note that
the optimization problems (∗∗) and (∗), the latter defined in the proof of Lemma 4 are
identical. Hence analogous to the proof of Lemma 4 it follows that the optimum value of
β is given by the relation F (β∗∗) = 1, which implies β∗∗ = 1, and the optimal α∗∗ must
satisfy the condition F (α∗∗) = F (ωv)
p
− 1−p
p
. Replacing the optimum values of α∗∗ and β∗∗
in (4.11), we have the maximum ex-ante payoff of the media under equilibria belonging
to Class 2 to be
E[um]
∗∗
2 =
(
F (ωv)
p
− 1− p
p
+ 1
)
(1−J(n, p))(τm−ζm)+F (ωv)(1−2J(n, p))(ζm−τm)+ζm
(4.12)
After having described the equilibria which corresponds to the highest ex-ante payoff
of the media in Class 1 and Class 2, we compare the ex-ante payoff of the media between
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these two equilibria. From (4.1) and (4.12) it follows that
E[um]
∗∗
2 − E[um]∗∗1 =
V
p
(4.13)
where V = (τm − ζm)(J(n, p)(F (ωv)− 1)(2p− 1) + p(2− F (ωv))− 1).
We now show that E[um]
∗∗
2 − E[um]∗∗1 < 0 holds for all n ≥ 3, which is proved if the
following (4.14) can be shown to hold for all n ≥ 3
J(n, p)(F (ωv)− 1)(2p− 1) + p(2− F (ωv))− 1 < 0 (4.14)
Let K(n, p, F (ωv)) = J(n, p)(F (ωv) − 1)(2p − 1) + p(2 − F (ωv)) − 1. Note that since
F (ωv) < 1 and p > 1/2, we have
∂K(n,p,F (ωv))
∂J(n,p)
< 0. From Claim 3 it follows that if (4.14)
can be shown to hold for n = 3, it will hold for n > 3. Note that when n = 3, we have
J(3, p) = 3p2(1− p) + p3. Hence we have
K(3, p, F (ωv)) = 4p
4(1− F (wp)) + 8p3(F (ωv)− 1) + 3p2(1− F (wp)) + p(2− F (ωv))− 1
Note that ∂K(3,p,F (ωv))
∂F (ωv)
= −p(4p3−8p2 +3p+1). Also note that ∂K(3,p,F (ωv))
∂F (ωv)
|p=1/2 = −1/2,
∂K(3,p,F (ωv))
∂F (ωv)
|p=1 = 0, and ∂2K(3,p,F (ωv))∂p2 = 0 has no solution in p ∈ (1/2, 1). Hence
∂K(3,p,F (ωv))
∂F (ωv)
< 0 for all p ∈ (1/2, 1). Therefore the maximum value of K(3, p, F (ωv))
is attained at K(3, p, 1/2) = 2p4 − 4p3 + 3p2
2
+ 3p
2
− 1. Now K(3, p, 1/2)|p=1/2 = −14 ,
K(3, p, 1/2)|p=1 = 0, and ∂K(3,p,1/2)∂p = 0 has no solution in p ∈ (1/2, 1). HenceK(3, p, F (ωv)) <
0 for all p ∈ (1/2, 1), F (ωv) ∈ (1/2, 1).
We now argue that the optimum equilibrium obtained under Class 1 corresponds to the
maximum ex-ante payoff of the media among all possible equilibria. Note that under
Class 1 equilibria, E[um] is increasing in wˆ, and the maximum value of wˆ under Class
1 is when the condition F (wˆ) = F (ωv)
p
is satisfied. When F (wˆ) > F (ωv)
p
then γˆY < 1/2
and we revert to equilibria under Class 2 with α = 0, β = wˆ which has been proved to
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have a lower expected payoff for the media than the optimum Class 1 equilibrium. This
concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 8 : Since P[ω < ωv|si,mk, P ivi] = P[ω < ωv|si,mk] for all k, it follows
from the proof of Lemma 4 that the optimum value of ex-ante payoff of the media, denoted
by E[um]
∗∗
1 under Class 1 message strategies (as defined in the proof of Lemma 4) is given
by (4.1). Consider Class 2 message strategies as defined in the proof of Lemma 4. From
the proof of Lemma 7 it follows that the message strategy which maximizes the ex-ante
payoff of the speaker is obtained by solving the optimization problem (∗∗).
Now consider F (ωv) < 1/2, and p > 1− F (ωv), which implies 1 < F (ωv)1−p . In this case the
solution of (∗∗) is given by (α∗∗, β∗∗) such that F (β∗∗) = 1 and F (α∗∗) = F (ωv)
p
− 1−p
p
.
Replacing the optimum values of α∗∗ and β∗∗ in (4.11), we have the maximum ex-ante
payoff of the media under Class 2 message strategies to be given by (4.12). Parts (a.i)
and (a.ii) of this lemma therefore follows from (4.14).
Now consider F (ωv) < 1/2, and p < 1 − F (ωv), which implies F (ωv)1−p < 1. In this case
the solution of (∗∗) is given by (α∗∗,β∗∗) such that F (α∗∗) = 0, and F (β∗∗) = F (ωv)
1−p .
Replacing the optimum values of α∗∗ and β∗∗ in (4.11) , we have the maximum ex-ante
payoff of the media under equilibria belonging to Class 2 to be
E[um]
∗∗
2 = (
F (ωv)
1− p )(1− J(n, p))(τm − ζm) + F (ωv)(1− 2J(n, p))(ζm − τm) + ζm (4.15)
From (4.1) and (4.15) it follows that
E[um]
∗∗
1 − E[um]∗∗2 =
D
p(1− p)
where D(ωv, n, p) = F (ωv)(τm − ζm)(J(n, p)p(2p− 1)− p2 − p+ 1).
Let η(n, p) = J(n, p)p(2p−1)−p2−p+1. Since p > 1/2, therefore η(n, p) is increasing
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in J(n, p), which by Claim 3 is increasing in n. Note that η(5, 1/2) = 1/4, η(5, 1) = 0, and
η(5, p) = 0 does not have a solution in p ∈ (1/2, 1). Hence η(5, p) > 0 for all p ∈ (1/2, 1),
which implies D(ωv, 5, p) > 0 for all p ∈ (1/2, 1). Since D(ωv, 5, p) is increasing in n, this
proves part (b.i) of the lemma.
To prove part (b.ii), consider n = 3. Note that η(3, 1/2) = 1/4, η(3, 1) = 0, and
η(3, p) = 0 has a unique solution in p ∈ (1/2, 1) given by p′ = (27−3
√
78)
1
3
6
+ (3
√
78+27)
1
3
6
≈ .76.
This shows that for all p ∈ (1/2, p′), we have D(ωv, 3, p) > 0 while for all p ∈ (p′, 1), we
have D(ωv, 3, p) < 0. This proves part (b.ii) of the lemma and completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4 :
Consider 1/2 < p < F (ωv). It follows from Lemma 3 part (a.ii), Lemma 6 and Lemma
7 that in equilibrium, for both the cases when the media is absent or present, the voter
welfare is given by
U(∅, v) = U(Ω, v) =
∫ ωv
0
τf(ω)dω +
∫ 1
ωv
ζf(ω)dω = F (ωv)τ + (1− F (ωv))ζ
This proves part (a) of the proposition.
Consider 1/2 < F (ωv) < p. From Lemma 3 part (a.i) and Lemma 6 it follows that in
the absence of a media the ex-ante voter welfare is given by
U(∅, v) = J(n, p)τ + (1− J(n, p))ζ,
where
J(n, p) =
n∑
j=n+1
2
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j.
From Lemma 7 it follows that in the presence of a media, the most influential equilibrium
(mk, v) results in the ex-ante voter welfare given by
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U(mk, v) = τF (ωv) + ζ(
F (ωv)
p
− F (ωv)) + τ(1− F (ωv)
p
).
Hence U(∅, v) > U(mk, v) if
(τ − ζ)(J(n, p)p− p(F (ωv) + 1) + F (ωv))
p
> 0,
which holds if the following condition (4.16) is satisfied.
F (ωv) >
p
1− p(1− J(n, p)) = G(n, p). (4.16)
We now state and prove two additional claims:
Claim 4. For all p below (1/2)(1 + 2
n+1
), any critical point of G(n, p) is a strict local
maximum and any critical point above is a strict local minimum.
Proof of Claim 4 : Let Ln,j (p) ≡
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j. Also let
Fn,r (p) ≡
r∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j =
r∑
j=0
Ln,j (p) .
Since n is an odd integer, and let m be an even integer given by m = n+1
2
. We may
express
G (n, p) ≡ p
(1− p)Fn,m−1 (p)
At p = 0 we replace this definition by its limiting value G (n, 0) = 0. We also have
G (n, 1) = 0. Note that
d
dp
Ln,j (p) = n (Ln−1,j−1 − Ln−1,j) (4.17)
So
d
dp
Fn,m−1 (p) =
m−1∑
j=0
n (Ln−1,j−1 − Ln−1,j) = −nLn−1,m−1.
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Hence we have
d
dp
G (n, p) =
1
(1− p)2Fn,m−1 (p)−
np
(1− p)Ln−1,m−1 (4.18)
Differentiating both sides of (4.18) again with respect to p we have
d2
dp2
G (n, p) =
2
(1− p)3Fn,m−1 (p)−
2n
(1− p)2Ln−1,m−1 − n
(
1
(1− p) − 1
)
L′n−1,m−1
From (4.17) we have
L′n−1,m−1 = (n− 1) (Ln−2,m−2 − Ln−2,m−1) ,
and hence
d2
dp2
G(n, p) =
2
(1− p)3Fn,m−1 (p)−
2n
(1− p)2Ln−1,m−1−n (n− 1)
p
(1− p) (Ln−2,m−2 − Ln−2,m−1)
(4.19)
By the Weierstrass theorem, G(n, p) has at least one global maximum over [0, 1].
We now require G′ (n, p∗) = 0, so from (4.18) we have
1
(1− p∗)2F
∗
n,m−1 −
np∗
(1− p∗)L
∗
n−1,m−1 = 0
where F ∗n,m−1 ≡ Fn,m−1 (p∗) etc.
For maximization we require G′′ (n, p∗) ≤ 0, so from (4.19) we have
2
(1− p∗)3F
∗
n,m−1 −
2n
(1− p∗)2L
∗
n−1,m−1 − n (n− 1)
p∗
(1− p∗)
(
L∗n−2,m−2 − L∗n−2,m−1
) ≤ 0
Using the first-order condition, the second order condition is equivalent to
−2n(1− p∗)L∗n−1,m−1 − n (n− 1) p∗(1− p∗)
(
L∗n−2,m−2 − L∗n−2,m−1
) ≤ 0,
which is further simplified as,
2 + (n− 1) p∗
(
m− 1
n− 1
1
p∗
− n−m
n− 1
1
(1− p∗)
)
≥ 0
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⇔ m+ 1 ≥ (n+ 1) p∗.
Using n = 2m− 1 we can write the above inequality as p∗ ≤ m+1
2m
, which implies that
p∗ ≤ (1/2)
(
1 +
1
m
)
. (4.20)
Thus it follows from (4.20) that any critical point below (1/2)
(
1 + 1
m
)
is a strict local
maximum and any critical point above is a strict local minimum. Putting m = n+1
2
proves
the claim.
Claim 5. dG(n,p)
dp
|p=1/2 < 0 for all n ≥ 7.
Proof of Claim 5 : Note that
dG(n, p)
dp
=
1
(1− p)2 −
n∑
j=n+1
2
(
n
j
)
(p)j(1− p)n−j
[
j + 1
1− p −
(
p
(1− p)2
)
(n− j − 1)
]
Hence
dG(n, p)
dp
|p=1/2 = 4
1− (1
2
)n+1 n∑
j=n+1
2
(
n
j
)
(2j + 2− n)

We want to establish that for n ≥ 7, ∂G(n,p)
∂p
|p=1/2 < 0 which implies
2n+1 <
n∑
j=n+1
2
(
n
j
)
(2j + 2− n) (4.21)
Note that
∑n
j=0
(
n
j
)
= 2n, and since n is odd, we also have
n∑
j=n+1
2
(
n
j
)
= (1/2)
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
.
Using these, we may express (4.21) as
2n <
n∑
j=n+1
2
(
n
j
)
(2j − n) (4.22)
Let k = n−1
2
. We may express (4.22) as
2
[(
2k + 1
k + 1
)
+
(
2k + 1
k + 2
)
+ ..+ 1
]
<
(
2k + 1
k + 1
)
+ 3
(
2k + 1
k + 2
)
+ 5
(
2k + 1
k + 3
)
+ ..+ (2k+ 1)
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which holds if
2
[(
2k + 1
k + 1
)
+
(
2k + 1
k + 2
)
+
(
2k + 1
k + 3
)]
<
(
2k + 1
k + 1
)
+ 3
(
2k + 1
k + 2
)
+ 5
(
2k + 1
k + 3
)
Using the relation (
n
j + 1
)
=
(
n
j
)
n− j
j + 1
,
the above inequality reduces to
k
k + 2
+
3k(k − 1)
(k + 2)(k + 3)
> 1
Consider
g(k) =
k
k + 2
+
3k(k − 1)
(k + 2)(k + 3)
− 1.
Note that for k > 0, the equation g(k) = 0 has a unique solution at k =
√
97
6
+ 5
6
< 3,
and dg(k)
dk
|
k=
√
97
6
+ 5
6
> 0. Hence g(k) > 0 for all k ≥ 3, which implies (4.22) is satisfied for
all n ≥ 7. This proves Claim 5.
Now, note that when p = 1/2, then J(n, 1/2) = 1/2 for all n and hence G(n, 1/2) =
1/2. From Claim 4 we know that for the function G(n, p) any critical point when p is
below (1/2)(1+ 2
n+1
) must correspond to a strict local maximum and therefore cannot be
a local minimum. But from Claim 5 we know that when n ≥ 7, then dG(n,p)
dp
|p=1/2 < 0, and
hence from Claim 4 it follows that there does not exist any p ∈ (1/2, (1/2)(1+ 2
n+1
)) such
that G(n, p) ≥ 1/2. From Claim 4 it follows that when n ≥ 7, any critical value of G(n, p)
for p above (1/2)(1 + 2
n+1
) must correspond to a strict local minimum. Since G(n, 1) = 0,
it must therefore be that G(n, p) < 1/2 when p ∈ [(1/2)(1 + 2
n+1
), 1). Therefore we have
shown that when n ≥ 7, G(n, p) < 1/2 for all p ∈ (1/2, 1).
Since F (ωv) ∈ (1/2, 1), it follows that when n ≥ 7, the condition F (ωv) > G(n, p)
holds for all p ∈ (1/2, 1) and therefore from inequality (4.16) we have U(∅, v) > U(mk, v).
This proves part (b.i) of the proposition.
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To prove part (b.ii), consider the case when n ∈ {3, 5}.
Let n = 3. Note that G(3, 1/2) = 1/2, dG(3,p)
dp
|p=1/2 = 1/2 > 0, and that in the range
p ∈ (1/2, 1), the equation dG(3,p)
dp
= −6p2 + 2p + 1 = 0 yields a unique solution given by
p∗3 =
√
7
6
+ 1
6
> 1/2. Also note that d
2G(3,p)
dp2
= −12p + 2 < 0 for all p ∈ (1/2, 1). Hence
the maximum value of G(3, p) is G(3, p∗3) =
7
√
7
54
+ 5
27
= k∗(3) which is greater than 1/2
and less than 1. Therefore it follows from (4.16) that when F (ωv) > k
∗(3), then ex-ante
voter welfare is always higher in the absence of a media. This proves part (b.ii.1) of the
proposition for n = 3.
Suppose 1/2 < F (ωv) < k
∗(3). Since d
2G(3,p)
dp2
< 0 for all p ∈ [1/2, 1], it follows
that there exists F (ωv) < pˆ(3) < p
∗
3 such that for all p ∈ (F (ωv), pˆ(3)), the inequality
G(3, p) < F (ωv) holds while for all p ∈ (pˆ(3), p∗3), the inequality G(3, p) > F (ωv) holds.
Since G(3, p∗3) > 1/2 and G(3, 1) = 0 it follows that there exists p
∗
3 < p˜(3) such that
for all p ∈ [p∗3, p˜(3)), the inequality G(3, p) > F (ωv) holds while for all p ∈ (p˜(3), 1), the
inequality G(3, p) < F (ωv) holds. This proves part (b.ii.2) of the proposition for n = 3.
Now consider n = 5. Note that G(5, 1/2) = 1/2, dG(5,p)
dp
|p=1/2 = 18 > 0, and that in
the range p ∈ (1/2, 1), the equation dG(5,p)
dp
= 30p4 − 36p3 + 3p2 + 2p + 1 = 0 yields a
unique solution given by p∗5 =
(548−30√290) 13
30
+ (30
√
290+548)
1
3
30
+ 1
15
. Note that 1/2 < p∗5 < p
∗
3
and 1/2 < G(5, p∗5) < G(3, p
∗
3) < 1. Let G(5, p
∗
5) = k
∗(5). When F (ωv) > k∗(5), it follows
from inequality (4.16) that ex-ante voter welfare is higher in the absence of a media.
This proves part (b.ii.1) of the proposition for n = 5. Suppose 1/2 < F (ωv) < k
∗(5).
Since d
2G(5,p)
dp2
|p=1/2 < 0, d
2G(5,p)
dp2
|p=p∗5 < 0, and the equation d
2G(5,p)
dp2
= 0 is not solved for
p ∈ [1/2, p∗5], it follows that d
2G(5,p)
dp2
< 0 for all p ∈ [1/2, p∗5]. This proves the existence of
pˆ(5). Since G(5, p∗5) > 1/2 and G(5, 1) = 0, the existence of p˜(5) is proved. This proves
part (b.ii.2) of the proposition for n = 5. This concludes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 5 :
Let 1 − p < F (ωv). From Lemma 3 part (b.i) and Lemma 6 it follows that in this case
the ex-ante welfare of the voter in the absence of the media is given by
U(∅, v) = J(n, p)τ + (1− J(n, p))ζ (4.23)
Now consider the case where the media is present. Suppose (∗) holds. From Lemma 8
part (a.i), the ex-ante welfare of the voter in this case is given by
U(mk, v) = τF (ωv) + ζ(
F (ωv)
p
− F (ωv)) + τ(1− F (ωv)
p
) (4.24)
It follows that in this case U(∅, v) > U(mk, v) if (4.16) holds.
Suppose (∗) is always violated, in which case by Lemma 8 part (a.ii) it follows that the
ex-ante welfare of the voter is given by
U(mk, v) = τ(
F (ωv)
p
− 1− p
p
) + (1− (F (ωv)
p
− 1− p
p
))(J(n, p)τ + (1− J(n, p))ζ) .
Since p > 1−F (ωv), it follows that 0 < F (ωv)p − 1−pp < 1 and since τ > ζ, 0 < J(n, p) < 1
it follows that for this case U(mk, v) > U(∅, v). This proves Part (a) of the proposition.
Now consider F (ωv) < 1− p. It follows from Lemma 3 part (b.ii) and Lemma 6 that in
this case the ex-ante welfare of the voter in the absence of a speaker is given by
U(∅, v) =
∫ ωv
0
ζf(ω)dω +
∫ 1
ωv
τf(ω)dω = F (ωv)ζ + (1− F (ωv))τ
From Lemma 8 part (b.i) it follows that in the presence of the media, when n ≥ 5, the
ex-ante welfare of the voter is given by (4.24). Hence it follows that U(mk, v) > U(∅, v)
if
(τ − ζ)(2F (ωv)− F (ωv)
p
)) > 0 (4.25)
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which always holds for all 1/2 < p < 1. Hence in this case the presence of the media leads
to higher voter welfare. When n = 3, and p ∈ (1/2, p′) where p′ is defined in Lemma 8
part (b.ii), it is analogously shown that (4.25) holds and presence of the media leads to
higher voter welfare. When n = 3, and p ∈ (p′, 1), from Lemma 8 part (b.ii) it follows
that under media presence, the ex-ante voter welfare is given by
U(mk, v) =
(
F (ωv)
1− p
)
(J(n, p)τ + (1− J(n, p))ζ) +
(
1− F (ωv)
1− p
)
τ .
Hence it follows that U(mk, v) > U(∅, v) if
F (ωv)(τ − ζ)(J(n, p)− p)
1− p > 0
which always holds since F (ωv) > 0, τ > ζ and 1/2 < p < J(n, p). Hence in this case
the presence of media leads to higher ex-ante voter welfare. This proves part (b) of the
proposition and concludes the proof.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In the model described in Chapter 3, we show that to obtain informative voting as an
equilibrium outcome, it is necessary and sufficient to have a unanimous committee with
random transparency when the common prior is not too biased towards a particular alter-
native. This shows that the simple majority rule can never elicit informative voting from
professional experts. We then show that even if there exist unanimous committees with
intermediate probabilities of transparency that achieve informative voting, such commit-
tees are never welfare maximising, that is, informative voting and welfare maximisation
are two mutually exclusive properties of professional committees. In particular it turns
out that for committees following the unanimity voting rule there exists a critical value
of the common prior such that if the prior falls below that level, full transparency is best
for the society, while full secrecy is optimal for priors above that level. We then show
that if the common prior is not too biased, a transparent committee using the majority
rule is socially better than any committee using the unanimity rule.
These results bring out an interesting conclusion that while only randomness in trans-
parency can achieve truthful voting, such committees are not socially optimal. These
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findings have interesting implications regarding the recent debate on the effect that in-
dependent whistle-blowing agencies (like the Wikileaks) may have on professional expert
committees. It suggests that without such exogenous, but moderate, leakage threats
we cannot expect professional experts to advise informatively; however, since these ex-
perts are possibly heterogeneous in their talent levels, such leakage which elicits perfect
informativeness from all the experts may not be welfare enhancing.
In the model described in Chapter 4, we study information transmission where an
informed media outlet, whose interests are partially in conflict with a finite group of
rational voters, transmits news items in an attempt to manipulate democratic decisions.
In a common interest two-alternative voting model, where due to reputation concerns
the media can credibly commit to send any news reliably, it is shown that even when
voters welcome the news when it arrives, the media’s presence can hurt their ex-ante
welfare in both large and small constituencies. This is because of the following: due to
the credibility of the media, the voters excessively rely on the informative content of the
transmitted news to the point that their private signals have no bearing on their voting
behaviour. Hence in this case the welfare is invariant to the number of voters, since their
signals are not reflected in the decision. On the other hand, in the absence of the media
outlet, the voters end up voting in accordance to their private signals. In this case the
probability that the social decision will be in accordance to the voters’ preference rises
as the number of voters rise, since the incidences of informative signals that contribute
to the correct decision rise. Therefore for a sufficiently large number of voters, the voter
welfare in the absence of the media is higher than when credible news is received from it.
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